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Stacy Banwell
The Securitisation of Wartime Rape and Sexual Violence
The question that appears in the title of this book is taken from the following 
statement: ‘it is perhaps more dangerous to be a woman than a soldier in armed 
conflict’. It was made by Major General Patrick Cammaert in a video clip on 
the Stop Rape Now: UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict website (Stop 
Rape Now, n.d.). He is the former United Nations force commander for the East-
ern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). I will return to this statement shortly, 
for now let us review the Stop Rape Now website.
The site includes the ‘GET CROSS!’ campaign with the following caption: 
‘[t]ake a stand against the use of sexual violence as a tactic of war by adding your 
crossed arm picture to our global campaign’ (Stop Rape Now, n.d., emphasis 
added). This global campaign is visualised through an interactive map. This is 
populated with crosses where individuals have uploaded images of their crossed 
arms. Other images of individuals (including celebrities) crossing their arms flash 
across our screens. Celebrities, such as Charlize Theron and Nicole Kidman, also 
feature in the video clips included on the website. They inform us about the use of 
rape as a weapon of war against women and girls. They also encourage viewers to 
develop their knowledge further and take action.
Others have also written about the Stop Rape Now website (Grey & Shepherd, 
2012; Meger, 2016b). Departing from this work, I draw on Visual Criminology 
to unpack this campaign. Briefly, and in simple terms (a more detailed review is 
provided in Chapter 5), Visual Criminology is interested in the visual representa-
tions of crime and punishment. It unpacks the visuality of hierarchical classifica-
tions such as race, class, gender and sexuality as they relate to these phenomena 
(Brown, 2014; Brown & Carrabine, 2017; Henne & Shah, 2016). Beyond this, 
Visual Criminology is interested in human lived experiences and in interrogating 
the ethical and moral consequences of looking at images (Brown, 2017; Brown & 
Carrabine, 2017; Gies, 2017). Of relevance for my discussion here is the argument 
that visuality need not only be visual, it also includes narratives which seek to reify 
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and reproduce State power (Schept, 2016). In my analysis of this campaign, Stop 
Rape Now, a United Nations international organisation (comprising of 193 mem-
ber States) is understood as a form of State power. And finally, on the subject of 
how power is conveyed through images, Hayward (2010, p. 5 as cited in Henne 
& Shah, 2016, p. 5) argues that images ‘can be used as both a tool of control and 
resistance’. These ideas are teased out below.
Notwithstanding the literal display of resistance represented by the crossed 
arms; symbolising condemnation of the use of rape as a weapon of war, global 
advocacy such as the GET CROSS! campaign – which focuses narrowly on war-
time rape against women and girls – reproduces ‘master narratives’ which are then 
‘presented as natural, universal, true, and inevitable’ (Bal, 2003, p. 22 as cited by 
Henne & Shah, 2016, p. 18). I believe as a tool of control, the visuality of this 
campaign (the images of the crossed arms, the captions and the video clips that 
accompany them) – that is, the narrative it produces, results in the securitisation 
and fetishisation of wartime rape and sexual violence.
Securitisation, to paraphrase Hirschauer (2014, pp. 5–6), involves a process 
of applying a specific existential threat component to a social problem – in this 
instance, rape and sexual violence. The State, international bodies, non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs) and the media (referred to as securitisation actors) 
decide which groups are vulnerable to this security threat. Funding agencies, 
international institutions and donors are then persuaded, through discursive 
representations (by policymakers, activists and the news media), that exceptional 
measures are required to maintain peace and security.
Allied to securitisation is the fetishisation of wartime rape and sexual vio-
lence. This involves selective and sensationalist accounts of  rape and sexual 
violence – particularly against women and girls – at the expense of  other types 
of  conflict violence. Here, rape and sexual violence are identified as the most 
dangerous forms of conflict violence (Meger, 2016a, 2016b). Not only does this 
obscure the complexity of  wartime rape and sexual violence, and indeed the con-
flicts within which they occur, it also marginalises other types of  violence taking 
place within and beyond conflict zones (Crawford, Green, & Parkinson, 2014). 
It also excludes the experiences of  men and boys. This impedes wider efforts to 
address and combat the violence(s) of  war and armed conflict (Baaz & Stern, 
2013; Meger, 2016a, 2016b; Mertens & Pardy, 2017). Indeed, the statement made 
by General Patrick Cammaert is a perfect illustration of this gendered securiti-
sation agenda: a policy narrative that prioritises the needs and experiences of 
women and girls while obscuring those of  men and boys, thereby confirming the 
belief  that it is they who are more at risk during war and armed conflict.1
1My criticism of this security paradigm should not be read as though I am suggest-
ing that wartime rape and sexual violence are not worthy of attention (or recourses 
for that matter), nor do I want to diminish the impact these crimes have on victims 
and/or survivors. Rather, my goal is to draw attention to the implications of dispro-
portionately focusing on rape and sexual violence at the expense of other types of 
conflict violence. At this point I would also like to acknowledge that the case studies 
and types of violence discussed in this book are based upon the experiences of those 
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Let us return to the visuality of the Stop Rape Now campaign and its role in 
reproducing hegemonic (read as western) discourses around violence and victimi-
sation during conflict. Here, I will focus on the two video clips that are included 
on the website. In the first, we hear the story of a nameless victim who has been 
raped. We learn through Charlize Theron that the victim is female. She states: 
‘she could be your mother, your sister, your daughter’. The second video clip 
provides information regarding the prevalence and nature of wartime rape com-
mitted against women and girls. The brutal details of these acts are shared. While 
reference is made to the use of rape during the genocide in the former Yugoslavia, 
all other examples focus narrowly on wartime rape in Africa, omitting numerous 
other cases where rape has been used as part of warfare. In all of the examples, 
the victims are female.
I identify three elements within the visuality of this ‘master narrative’. Firstly, this 
violence happens to ‘other’ women and girls. In order for us to empathise and take 
action, the victim has to be transformed from a generic marginalised ‘other’ to ‘one 
of us’. Second, this violence happens elsewhere, specifically Africa, which evokes a 
colonial imagery ‘…of African backwardness and primitivism’ (Dunn, 2003, p. 5 as 
cited in Mertens & Pardy, 2017, p. 958). The corollary of this: a powerful western 
organisation like the UN is needed to mobilise global support in order to ‘rescue’ 
these female victims and combat this violence. And third, by only referencing female 
victimisation, this campaign engages in ‘visual essentialism’: visual representations 
that reproduce essentialist depictions of gender and crime (Bal, 2003, p. 22 as cited 
in Henne & Shah, 2016, p. 18). This brief discussion of visual representations of the 
securitisation agenda acts as a preface to a more in-depth analysis provided in Chap-
ter 4. For now, however, I want to unpack, in more detail, the implications of gender 
essentialism within existing accounts of war and armed conflict.
Gender Essentialism Within ‘Stories’ About  
War and Armed Conflict
In 2015, I was asked by the reviews editor of the Journal of Gender Studies to 
review The Underground Girls of Kabul: The Hidden Lives of Afghan Girls Dis-
guised as Boys by Jenny Nordberg. The aim of Nordberg’s book is to examine 
what it is like to be an Afghan woman after ten years of Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan: ‘America’s longest war and one of the largest foreign aid 
efforts of a generation’ (Nordberg, 2014, p. 9 as cited in Banwell, 2015a, p. 587). 
In contrast to the more visible efforts of the international community to address 
gender inequality in war-torn Afghanistan, the book reveals that Afghans are 
using more clandestine measures. In a deeply patriarchal, segregated society, 
women resort to presenting themselves, and their daughters, as men/boys. As 
I wrote in my review: these women ‘do this in the context of a nation that has a 
we might refer to as cisgender male and female - referred to throughout as boys, men, 
male(s) and girls, women, female(s). Elsewhere I have written about the experiences 
of LGBT+ individuals.  See the chapter on Sex and War in the forthcoming book Sex 
and Crime by Fanghanel, Milne, Zampini, Banwell & Fiddler.
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long history of war, conflict, invasion, nation building and outside attempts to 
effect gender parity’ (Banwell, 2015a, p. 587). Nordberg’s book follows the lives 
of five Afghan women or, bacha posh; a colloquial Dari term meaning ‘dressed 
like a boy’ (Nordberg, 2014, p. 67 as cited in Banwell, 2015a, p. 588).
In Afghanistan, having a son enhances a family’s reputation. A baby boy 
is regarded as a ‘triumph’, while a baby girl is regarded as a ‘humiliation’ or a 
‘failure’ (Banwell, 2015a, pp. 587–888). Indeed, in conflict-affected societies – 
where security and infrastructure are lacking – sons provide financial and social 
insurance. Presenting girls as boys offers girls freedom and opportunity. However, 
this is for a limited period only. Before reaching puberty, the girl must return to 
being female in order be married off  and fulfil her childbearing responsibilities. 
Nordberg (2014) is convinced that this practice is not based on gender dysphoria, 
but rather is related to being female in the then war-torn Afghanistan. This then 
leads her to ask: would these women want to be male in other contexts?
This example can be interpreted in two ways. On a cursory level, it can be read 
as confirmation of male power, freedom and dominance, as well as the (perceived 
or otherwise) privilege and protection afforded to males. A more critical reading 
would argue that it is a reductive and essentialist comment on men and masculin-
ity, specifically hegemonic masculinity. This is an interpretation that ignores the 
context specific ways in which certain men and certain masculinities are associ-
ated with power, freedom and authority. This first reading supports the gendered/
essentialist assumption hinted at in the statement by Major General Patrick Cam-
maert: women are more vulnerable than men, especially during war and armed 
conflict. To be clear, my intention is not to diminish the oppressions and discrimi-
nation Afghan women faced (and indeed face), both at the individual and struc-
tural levels. Rather, my goal is to provide a nuanced understanding of women’s 
victimisation, agency and resistance: one that challenges binary constructions of 
women as either always and exclusively victims or, as possessing complete agency 
for their actions. Both positions preclude an appreciation of the complexity and 
contradictions inherent within women’s life choices and experiences.
The statement made by Major General Patrick Cammaert has been referred to 
a number of times so far in this Introduction. Below, as part of my review of the 
disproportionality thesis, I will dissect it in more detail.
Feminist writers within the fields of International Relations and International 
Security, and War Studies more broadly, have put forward the case that women 
are disproportionately affected by war and armed conflict (Alsaba & Kapilas-
hrami, 2016; Cohn, 2013; Enloe, 2010; Lee-Koo, 2011; Raven-Roberts, 2013; 
Sjoberg, 2006a, 2006b; Sjoberg & Peet, 2011). This is also reiterated in numerous 
UN policy documents, most notably the eight UN Security Council Resolutions 
(UNSCR) that make up the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda (see the 
special issue of International Political Science Review 2016 for a detailed exami-
nation of the WPS agenda). Furthermore, writers argue that pre-existing gender 
inequalities are exacerbated within and beyond the conflict zone, thus increasing 
females’ vulnerability to various types of gender-based violence (GBV) (Baaz & 
Stern, 2013; Banwell, 2014, 2018; Davies & True, 2015; Henry, 2016; Leather-
man, 2011; Manjoo & McRaith, 2011; Meger, 2010; Ohambe, Muhigwa, & Wa 
Mamba, 2005; Sjoberg, 2011, 2013; Skjelsbæk, 2001). For example, as Cohn 
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(2013) notes in relation to gendered divisions of labour, the domestic labour of 
rural women, such as fetching water or gathering firewood – activities that involve 
them travelling to isolated areas alone – increases their risk of attack in conflict-
prone regions. Likewise, their role as primary caregivers for ‘children, the sick and 
the elderly leaves [them] more vulnerable because they are too encumbered to flee 
quickly’ (Cohn, 2013, p. 29).
Relatedly, this body of work has drawn attention to the ways in which pre-
existing types of GBV are reproduced during war and armed conflict. As noted 
by the Peace and Security (GAPS) network:
[…] sexual violence is only one of many related forms of gender-
based violence in conflict situations and should not be addressed in 
isolation…this violence is linked to gender-based violence against 
women and girls in peace time and is driven by the same under-
lying factors – namely women’s unequal status in society. (GAPS  
UK 2013, 1, emphasis in the original as cited in Kirby, 2015a, p. 509)
In all of this work, women and girls are considered the main victims of GBV 
prior to, during and in the aftermath of war and armed conflict (United Nations 
General Assembly, 1993, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
[UNHCR], 2003). This leads to the conviction that they are disproportionately 
affected by the violence(s) of war and armed conflict. However, it is worth paus-
ing to unpack the ‘taken-for-granted’ premise of the disproportionality thesis in 
more detail.2 If, as it is noted, there is a high prevalence of violence against women 
and girls in peacetime, what does it mean when we say they are disproportionately 
affected by war, disproportionate to what? Disproportionate to women’s experi-
ences of GBV during peacetime, which is already asymmetrical? On what basis do 
we make this claim and with whom, specifically, are we comparing them to/with? 
Do we make this claim because, making up the majority of civilians during war/
armed conflict; compared with the higher numbers of male combatants, their suf-
fering is disproportionate? Is it not logical then, based on their higher participation 
as fighters, to assume that males will make up the majority of casualties? In fact, 
‘…statistics suggest that young men of military age are most likely to be killed in 
war, whether as combatants or as civilians’ (Chinkin & Kaldor, 2013, p. 167 empha-
sis added). Does our preoccupation with the unequal experiences of women and 
girls during war and armed conflict diminish our ability to acknowledge the suf-
fering of male civilians and combatants? How do we interpret their victimisation? 
Finally, is there a difference between increased vulnerability to certain types of 
GBV (which can happen to both males and females) and being disproportion-
ately affected by war and armed conflict?
2In the interest of full disclosure, when I began writing about wartime rape and sexual 
violence against women and girls, I too was blinded by this focus on disproportional-
ity. However, after spending more time researching, thinking and writing about this 
topic – expanding my analysis to include the experiences of men and boys – I began to 
see how shortsighted this quantitative, comparative endeavour was/is.
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Rather than overwhelm readers with these questions, perhaps a more fruit-
ful exercise is to examine the ways in which war and armed conflict are gen-
dered. To rework (and reduce) the questions to the following: how is suffering 
gendered? how does gender inform experiences of war and armed conflict? rather 
than ask, who suffers more? As noted by Collins (2017, p. 62 emphasis added): 
‘[u]ndeniably, all civilian populations suffer during conflict [,] but war leads to 
specific gender-related harms making women’s experiences of conflict very dif-
ferent from those of men…’ For me the keyword here is different, not more (see 
also Cockburn, 2012). In this book, I trace the unique ways in which women 
and men experience war and armed conflict. Rather than pursue quantifiable, 
measurable differences, I am interested in unpacking the qualitative differences 
in how both genders experience war and armed conflict. I am more interested 
in understanding their material, lived experiences. To this end, where possible, I 
draw upon survivor testimonies3 and first-hand accounts (details are provided in 
the individual chapters).
Drawing on examples of women and men as both victims and perpetrators of 
conflict violence, the aim of this book is to answer these revised questions and 
provide a thorough analysis of the ways in which women’s experiences of war and 
armed conflict might be, and are, different to those of men. Before we continue, 
I want to outline the value of exploring war and armed conflict through a gen-
dered lens; explain why I have chosen the term violence(s) and finally, clarify the 
difference between war and armed conflict.
Examining War and Armed Conflict Through  
a Gendered Lens
In this book, various examples of the violence(s) of war and armed conflict will 
be explored through a gendered lens. What does this mean? A gendered lens 
means viewing the world through the prism of gender where gender is under-
stood relationally and hierarchically and is mapped onto the normative binary 
pair relations: male/female, masculine/feminine. The former is traditionally asso-
ciated with agency and power, while the latter is associated with passivity and 
weakness (I offer a new way of thinking about gender binaries in the Conclusion). 
According to Steans (1998, p. 5 as cited in Gentry & Sjoberg, 2015, p.11):
To look at the world through gender lenses is to focus on gender as a 
particular kind of power relation, or to trace out the ways in which 
gender is central to understanding international processes. Gender 
lenses also focus on the everyday experiences of women as women 
and highlight the consequences of their unequal social position.
3With regards to using the terms victim and/or survivor, I will use the terminology 
chosen by the individuals themselves and/or how they have been referred to in the 
literature.
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Like many other writers, Steans (1998) appears to have conflated the term 
gender with women. A gendered lens should examine the everyday experiences of 
both males and females as they relate to the construction of masculinities and 
femininities in any given context. Applying this to the context of war and armed 
conflict, and to paraphrase Gentry and Sjoberg (2015, p. 137), a gender lens 
examines how gender is present, yet invisible in the lives of those who commit 
conflict violence and in the theories used to explain such violence. Below I offer 
two examples of the ways in which gender is used to (1) justify war and armed 
conflict and (2) inform the methods used during war and armed conflict.
Gendered Justificatory Narratives
Discourses that seek to legitimise war and armed conflict rely upon idealised 
and binary constructions of  masculinity and femininity. This gender essential-
ism is crystalised through the immunity principle which draws upon notions of 
men as warriors and fighters and women as ‘beautiful souls;’ fragile beings who 
need protecting (Elshtain, 1982; Lobasz, 2008; Sjoberg, 2007; Sjoberg & Peet, 
2011). This gendered interpretation of  protection is used to encourage men to 
fight in ‘just wars’ (Sjoberg, 2011). Such gendered justificatory narratives have 
been used since the First World War (see Sjoberg, 2006a, 2006b, 2011 for other 
examples). They were also used during the Bush-administration’s global war on 
terror4 in Iraq and Afghanistan (Nayak, 2006; Shepherd, 2006; Sjoberg, 2006a; 
Stabile & Kumar, 2005; Steans, 2008). In both cases, President George W. Bush’s 
overarching narrative ‘…linked the fight against terrorism to a battle for the 
rights and dignity of  women’ (Steans, 2008, p. 160). More recently, rape and 
sexual violence against women and girls in Syria has been used to inform such 
foreign policy agendas.
Gendered War-fighting
In terms of the methods used during war, men are celebrated and rewarded if  they 
live up to the just warrior ideal and fight to protect their ‘beautiful souls’ – that 
is, their women. In both old and new wars (see below), women come to represent 
the nation, the centre of gravity (Cohn, 2013; Sjoberg & Peet, 2011). Men fight in 
wars to protect their nation. If  men fail to fulfil this role, they are emasculated and 
feminised. Unpacking the logic of the woman-as-nation thesis, Sjoberg and Peet 
(2011, pp. 174–186) argue that wars are won by eliminating women who belong 
to the enemy group (see also Alison, 2007; Heit, 2009). This expulsion commu-
nicates to enemy masculinities that they have been incapable of protecting their 
women/nation. And while Sjoberg and Peet (2011) are not suggesting that it is 
only women who are attacked during war and armed conflict, they are suggesting 
a gendered dynamic to this victimisation. In their words:
4A foreign policy campaign created in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
8   Gender and the Violence(s) of War and Armed Conflict
Belligerents attack (women) civilians for the same reason they 
claim protection for their own – because the ‘protection racket’ 
is an underlying justification for [S]tates, governments, and their 
wars. Insomuch as women are indicators, signifiers, and repro-
duces of [S]tate and nation, belligerents attack women to attack 
the essence of [S]tate and nation. (Sjoberg & Peet, 2011, p. 186 
emphasis in the original)
Why Violence(s)?
I use the term violence(s) to acknowledge the multiple, diverse and complex 
nature of the violence that takes place within and beyond the conflict zone. In 
this book, through various case studies, structural, institutional (the US mili-
tary), interpersonal and State violence(s) are explored. I also address genocidal 
and reproductive violence and structural and interpersonal violence(s) that can 
be linked to extreme droughts caused by climate change. Examining this range 
of violence (through a gendered lens) broadens the diagnostic framework. This 
extends – thereby enriching – our understanding of the nature, causes and conse-
quences of such acts. Details of these violence(s), and how they are addressed in 
the individual chapters of the book, are outlined below.
Why Use the Terms War and Armed Conflict?
Globally, there have been 252 conflicts since the Second World War (Themnér & 
Wallensteen, 2013). These are formed of ‘interstate or internationalized intra-
state conflicts’ (also referred to as civil wars) (Themnér & Wallensteen, 2013, 
p. 510). As established, historically male combatants comprise the majority of 
casualties (Leiby, 2009). However, with the changing nature of  wars and armed 
conflict – where the State often deliberately targets civilians – the majority of 
casualties are non-combatants, both male and female. Indeed, by the end of the 
1990s, approximately 90% of all casualties of  war were non-combatants (Euro-
pean Security Strategy, 2003).
New wars – as envisioned by Kaldor (1999, p. 2) – encompass the following:
[…] a blurring of the distinctions between war (usually defined as 
violence between [S]tates or organized political groups for politi-
cal motives), organized crime (violence undertaken by privately 
organized groups for private purposes, usually financial gain) and 
large-scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by  
[S]tates or politically organized groups against individuals).
While there is considerable debate about the concept of new wars – for exam-
ple see Rigterink (2013) for both a review of this literature and for an empirical 
test of Kaldor’s (1999, 2013) theory – I find that it is a useful way to categorise 
the different elements of war and armed conflict discussed in this book. Let us 
unpack this concept in more detail.
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New wars refer to ‘internal or civil wars’, as well as ‘low-intensity conflict’ 
(Kaldor, 1999, p. 2). The latter relates to guerilla warfare or terrorism and was 
coined during the Cold War (Kaldor, 1999). Often fought at the local level, new 
wars involve a complex network of transnational and international actors:
[…] so that the distinction between internal and external, between 
aggression (attacks from abroad) and repression (attacks from 
inside the country), or even between local and global, are difficult 
to sustain. (Kaldor, 1999, p. 2)
New wars are often referred to as proxy wars as in the case of Syria (discussed in 
Chapter 4). Unlike new wars, where fighters include State and non-State actors, old 
wars were fought with armed soldiers of national military institutions (Chinkin & 
Kaldor, 2013). According to Chinkin and Kaldor (2013, p. 170), those fighting in 
new wars include fragments of official armed forces, paramilitary groups, private 
security companies, warlords and extremist terrorist groups as well as various 
criminal organisations (see also Kaldor, 2013). New wars are new in terms of 
their goals, methods and financing (Chinkin & Kaldor, 2013; Kaldor, 2013). I will 
examine each of these in more detail below.
Goals
In terms of their goals, distinguishing them from old wars – which were based on 
‘geopolitical and ideological goals’ – new wars are fought in the name of ethnic, reli-
gious or tribal identities (Chinkin & Kaldor, 2013, p. 171; Kaldor, 1999, 2013, p. 2).
Methods
In terms of their methods, new wars use ‘guerrilla warfare and counterinsur-
gency’ methods of  fighting (Kaldor, 1999, p. 7; see also Turshen, 2016). To para-
phrase Kaldor (1999), while conventional war involves battles and the seizing of 
territory through military means, by contrast, guerrilla warfare avoids engaging 
in battle, rather, territory is captured through political suppression of the popu-
lation. Counterinsurgency involves destabilisation and control of  the population 
through expulsion (Kaldor, 1999). Those identified as ‘them’ (as different) are 
forcibly removed (Chinkin & Kaldor, 2013; Kaldor, 1999). This, as Kaldor (1999) 
points out, is why new wars are characterised by large increases in the number 
of  refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Indeed, according  to the 
UNHCR Global Trends report, by the end of 2016, 65.5 million people had 
been forcibly removed as a result of  persecution, conflict, violence and/or human 
rights violations (UNHCR, 2016).
Financing
Whereas old war economies (e.g. the First and Second World Wars) were financed 
by taxation and were centralised, involving a labour force, ‘[n]ew war economies 
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are decentralised and are open to the global economy’ (Chinkin & Kaldor 2013, 
p. 175; Turshen, 2016). They do not rely as heavily on taxation; they involve high 
unemployment (Chinkin & Kaldor, 2013) and are funded by violent and criminal 
activities that include but are not limited to: the extraction, sale and illegal trans-
port of valuable commodities to transnational corporations through regional and 
international criminal networks (Banwell, 2014); looting, pillaging and kidnap-
ping; the exchange of stolen goods, money laundering and arms sales at cross-
border points (Banwell, 2018; see also Richani, 2016). These activities form part 
of the informal global economy. Indeed, a key characteristic of new wars is the 
fragmentation and informalisation of the economy (Peterson, 2009; Banwell, 
2015b, 2018). In its place, a new type of globalised informal economy emerges 
(this is discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4). Indeed, globalisation and neoliberal-
ism are key facilitators of new (informal) war economies (Banwell, 2015b, 2018; 
Jacobson, 2013; Turshen, 2016).
In this book, war refers to traditional warfare, referred to in the literature 
as old wars. Obvious examples are the two World Wars. Armed conflict/conflict 
will be used when referring to new wars: the DRC, Syria and Darfur. This will 
include invasion and occupation (as in the case of Iraq). Unless referring to dis-
tinct examples of war (old wars) or armed conflict (new wars), I will use the term 
war/armed conflict to inform readers that the point I am making refers to both 
types of conflict. Although referred to as The Liberation War of 1971, the armed 
conflict between East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and the then West Pakistan, 
does not fit the definition of a new war, nor is it an old war. Rather, this case study is 
understood as a violent uprising that resulted in genocide.
Before we arrive at the style and organisation of the book, two further themes 
are explored: the relationship between masculinities, femininities and war/armed 
conflict and GBV during war/armed conflict.
Masculinity/ies, Femininity/ies and War
In the statement made by General Cammaert, the gender of the solider is implicit: 
he is male. If  we follow the logic of his assertion, the female is, necessarily, a civil-
ian. If, however, we adopt the more critical reading of the bacha posh (dressed 
like a boy) outlined earlier, we can see that this approach essentialises men and 
masculinities (Al-Ali & Pratt, 2009a). With reference to men in the middle-east, 
Al-Ali and Pratt (2009a) remind us that it is not simply because of their biol-
ogy or their sexual drives/frustrations that these men commit numerous acts of 
political, ethnic or domestic violence. Their use of violence is much more complex 
than this and can be attributed to: ‘…brutal occupations, states of lawlessness, 
economic crises, unemployment and political corruption’ …which can then be 
rooted in other factors such as ‘class, nationality, religion, as well as gender’ (Al-
Ali & Pratt, 2009a, p. 10).
Another contributing factor is the construction of (heterosexual) militarised 
masculinity. Within the military institution, gender essentialism and the inher-
ent maleness of war-making and war-fighting are reproduced. Within this insti-
tution, differentiated gender-role expectations are upheld. In terms of gendered 
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expectations, militarised masculinity expects men to be tough and aggressive. The 
military is where male soldiers learn to fight and kill for their women/nation.
Conversely, idealised militarised femininity ‘expects a woman to be as capable 
as a male soldier, but as vulnerable as a civilian woman’ (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007, 
p. 86). To elaborate:
The militarized woman is…tough, but not violent…. She is brave, 
but not self-sufficient. She is masculine, but not above femininity. 
She is frail, but not afraid…She is a soldier and a participant, but, 
at bottom, innocent; a Beautiful Soul. (Sjoberg, 2007, p. 93)
As noted above, traditionally, within discourses of war/armed conflict, women 
are treated as passive, weak and in need of protection. Men within the military 
provide such protection (Sjoberg, 2007, p. 84). Recently, we have seen increasing 
numbers of women join the military. Like men, it would seem, they fight for and 
protect the nation. And yet, the expectation that women within the military per-
form idealised militarised femininity underscores that what is required of female 
soldiers is different from that which is expected of male soldiers. In this book, 
I examine female soldiers’ use of sexualised violence and torture within the US 
military (see Chapter 5).
GBV During War/armed Conflict
The final theme I will address is the relationship between GBV and war/armed 
conflict. The subject of GBV in conflict and post-conflict situations has received 
increased attention from diverse audiences ranging from academics, NGOs, 
and policy makers to advocacy groups and the news media (Alsaba & Kapilashrami, 
2016; Freedman, 2016; Manjoo & McRaith, 2011; Spencer et al., 2015; Tappis, 
Freeman, Glass, & Doocy, 2016; Wirtz et al. 2014). GBV is violence directed 
against an individual based on socially ascribed gender differences. The types of 
GBV committed in these contexts include: rape and sexualised violence, including 
sexual slavery and genital mutilation; forced abortion, forced sterilisation, forced 
nakedness, forced marriage, forced pregnancy, forced prostitution, forced labour 
and forced recruitment; sex-selective killing, kidnapping and trafficking. These 
map onto the structural, institutional, interpersonal, State, reproductive and gen-
ocidal violence(s) discussed above. All will be examined in the chapters to come. 
The impact of such violence, which can be physical, social, psychological, and/or 
economic, is severe. The consequences of such violence will be addressed in more 
detail in the individual chapters.
Numerous international bodies (e.g. The International Criminal Court, The 
United Nations, The International Court of Justice), international laws and 
instruments (e.g. International Criminal Tribunals, the Rome Statute, the Geneva 
Conventions; the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
against Women; the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women), as well as UNSCRs (e.g. the eight UNSCRs on WPS: UNSCR 
1325, 2000; UNSCR 1820, 2008; UNSCR 1888, 2009a; UNSCR 1889, 2009b; 
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UNSCR 1960, 2010; UNSCR 2106, 2013a; UNSCR 2122, 2013b and UNSCR 
2242, 2015) have been put in place to combat the violence(s) of war and armed 
conflict. These will be addressed in the individual chapters as they relate to the 
case study under discussion. The remainder of this Introduction will address the 
style, contribution, analytical framework, case studies and organisation of the 
book.
Style
This book is eclectic in its approach. While it is largely informed by a feminist 
analysis, it adopts a multi-disciplinary approach and draws on theoretical and 
empirical research from a range of disciplines and sub-disciplines. Historically, 
the discipline of Criminology has inadvertently been western-centric. In order 
to redress this, in addition to drawing on the sub-disciplines of Critical, Feminist 
and Visual Criminology, this book engages with International Relations, Security 
Studies (including Environmental Security), Postcolonial Studies, Gender Studies 
and Political Geography. Combined, these subjects have enabled a nuanced and 
intricate exploration of gender and the violence(s) of war/armed conflict.
Contribution of the Book
In terms of  war/armed conflict, criminologists have drawn attention to Crimi-
nology’s surprising lack of  engagement with topics such as genocide, murder, 
rape, torture, and the displacement and enslavement of  war-affected populations 
(Maier-Katkin, Mears & Bernard, 2009; Pruitt, 2014). Despite some advances 
within the field (e.g. Hagan, Rymond-Richmond, & Parker, 2005; Haveman & 
Smeulers, 2008; Kramer & Michalowski, 2005; Mullins & Rothe, 2008), missing 
from this work is a gendered analysis of  these issues (Collins’ 2017 book is a 
notable exception). Whilst Mullins provides an excellent criminological analysis 
of  sexual violence during the Rwandan genocide (Mullins, 2009a, 2009b) – and 
indeed, I too examine wartime rape and sexual violence during the course of 
this book – I extend Mullins’ work in three ways: first, I examine structural 
forms of  violence against women and girls (Chapters 3 and 4). Second, I con-
sider female perpetrators of  sexualised violence and torture (Chapter 5). And 
third, I examine GBV against men and boys, demonstrating how men and boys 
are also victims of  reproductive and genocidal violence within the conflict zone 
(Chapter 6).
With regards to the feminist critique of  mainstream Criminology, in her arti-
cle, Has Criminology awakened from its ‘androcentric slumber’?, Cook (2016, p. 
340) reviews the ‘social realities of  gender’ in relation to crime and victimisa-
tion. While there has been significant developments in this area – notable con-
tributions include theories of  ‘doing gender’, work on intersectionality and an 
understanding of  gender as situated action (Cook, 2016, p. 343) – Cook (2016, 
p. 344) argues that ‘there is room for their expansion within [C]riminology’. In 
Chapter 5 of  this book, drawing on Feminist and Visual Criminology, I explore, 
among other issues, intersectionality and crime as resource for accomplishing 
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gender in relation to women’s involvement in sexualised violence and torture at 
Abu Ghraib.
As discussed earlier in relation to new wars, many crimes committed during 
armed conflicts are crimes committed by the State. There has been a growing 
body of criminological research on State crimes (e.g. Kramer & Michalowski 
2005; Michalowski & Kramer, 2007; Rothe, 2009; Rothe & Mullins, 2011; Whyte, 
2007). Criminologists have also addressed the subject of risk, moral panics, 
terrorism and the war on terror (see Aradau & van Munster 2009; Mythen & 
Walklate, 2006, 2008; Rothe & Muzzatti, 2004). Absent from this body of work 
is a gendered analysis of  State crimes committed during armed conflict. Also 
 missing is a gendered analysis of the ‘war on terror’. In Chapters 2 and 3 of this 
book – drawing on international case studies relating to contemporary armed 
conflicts – I address State crimes from a gendered perspective. In Chapter 5, I 
provide a gendered analysis of the war on terror.
Two final contributions are worth highlighting:
Both within and outside of the discipline, traditional theories of genocide 
argue that in order for perpetrators to carry out atrocities they must dehuman-
ise their victims first. I challenge the dehumanisation thesis and argue that the 
concept of ‘essentialisation’ (Chirot & McCauley, 2006) better explains the use 
of rape and sexualised violence by German men against Jewish women during 
the Holocaust, as well as by West Pakistani men against Bengali women. This is 
done in the first chapter in relation to the woman-as-nation thesis. I then revisit 
my anti-dehumanisation thesis in Chapter 5 when unpacking sexualised violence 
and torture against the enemy ‘other’.
Finally, in Chapters 4 and 6, drawing on research from Political Geography 
and Environmental Studies, I expand the analytical framework to consider how 
climate variability, and the extreme weather events it leads to (such as droughts), 
is linked to the violence(s) of armed conflict.
Case Studies and the Five Key Messages of the Book
The case studies that I have chosen for analysis address all of the issues outlined 
in the preceding section. They include, The Holocaust, The 1971 Liberation War 
in Bangladesh, and the armed conflicts in the DRC, Iraq, Syria and Darfur. These 
case studies are central for illustrating the five key messages of this book:
1. The GBV(s) that take place during and in the aftermath of armed conflict can-
not be reduced to visible acts of interpersonal violence, they also include, and 
are connected to, structural violence, State crimes and institutional organisa-
tions (Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5).
2. As both symbolic and corporeal mothers of  the nation, women are at 
risk of  reproductive and genocidal violence during war/armed conflict 
(Chapter 1).
3. Gender essentialism – that is, the equation of maleness with war-fighting and 
femaleness with victimisation – obscures the experiences of male victims and 
female perpetrators (Chapters 5 and 6).
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4. Climate variability intersects with gender to inform structural and interpersonal 
forms of violence within and beyond the conflict zone (Chapters 4 and 6).
5. The violence(s) of war/armed conflict take place at the interrelated macro-, 
meso- and micro-levels (all chapters).
The Analytical Framework of the Book
Throughout the book, gender and the violence(s) of war/armed conflict will be 
analysed at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels. This is the framing device for 
understanding and analysing the different types of violence across all case stud-
ies. The macro-level refers to large-scale, overarching social, cultural, political 
and/or economic processes, interactions and/or structures. These operate at both 
the global and State levels. The meso-level refers to institutions (e.g. the military) 
the law and (government) organisations. The micro-level deals with small-scale 
interactions and processes, often examining behaviour at the individual level. At 
the beginning of each chapter, I outline how these three interrelated levels map 
onto the case study under discussion.
As mentioned earlier, a key feature of new wars is the global informal econ-
omy. To assist in my discussion of this within the DRC, Iraq and Syria, I will draw 
upon the feminist political economy approach. This approach draws attention to 
the economic, political and gendered dimensions of armed conflict. It examines 
the macro- (global), meso- and micro- (local) contexts in which the violence(s) of 
armed conflict occur. It traces how GBV is both produced and reproduced within 
and beyond the conflict zone.
Organisation of the Book
Drawing on two historical case studies, the Holocaust and the 1971 Liberation 
War in Bangladesh, Chapter 1 explores the implications of the woman-as-nation 
thesis. Here, I explore how the female reproductive body, alongside discourses of 
biological motherhood, form part of women’s experiences of sexualised, geno-
cidal and reproductive violence during and in the aftermath of war/armed con-
flict. I draw on the concept of essentialisation (which opposes the dehumanisation 
thesis) to encapsulate the vulnerability of the maternal body. In both examples, it 
will be argued that rape has political, social and gendered motivations (Banwell, 
2014, 2016). Furthermore, across both cases – and within the general literature 
on wartime rape and genocidal violence – I argue that such violence(s) take place 
at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels. In this chapter, I reimagine the woman-as-
nation thesis to the following: woman-as-Jew, in the case of the Holocaust and, 
mother-as-nation, in the case of Bangladesh.
Chapter 2 draws upon the feminist political economy approach to examine 
rape and sexual violence in the DRC. It demonstrates how these violence(s) are 
perpetrated and facilitated at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels. At the macro-
level, I outline the complex relationship between economic globalisation, hegem-
onic masculinity, global hyper-capitalism and conflict-related sexual violence 
in the Congo. Here, transnational corporations compete for access to minerals 
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contained within the DRC. Fighters on the ground use rape to terrorise and 
displace the civilian population. This allows them access to these minerals. These 
are then sold to the various national and transnational companies involved in the 
trade. These actors, who rely on the chaos of the conflict to engage in these illegal 
transactions, are guilty of committing State crimes that include war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. At the meso-level, I explore how the military institution 
encourages men to adopt a violent and aggressive heterosexual masculinity. Pre-
existing gendered inequalities, as reflected in Congolese law and cultural prac-
tices, are also explored at this level. And finally, at the micro-level, I argue that 
individual soldiers utilise rape and sexual violence to overcome their subordinate 
position within the gender hierarchy (Banwell, 2014).
These State corporate crimes are analysed with reference to the gender hierar-
chy and globalisation masculinities (Connell, 1998, 2005). Drawing on the con-
cept of a ‘feminist ethics of war’ (Sjoberg, 2006b), the chapter closes with some 
suggestions for how we can address the crimes committed in the DRC.
The invasion and occupation of Iraq has been described by criminologists as a 
State crime, a crime of aggression and an illegal intervention under international 
law (Kramer & Michalowski, 2005, 2011). Utilising the feminist political eco-
nomic approach, Chapter 3 explores this illegal intervention through a gendered 
lens, revisiting Connell’s (1998) notion of globalisation masculinities.
In order to examine the gendered impact of  this invasion and occupation, 
I compare pre-conflict security and gender relations in Iraq with the situation 
post-invasion/occupation. I also review men’s and women’s involvement in the 
illicit economy in Iraq following the intervention and the collapse of  the for-
mal economy. This analysis demonstrates how economic policies (specifically 
privatisation) imposed by the Global North on the Global South, resulted in 
women and girls either being forced into the illicit economy as a means of 
survival or, trafficked for sexual purposes by profit-seeking (male) criminal 
networks in post-invasion/occupation Iraq. While both are examples of  GBV, 
forced prostitution is treated as a form of  structural violence. A review of 
the different types of  coerced sexual activities that occur during war/armed 
conflict – as well as the feminist debates that surround them – is also provided.
In Chapter 4, using the example of Syria, I argue that the securitisation of 
wartime rape and sexual violence against civilian women and girls obscures other 
forms of GBV that are taking place. Departing from this reductive tendency, and 
following on from Chapter 3, this chapter examines structural forms of GBV 
in Syria: denial of reproductive healthcare, specifically access to safe abortion; 
denial of education, exacerbated by the use of early marriage and denial of 
employment opportunities, leading to survival sex. Denial of reproductive health-
care is discussed in relation to President Trump’s foreign policy on abortion, while 
diminished access to employment opportunities is attributed to environmental 
forces. Here, I explore the link between climate change and women’s involvement 
in coerced sexual activities.
The feminist political economy approach (True, 2010, 2012) is used to dem-
onstrate how women and girls’ experiences of these three types of structural vio-
lence – taking place at the local level within and beyond the Syrian conflict zone – is 
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informed by macro- and meso-level economic, cultural and political policies and 
practices: economic globalisation, neoliberalism and patriarchy.
In Chapter 5, I use Feminist and Visual Criminology to critically examine 
three women’s involvement in the sexualised violence and torture at Abu Ghraib: 
Megan Ambuhl, Lynndie England and Sabrina Harman. This chapter provides a 
gendered analysis of the war on terror. It unpacks the three main narratives that 
emerge: ‘the woman in need of rescue and protection,’ ‘the woman in danger’ and 
‘the fallen woman.’ At the meso-level, I consider women’s role within the US mili-
tary, replacing militarised femininity with my notion of ‘war-on-terror feminin-
ity’. At the micro-level, I unpack the involvement of individual women (Lynddie 
England and Sabrina Harman) in the violence(s) that took place. All three levels 
are set against the backdrop of American exceptionalism.
In order to investigate women’s involvement in these violence(s), four images 
from Abu Ghraib are analysed. This is done in three stages. In the first section, 
I use literature from Visual Criminology and scholarly work on war photogra-
phy to explore the following: gender and sovereign violence; gender, ethics and 
appropriate responses to images of suffering (specifically the postmodern ‘doing 
a Lynndie pose’) and the limitations of images. Drawing on Feminist Criminol-
ogy, the second section reviews mainstream media accounts of Lynndie England’s 
involvement in sexualised violence and torture. With reference to the belief  that 
crime is a resource for doing gender, the final section considers my notion of ‘war-
on-terror femininity’.
In Chapter 6, in order to redress the invisibility of  male victimisation, 
I examine conflict-related sexual violence committed against men and boys. 
I focus in detail on the use of  genocidal and reproductive violence (rape, sex-
selective killing and acts of  genital harm) against men and boys in Darfur. 
These sexual GBV(s), that are demarcated along environmental, institutional 
and interpersonal lines, are explored at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels. To 
facilitate this analysis, I replace Connell’s notion of  globalisation masculinities 
with my notion of  glocalisation masculinities. The term glocalisation was used 
by Howe (2008) to capture the relationship and impact of  macro-level systems 
and structures on experiences at the meso- and micro-levels. At the macro-level, 
I unpack how climate variability, and the severe droughts it led to, forms the 
backdrop to the genocidal violence that took place at the local level during the 
conflict in Darfur. At the meso-level, I unpack how State-led Arabisation poli-
cies were used to alter the gender hierarchy in Darfur for the purpose of  mar-
ginalising African Darfuri men. Rape and sexual violence were the tools used to 
accomplish this subordination. Finally, at the micro-level, I examine genocidal 
and reproductive violence committed by the Janjaweed and the government of 
Sudan against Darfuri African men. Here, I explore individual and localised 
acts of  conquest and expulsion.
I will close this Introduction by restating the main question I seek to answer in 
the remaining chapters of this book, namely: how does gender inform both the 
experiences of those who victimise and those who are victimised during war/armed 
conflict? In other words, how are the experiences of males and females (as victims 
and as perpetrators) distinct? This will be a qualitative endeavour rather than a 
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quantitative, comparative analysis; one that is concerned with understanding the 
lived experiences of victims, survivors and perpetrators. The book explores the 
GBV(s) committed and experienced within and beyond the war/conflict zone, 
tracing how they are interrelated at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels. It does 
so through a gendered lens.
The overarching goal is to challenge the inherent gender essentialism within 
existing explanations and representations of gender and the violence(s) of war/
armed conflict.




As highlighted in the Introduction, wartime rape can be used to destroy the 
opponent’s centre of gravity: their women. Thus, ‘the rape of the women in a 
community can be regarded as the symbolic rape of the body of this community’ 
(Seifert, 1994 as cited in Fein, 1999, p. 43). Indeed, in times of war/armed conflict, 
female bodies are regarded as the vessels through which national, ethnic, racial 
and religious identities are reproduced (Cohn, 2013, p. 14; see also Sharlach, 
2000; Takševa, 2015). Rape in this context is used not only as an attack upon the 
individual female, but also as attack upon the nation (Alison, 2007; Baaz & Stern, 
2009; Leiby, 2009). It is also, as Sjoberg (2013) notes, an attack against men and 
the masculine, specifically men belonging to the enemy group who have failed to 
protect women belonging to their group (we will revisit this in Chapter 6).
In this chapter, and elsewhere in this book (Chapters 4, 5 and in the Conclu-
sion), drawing on a number of examples of war/armed conflict, I examine how 
State policies interact with discourses of biological motherhood and the (post-
conflict) maternal body to form part of the landscape of physical and structural 
violence against women and girls. As noted above, according to the woman-as-
nation thesis, women are understood as both symbolically and corporeally moth-
ers of the nation. The implications of this coding are discussed in this chapter. 
Through an exploration of the Holocaust and the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation 
War, both the regulation (as was the case in Bangladesh) and the destruction of 
motherhood (which occurred during the Holocaust) are examined. In the case of 
Bangladesh, State regulation of motherhood was an attempt to recuperate the 
post-war maternal body. In the case of the Holocaust, the attack upon the mater-
nal body (and its reproductive capabilities) formed part of the genocidal cam-
paign. These historical case studies have been chosen because they both, albeit in 
different ways, exemplify the woman-as-nation thesis. They both highlight how 
women, as reproducers of the nation, are targeted during war/armed conflict. 
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In response to the question, ‘is it more dangerous to be a woman than a soldier 
in armed conflict?’,  the two examples explored here unpack the unique ways in 
which women and girls experience war/armed conflict. Across both examples, 
we see how rape and sexual violence operate at the three interrelated levels: the 
macro-, meso- and micro- (these levels were defined in the Introduction).
I would like to close this Introduction by outlining my challenge to the 
dehumanisation thesis. Within mainstream analyses of  genocide, it is argued 
that in order for ordinary individuals to carry out ‘excessive’ and brutal acts 
of  violence their victims have to be ‘transformed conceptually and psychologi-
cally into less-than-human creatures’ (Lang, 2010, p. 227). Hagan and Rymond-
Richmond (2008, p. 876) argue that collective dehumanisation places the 
targeted group ‘outside the normative universe of  moral protection’, thereby 
leaving them vulnerable to genocidal violence. I believe that the logic of  the 
woman-as-nation thesis (outlined above) necessarily negates the notion that 
the violence(s) enacted require persons to be dehumanised first. Let me explain 
in more detail.
Rape in warfare has been present throughout history. It has been used in both 
old and new wars. For example, Belgian women were raped during the First 
World War, Chinese women were raped during the invasion of Nanking in 1937 
and the widespread rape of German women occurred at the end of the Second 
World War (Henry, 2016, p. 44). Henry (2016, p. 44) goes on to list the follow-
ing recent examples: ‘Vietnam, Bangladesh, Uganda, the former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Peru, the DRC, Darfur, Libya, Iraq … Syria.’ To this, 
we can add Myanmar and Yemen. In modern civil conflicts, such as the former 
Yugoslavia, the DRC, Syria and Myanmar, rape is used as a systematic weapon 
against civilian populations.
According to Henry (2016, p. 44), a common theme among these examples 
‘…is that rape is a product of warped (yet normalised) militarised hegemonic 
masculinity, which arguably is structurally embedded in pre-conflict gender ine-
quality and unequal power relations’. In my own work, I have identified an addi-
tional theme within this literature: the assumption that, in order to commit such 
acts, perpetrators must dehumanise and objectify their victims first.
In contrast to this work, I argue that the concept of ‘essentialisation’ facilitates 
a more nuanced understanding of the use of rape and sexualised violence by Ger-
man men against Jewish women during the Holocaust. According to Chirot and 
McCauley (2006), essentialisation involves the reduction and denigration of a 
diverse group into a single, redundant category, attributing them all with the same 
negative characteristics. They state:
The idea of  essence … turns out to be a key psychological con-
cept in examining violence against groups. Something about 
members of  the targeted group is inherently disgusting – their 
habits … their appearance – and this justifies the violence against 
them because their disgusting characteristics threaten to pollute 
the environment and must be eliminated. (Chirot & McCauley, 
2006, p. 81)
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As established through the woman-as-nation thesis: ‘…motherhood often 
starts with a conceptualization of the womb as a recruiting station in nationalist 
discourses… [W]omen serve their nation by “producing” children/soldiers [pref-
erably sons] of the nation’ (Åhäll, 2017, p. 22). Based on this, I argue that it was 
precisely because of their Jewishness (race) and their reproductive (gender) capa-
bilities – the coding of woman-as-Jew – that Jewish women were targeted by Ger-
man men during the Holocaust. My notion of woman-as-Jew has been adapted 
from Cohn’s (2013, p. 14) ‘nation-as-woman’ and ‘woman-as-nation’ as, I would 
argue, in the case of Jewish women, Jews – along with Poles and Roma – would 
have been considered by the Nazis as a source of contamination to the German 
nation/bloodline, and thus more likely regarded as a counter-nation.
This notion of essentialisation can also be applied to my second case study. 
However, in my discussion of the 1971 Liberation War, and in contrast to what 
occurred during the Holocaust, I focus my attention on understanding geno-
cidal rape as a form of social death when forced impregnation cannot be applied. 
My challenge to the dehumanisation thesis will be explored in more detail below. 
It will be revisited in Chapter 5 when I examine sexualised violence and torture 
against Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib.
Outline of the Chapter
Drawing on two historical case studies, the Holocaust and the 1971 Liberation 
War in Bangladesh, this chapter will demonstrate how women were targeted based 
on the notion of woman-as-nation (Cohn, 2013). The chapter will begin with a 
gendered analysis of the Holocaust. It will then review the literature on wartime 
rape and genocidal rape, before examining the use of rape during the Nazi geno-
cide. Essentialisation (the anti-thesis to dehumanisation) informs the discussion 
of sexualised and reproductive violence against Jewish women by German men. 
The chapter then moves on to unpack the second case study. This section begins 
with an overview of the 1971 conflict, including details of the systematic rape of 
Bengali women by the Pakistani army. The theme of dehumanisation is revisited 
briefly. The main focus, however, is on understanding the individual and social 
consequences of sexualised and reproductive violence and how, in this example, 
rape was used as a tool of genocide. A discussion of the regulation of the post-
war maternal body concludes this case study analysis. A comparison of both 
iterations of the woman-as-nation thesis brings the chapter to a close.
Terminology
For both case studies, I will draw upon Halbmayr’s (2010, p. 30) notion of sexu-
alised violence:
The term sexualized violence makes it clear that male violence 
against females is not about sexuality but is a show of power on 
the part of the perpetrator and includes many forms of violence 
with sexual connotations, including humiliation, intimidation, 
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and destruction… From this we can derive that violent acts can be 
understood as sexualized if  they are directed at the most intimate 
part of a person and, as such, against that person’s physical, emo-
tional, and spiritual integrity.
I will also draw upon Grey’s (2017, p. 906) notion of reproductive violence. 
Reproductive violence – violence that violates a person’s reproductive autonomy 
or violence that is directed against an individual due to their reproductive capa-
bilities – encompasses forced impregnation, forced miscarriage, forced sterilisa-
tion and forced abortion (Grey, 2017, p. 907).
Sexualised violence against Jewish women will refer to rape and other bod-
ily sex-based violations that can be viewed as emotional expressions of violence 
(e.g. public nakedness and the shaving of hair from intimate parts of the body). 
All of these can be understood as sexualised violence as they are directed at the 
most intimate part of a person. Whilst perpetrator motivation may not always 
be rooted in sexual desire or gratification, the female victim may, nonetheless, 
experience the attack as a violation of her sexuality. In the case of the Holo-
caust, reproductive violence will refer to forced abortion and forced sterilisation. 
In Bangladesh, sexualised violence will refer to rape, while reproductive violence 
will be used to capture the assault and regulation of women’s reproductive bodies 
during and following the 1971 Liberation War.
In this chapter, the differences between genocidal rape and rape used during 
the Holocaust are highlighted. At this point, it will be useful to outline the con-
cept of genocide.
Genocide is defined in Article 2 of The Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of  the Crime of Genocide (2014) as:
[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily 
or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflict-
ing on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transfer-
ring children of the group to another group.
Based on this definition, rape can, and is, used as a tool of genocide. In this 
context, it is used intentionally and systematically as a weapon of war. Examples 
include the 1971 Liberation War, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. These will 
all be discussed in due course.
In the Introduction, I argued that this book engages in a qualitative analysis 
of gender and the violence(s) of war/armed conflict, tracing the distinct ways in 
which both genders suffer. To this end, I begin my analysis of the first case study 
(the Holocaust) by highlighting the unique ways in which women experienced 
sexualised and reproductive violence during this genocide. This forms part of a 
broader comment on the importance of a gendered analysis of the Holocaust. 
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I also promised that where possible I would draw upon victim and/or survivor 
testimonies. Throughout this chapter, I include testimonies of Holocaust survivors 
that have been archived by the USC Shoah Foundation – The Institute for Visual 
History and Education. Let us start with a gendered analysis of the Holocaust.
The Holocaust Through a Gendered Lens
Ringelheim (1958/1993, p. 375) was asking crucial questions about gender and the 
Holocaust as far back as 1985. Among them were:
[I]f  you were Jewish, in what ways did it matter whether you were 
a man or a woman … Is there … anything to be seen in statistics 
about the number of men killed compared to women?
On the subject of the function of sexism within Nazi racist ideology, Tec (2003, 
p. 8) advances a different argument to Ringelheim. She argues that there is no 
systematic data to suggest that women were more oppressed than men during the 
Holocaust. Furthermore, she is less interested in whether more women than men 
died, and more interested in how ‘women and men fared in different Holocaust 
settings, and how they responded to their circumstances’.
More recently, in the edited collection by Hedgepeth and Saidel (2010), Sexual 
Violence Against Jewish Women During the Holocaust, the following questions 
were raised: ‘what happened to women during the Holocaust?’ and ‘…was there 
anything different in their experience because they were women?’ (Reinharz, 2010, 
p. ix). Taking these as my point of departure, the questions I hope to answer are: 
why did soldiers of the Third Reich rape Jewish women if, firstly, sexual relation-
ships with Jews were a criminal offence and, secondly, rape was not an explicit 
function of the genocidal campaign?
Whilst Jewish women were raped by non-German allies, collaborators, civil-
ians and fellow prisoners (see Friedman, 2002 and the edited collection by Hedge-
peth and Saidel, 2010), this chapter will focus on the rape of Jewish women by 
German men: soldiers, guards, members of the Third Reich and SS members. 
Coerced sexual activities (forced prostitution and sexual slavery) and sex for sur-
vival – ‘entitlement rape’ (Fogelman, 2012, p. 20) – also formed part of wom-
en’s gendered experience of the Holocaust. They also formed part of women’s 
experiences of the 1971 Liberation War. These will not be reviewed here (a more 
detailed analysis of coerced sexual activities, including sexual exploitation and 
abuse, are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4).
As we know, the Holocaust was a genocide that targeted all Jews as Jews (Ban-
well, 2016). It also targeted other non-Aryan groups that it deemed inferior and 
undesirable such as homosexuals, Roma, the mentally ill and disabled people, 
as well as a number of political and religious opponents (Fogelman, 2012). So, 
whilst a gendered analysis of the Holocaust may be a legitimate focus of inves-
tigation, it is still important to answer the questions: why women? Why gender? 
(Weitzman & Ofer, 1998). It is because the Holocaust – and the Final Solution 
in particular – was the first event that did not treat the female population as the 
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inevitable spoils of war. Viewed as the carriers of the next generation of Jews, 
the Nazi eugenicist policy explicitly targeted pregnant women for death: women 
whose pregnancies were visible were killed immediately upon arrival at a concen-
tration camp (Goldenberg, 1998, 2013; Horowitz, 1998; Katz, 2012; Patterson, 
2013; Perl, 1984/1993; Weitzman & Ofer, 1998). As articulated by Yolan Frank: 
‘some women were taken away for men’s pleasure and when they got pregnant … 
they are sent back to the gas chamber’.1
It may seem illogical to focus on gender when Nazi ideology was premised 
on the status of  Jews as Jews and their genocidal policy targeted them based 
on their ‘race’. Yet, it is clear from women’s testimonies that they experienced 
the Holocaust differently from men (Goldenberg, 1998; Horowitz, 1998; Weitz-
man & Ofer, 1998). Women were vulnerable to sexualised and reproductive vio-
lence in a number of  ways: rape, forced abortion, forced sterilisation, sexual 
abuse, pregnancy, childbirth and the killing of  their newborns. Most of  these are 
uniquely female experiences and women suffered them as women and as Jews 
(Friedman, 2002).
By examining the genocidal violence women experienced during the Holo-
caust, it is not my intention to ignore or dismiss the violence(s) visited upon men, 
nor do I wish to reduce the Holocaust to an example of sexism (Rittner & Roth, 
1993). We know that Jewish men were also targeted and attacked as Jews and 
as men. Indeed, as Tec (2003) argues, given the Nazi emphasis on patriarchal 
values – which depicted men as rational, aggressive and more powerful than 
women – Jewish men were regarded as a greater threat to the political system than 
women. Thus, the goal of annihilating the Jews began with the extermination of 
Jewish men. Men endured indignities and assaults on their biology, including sex-
ual assault and rape (Friedman, 2002; Horowitz, 1998). According to Chalmers 
(2015), male rape occurred more often within the context of coerced homosexual 
interactions. Young boys would provide sexual favours, or act as sexual slaves, in 
order to receive food and better living conditions. This was mainly in the concen-
tration camps. Overall, Chalmers (2015) argues that the sexual abuse of men was 
less prevalent. This may be the result of underreporting (Chalmers, 2015; this 
theme is addressed in more detail in Chapter 6).
An Overview of Wartime Rape and Genocidal Rape
Explanations of wartime rape and genocidal rape can be demarcated along 
macro-, meso- and micro-levels. Gender plays an integral part at every level. 
At the macro-level, rape is central to a regime or policy directive (Waller, 2012, 
p. 85). It is used as a political and social tool to achieve the goals of genocide 
and ethnic cleansing (Waller, 2012). The consequences of rape in this context 
are death, both literally and figuratively (social and psychological) (Card, 1996). 
It destroys communities and social bonds. It ‘dilutes’ – and in some instances 
eradicates – the next generation (Waller, 2012). Rape, in cases of ethnic cleansing 
1Interview 35354, USC Shoah Foundation testimony.
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and genocide, acts as a statement of hetero-nationality and serves as an ethno-
marker (Lentin, 1999). It may also serve as an attack upon the nation’s culture of 
women (Cohn, 2013). This is the weapon-of-war paradigm.
At the meso-level, patriarchy, phallocentrism, the military institution and 
hegemonic masculinity all socialise men to embody a violent and aggressive 
heterosexual masculinity, whereby rape is normalised and used to achieve and 
perform this type of masculinity. And at the micro-level, in stark contrast to 
the weapon-of-war thesis, wartime rape is considered an opportunistic crime 
(Davies & True, 2015). Enloe (2000) referred to this as ‘recreational rape’. It can 
be related to the ‘pressure-cooker’ theory. This views wartime rape as a result 
of men’s biological/innate sexual drive and/or the result of the chaos of war 
(Mullins, 2009a). Individual men, at the micro-level, use rape and sexual violence 
to feminise their victims and to subvert their marginal position within the gender 
hierarchy. Rape is used not out of lust, but out of aggression to enhance mascu-
line identity (Banwell, 2014).
Generally speaking then, rape has political, social (genocide and ethnic cleans-
ing) and gendered (phallocentrism, misogyny and hegemonic heterosexual mas-
culinity) motivations. These operate at all three levels of analysis. More inclusive 
studies consider the victimisation of males as well as females during war/armed 
conflict and offer theoretical frameworks for understanding sexualised and geno-
cidal violence against males (see Chapter 6 of this book). I acknowledge the mul-
tiple dimensions and motivations of conflict-related sexual violence and argue 
that in some cases rape is used as a weapon of war, while in others it is not (see 
Chapters 2, 4 and 6).
It is worth reiterating: what unites these traditional understandings of  geno-
cide and wartime sexual violence is the tendency to view dehumanisation as a 
precursor to this type of  violence (see Fogelman, 2012; Friedman, 2002; Hagan 
& Rymond-Richmond, 2008; Waller, 2012). I offer a different interpretation. 
Based on the woman-as-nation thesis, I propose the following: during the Holo-
caust Jewish women were subjected to sexualised and reproductive violence pre-
cisely because of  their essentialised Jewishness. Dehumanisation may have been 
what followed – it may have been implicated in the process of  the violence, as a 
by-product – but it was not the condition under which this violence was per-
formed in the first instance. Dehumanisation was not a precondition of  this 
violence.
The use of rape against Jewish women – unlike rape used in Bangladesh, the 
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Darfur, and the DRC – was not an official compo-
nent of the Final Solution (Goldenberg, 2013). However, in order to understand 
the sexualised and reproductive violence against Jewish women by German men, 
it will be useful to consider examples where rape is used as an official weapon. 
As I will be examining the DRC in the following chapter and Darfur in Chapter 
6, I will limit my discussion in this chapter to genocidal rape in Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia, before comparing the use of rape during the Holocaust. A 
more detailed analysis of genocidal rape in Bangladesh forms the second part 
of this chapter. Space will not permit an in-depth analysis of the causes of the 
genocides in Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia, nor the conflicts that formed 
26   Gender and the Violence(s) of War and Armed Conflict
the backdrop to them. For my purposes here, I will be focusing on the issue of 
genocidal rape, starting with genocidal rape during the Rwandan genocide.
The Rwandan genocide began on April 6, 1994 when the plane of the Rwandan 
president, Habyarimana, was shot down (Buss, 2009; Mullins, 2009b). It lasted three 
months and it is estimated that 800,000 Rwandans, mainly Tutsi, were killed dur-
ing this time (Buss, 2009). Between 250,000 and 500,000 Rwandan Tutsi women 
were raped during the 12 weeks of the genocide. Perpetrators were primar-
ily Hutu men (Buss, 2009; Jones, 2002; Mullins, 2009a, 2009b; Sharlach, 1999, 
2000). The rapes involved sexual mutilation and torture. As Sharlach (1999, 
pp. 395–396) notes: ‘[t]he mere extermination of Tutsi was insufficient; the Intera-
hamwe inflicted upon the Tutsi every imaginable act of sadism, including rape, 
before killing them’. Women were gang raped and raped to death (Sharlach, 
1999). There is also evidence to suggest that the deliberate transmission of HIV 
was a component of genocidal rape in Rwanda. Reports from survivors note that 
HIV positive Hutu men raped Tutsi women in order to transmit the disease (see 
Sharlach, 1999, 2000).
Genocidal rape was also used during the Bosnian genocide. The Yugoslav wars 
(the Croatian war of independence, 1991–1995 and the Bosnian war, 1992–1995) 
took place between 1991 and 1995 in the former Yugoslavia, resulting in the dis-
mantling of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Although these wars 
were fought over territory, nationalism and independence, for my purposes here, 
I will focus on the ethnic cleansing of Bosnians by Serbs and Bosnian-Serbs. A 
key element of this genocide was the systematic rape and the enforced impregna-
tion of Muslim and Croatian women by Serbian men (Chinkin & Kaldor, 2013; 
Diken & Lausten, 2005; Sharlach, 2000; Takševa, 2015). It is estimated that 
between 25,000 and 40,000 Bosnian women were victims of rape and forced preg-
nancy (Takševa, 2015. Men were also victims of reproductive and genocidal vio-
lence; see Chapter 6).
The International Criminal Court (ICC) defines forced pregnancy as: ‘the unlawful 
confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the 
ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of 
international law’ (Rome Statue of the Criminal Court, 2011, p. 4). In the case 
of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, women were assaulted in the streets and 
in their homes. This was mainly by ethnically Serbian soldiers (Sharlach, 2000; 
Takševa, 2015). Others were detained in ‘rape camps’ where they were repeatedly 
raped until they became pregnant and held captive until access to safe abortion 
was no longer possible (Takševa, 2015). As noted in the genocide convention, this 
prevents births within the group. This is because women’s wombs are occupied 
with babies from a different ethnic group, which results in the birth of ethni-
cally mixed children. These children serve as a symbolic reminder of the genocide 
(Mullins, 2009a). More than that, as Mullins (2009a, p. 18) and Takai (2011) 
point out, in societies where patrilineal parentage determines lineage member-
ship, these children – who belonged to the father’s ethnic group, rather than the 
mother’s – altered the community’s ethnic group membership. This amounts 
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to ‘transferring children of the group to another group’ (Article 11(e) of the 
Genocide convention).
As well as forced pregnancy, women’s inability and/or unwillingness to engage 
in sexual relations following rape (not least due to the physical injuries women 
sustain), also ‘prevents births’ and contributes to the elimination of the group. It 
is important to note that, in addition to their physical injuries, women also have 
to live with the psychological and social impact of rape. In both of the examples 
discussed above, it is those who are raped, not those who rape, who are stigma-
tised (Sharlach, 2000; this also applies to male victims, see Chapter 6). According 
to the logic of the woman-as-nation thesis, genocidal rape not only dishonours 
the woman, it also dishonours the ethnic group to which she belongs. Women 
may be ostracised or expelled in order to restore lost honour and men may refuse 
to engage in marriage and/or sexual relationships with ‘spoiled’ women which, 
again, serves to destroy the group (Takai, 2011).
The Limitations of a Macro-level Understanding
Unlike the examples of systematic and genocidal rape discussed above (Rwanda, 
the former Yugoslavia), rape was not carried out in this manner during the Nazi 
genocide (see also Wood, 2009 who discusses the absence of systematic rape dur-
ing the civil war in Sri Lanka). The aim of the Final Solution was the elimination 
of all European Jews. In this context then, as Goldenberg (2013) points out, sex-
ual violence is a redundant weapon of terror. Given this, trying to understand the 
individual motivations and the context/conditions under which rape took place 
during this genocide becomes slightly more complicated.
During the Holocaust, women became more undesirable given the various 
oppressions they were subjected to. Yet, this did not deter German men from rap-
ing them. For Fogelman (2012, p. 18) then, it is ‘a myth that only pretty women 
were raped’. In the beginning, however, before women were subjected to various 
physical degradations, the motivation for rape may have been based on reinforc-
ing masculine identity and used for sexual gratification. In the latter stages of 
their imprisonment – when their feminine attributes and attractiveness had been 
stripped away, through a series of degradations – the motivation to rape may 
have arisen from aggression, power and dominance (Fogelman, 2012). Indeed, 
testimonies from survivors and witnesses describe instances of brutal and sadistic 
violence (see Perl, 1984/1993). As illustrated by Sara Moses, this was also the case 
for instances of sexualised violence and abuse:
[T]here were two men there and there were some other people in 
the room, I think. I was put on a table. From what I remember,  
[it was] a table or it could have been a high table. I was very little so 
it seemed like it was very high up from where I was and I was very 
violently sexually abused. And I remember being hit, I remember 
crying and I wanted to get out of there. And I was calling people 
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and screaming and I remember one thing that stands out in my 
mind that one of them told me that they would stand me on my 
head and cut me right in half. And they wanted me to stop scream-
ing and I’ve had nightmares about that most of my life.2
Another survivor, Doris Roe, talks about being taken into a doctor’s room 
where a female doctor strapped her to a bed. Three naked SS men entered the 
room. The female doctor instructed the men to rape her. She describes being gang 
raped by these men. She described her legs being tied to the bed so that she could 
not escape. After the first three men raped her, another three men entered the 
room. She describes being raped by 12 men in total. She believed that rape was 
used as a form of initiation for these men. She stated that the officer’s bit off  her 
nipples while she was in Birkenau so she could not breastfeed her child.3 This 
viscerally reminds us of Halbmayr’s argument that violence is sexualised if  it is 
directed at the most intimate part of a person’s body.
‘Sadistic rape’ (see Fogelman, 2012) allowed German soldiers omnipotent con-
trol over their victims, whist simultaneously reducing German soldiers’ sense of 
impotence. Fogelman (2012) argues that soldiers, who may have felt as though 
they were powerless cogs in a machine, could use sadistic rape to reinstate power. 
Related to this motivation is ego-gratification (Fogelman, 2012). For ordinary 
men, seeking to subvert their marginal positions within German society, the Nazi 
regime offered them success, notoriety and a chance to advance their careers 
(Fogelman, 2012). Excessive violence, through rape and various acts of sexualised 
violence, boosted their self-esteem and ‘add[ed] to the already-increased bravado 
of being an officer’ and ‘having power and privileges’ (Fogelman, 2012, p. 23).
However, in order to appreciate the more specific meaning of rape during the 
Holocaust, we must, as Fogelman (2012) suggests, place this behaviour within 
the social, political and cultural context of  the Third Reich. This moves us 
away from the limitations of  the macro- towards a meso-level of  understanding. 
Despite transgressing German policy, there was, paradoxically, as Katz (2012) 
points out, something ‘political’ about the sexualised violence committed against 
Jewish women. The political coding of  woman-as-Jew relocates this sexualised 
violence from an individual attack, to an assault upon the collective Jewish body 
(particularly when we consider the various acts of  reproductive violence that 
were carried out).
Sexualised, Genocidal and Reproductive Violence Against 
Jewish Women During the Holocaust
Lentin (1999) argues that the definition of genocide must be gendered in order 
to acknowledge that many of these political campaigns – aimed at the ‘alteration 
or elimination of a future ethnic group’, through sexual slavery, mass rape and 
2Interview 29016, USC Shoah Foundation testimony.
3Interview 23687, USC Shoah Foundation testimony.
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mass sterilisation – are transmitted through and upon women’s bodies. Indeed, in 
the context of the Holocaust, the Nazi eugenic vision of German racial superior-
ity specifically targeted Jewish women as child-bearers (Bock, 1984/1993). The 
reproductive body of the Jewish woman became a ‘biological danger’, as their 
wombs would ‘bear future generations’ of Jews (Levenkron, 2010, p. 15). To cre-
ate a superior Aryan race, Nazi race-hygiene policies demanded the elimination 
of inferior races. Women’s sexuality and their reproductive capabilities became 
integral components of this agenda. In order to better understand this assault 
on women’s sexuality – in all its devastating forms – it will be useful to unpack 
Halbmayr’s concept of ‘sexualised violence’ in more detail.
Halbmayr’s definition also encompasses indirect, emotional expressions of 
violence in the form of (sexualised) humiliations. Here, they include: forced pub-
lic nakedness, shaving of hair and invasive physical examinations. Male guards 
carried out these degrading public humiliations knowing that they would be expe-
rienced as grotesque sexual violations (Aoláin, 2000). By placing this sexualised 
violence within the historical–political context of the Holocaust, we can view this 
as part of a continuum of genocidal violence. At one of end of the spectrum, 
we have rape and other forms of direct physical, reproductive/genocidal violence 
(forced sterilisation and forced abortion), and at the other, we have these more 
indirect forms of sex-based violations.
Rape was committed by Germans and their Nazi collaborators, as well as by 
other Jews. This took place in the ghettos, in hiding and in the concentration 
camps. In the ghettos, Jewish women were also vulnerable to murder, including 
the murder of their children, as well as forced abortions and a number of other 
sex-based violations. Women were also sexually assaulted while they were being 
transported from the ghettos to the camps (Aoláin, 2000; Katz, 2012). Whilst 
some similarities may be drawn, the rape of Jewish women during the Holocaust 
involved factors that complicate a comparison with wartime rape in other con-
texts (Katz, 2012). Three distinctive features can be identified. First, we have the 
crime of Rassenschande. The law against Rassenschande (racial defilement) pro-
hibited sexual relations between Aryans and non-Aryans. This involved all sexual 
relationships between Aryans and Jews, consensual or otherwise. Between 1935 
and 1945, 2,000 cases were brought before the courts. Sentences for those found 
guilty of committing Rassenschande averaged between four and five years (Katz, 
2012).4 Second, if  these sexual encounters resulted in pregnancy, these women 
and their foetuses would have to be murdered. Unlike rape in other contexts, 
where the genocidal aim is to contaminate the bloodline by reproducing an eth-
nically mixed cohort of children, contamination of the German bloodline was 
antithetical to Nazi ideology. And third, unlike other examples of wartime rape, 
where emphasis is placed on the violation of the woman’s body, German men who 
raped Jewish women violated their own existence and jeopardised their member-
ship in the future master race (Goldenberg, 2013). Below I will elaborate on the 
4See Decision of the Nuremberg special court in the Katzenberger race defilement case.
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first and second of these distinct characteristics: the crime of Rassenschande and 
the murder of forcibly impregnated Jewish women.
The requirement to kill Jewish women following the violation of Rassenschande – 
and its potential reproductive consequences – was particularly common in 
the Skarzysko-Kamienna concentration camp. In the words of  survivor Milla 
Doktorczyk:
My friend, she was working alongside me in Skarzysko. One 
beautiful girl, tall and slim, a beauty…Came one time, a German, 
he took her away from the machine. They raped her a couple of 
times, everybody, and then they killed her…They raped her in the 
middle, one after another one, and they killed her…5
Paula Neyman, another survivor, recounts the rape and murder of a pregnant 
Jewish women at the Bruss-Sophienwalde Concentration Camp:
They dragged her out, four young Germans, each one had a leg 
or an arm and they threw her on the snow and…the command-
ers…they made everybody stand and watch…in full view of these 
young girls. Six or eight raped this pregnant girl. They picked her 
up like a sack of potatoes…and threw her on the truck. She was 
never heard of [again].6
Fogelman (2012) argues that some acts of rape were committed clandestinely, 
whereas others were done in public to humiliate and dehumanise the victim. Dur-
ing their interviews, a number of survivors talked about women being dragged 
to the forest to be raped in secret. They discussed the methods guards used to 
conceal their crime of race defilement. For them, it was clear that these guards 
were aware of the law of Rassenschande. This is clearly illustrated by Bronia 
Shlagbaum’s account:
A Jewish girl. You know. He want a Jewish girl. You know. To the 
forest. And he raped her. And it was Rassenschande. That means, 
how come a German should rape a Jewish girl? So they wanted to 
wipe up all the footsteps. They were ashamed.7
In a similar account, Ana Cymerman states:
One day he comes over to me and says to me I should come with 
him in a room and he’s going to show me what to do. So I did. You 
had to. He asked me. He would like to have sex with me.
5Interview 15012, USC Shoah Foundation testimony.
6Interview 4788, USC Shoah Foundation testimony.
7Interview 10747, USC Shoah Foundation testimony.
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She explains that she was surprised that, as a German, he wanted to rape her. 
She was aware of the law of Rassenschande. She explains that at the time she was 
thinking to herself: ‘[h]ow can you say this to me? I’m a Jew. A dirty Jew. You 
shouldn’t say that to me. Because I’m Jewish’.8 Sonia Nightingale also references 
Rassenschande. She explains that sexual molestation happened a lot ‘…it was 
how they call it… Germans shouldn’t touch a Jewish girl…Shouldn’t even look 
at her’.9 Sonia struggles to find the correct phrase and so the interviewer suggests 
Rassenschande. She then explains that they shot the women afterwards.
Based on the interpretations of survivors, we can argue that these acts (rape 
and murder), including the manner in which they were carried out, were perpe-
trated against ‘woman-as-Jew’: an essentialised group and bearers of the next 
generation.
Having reviewed these acts of  sexualised violence, we will now consider acts 
of  reproductive violence in the form of  forced sterilisation and forced abortion.
Assault on Jewish Motherhood
Aoláin (2000, p. 61) argues that the separation of children from their mothers and 
the removal of their capacity to bear children count as explicit sexual harms. It is 
an assault upon a woman’s bodily integrity ‘both in its actual and symbolic mani-
festations.’ As a symbolic function, this act communicates to the wider ethnic or 
cultural group that the destruction of mother and child denotes the achievement 
of broader military aims: the elimination of that particular group (Aoláin, 2000).
Forced sterilisation was carried out on thousands of women without the con-
sent, or often the knowledge, of the female victims (see Halbmayr, 2010). These 
genocidal experiments (which largely took place at Auschwitz, Ravensbrück and 
other concentration camps) were conducted by means of X-ray, surgery and 
drugs (Aoláin 2000, p. 56). The topic of sterilisation was discussed by a number 
of survivors. Elizabeth Feldman de Jong states, ‘[t]hey tried to give big injections 
in your womb. The needles were very painful. They pulled pieces of the womb…
so you could not get children’.10 In response to questions about medical experi-
ments, Sylvia Amir stated: ‘[h]e put two injections in [to the uterus] and closed the 
tubes. He closed the tubes and this was sterilisation’.11 Magda Blau talks about 
the experiment centre in the camps. When asked about the experiments that were 
carried out, she states: ‘[f]irst of all they did sterilization…and they made differ-
ent operations on woman … [T]aking out the woman’s business’. Magda points 
to her abdomen. She explains that this was done to hundreds of Jewish women: 
‘[a]ll Jewish women’. 12
8Interview 8641, USC Shoah Foundation testimony.
9Interview 1832, USC Shoah Foundation testimony.
10Interview 543, USC Shoah Foundation testimony.
11Interview 6000, USC Shoah Foundation testimony.
12Interview 19441, USC Shoah Foundation testimony.
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Forced abortions were also performed as part of the racist ideology. Indeed, 
abortions were forbidden for Aryan women who were considered to be the bear-
ers of the future ‘master race’ (Halbmayr, 2010, p. 37). In many of the forced-
labor camps and the concentration camps, abortion was not even an option: 
Jewish women were immediately condemned to death. A number of survivors 
also discuss the murder of newly born babies. Pearl Iroff  explains: ‘[t]here was 
one girl that was pregnant…and then she gave birth to the baby…and the doctor 
killed the baby’.13 Similarly, Ruth Foster explains:
One baby was born … the mother carried the full term of preg-
nancy … the SS … it came to our commandant … it came to his 
ears that there was a child born in the ghetto … the mother was 
brought with this little baby of a few days into the hospital … 
the soft part of the baby’s head had to be pressed in … had to be 
killed. It wasn’t shot, but it was killed that way.14
Describing the birth of a child in Auschwitz, Isabella Leitner states:
Most of us are born to live – to die, but to live first. You, dear 
darling, you are being born only to die …You belong to the gas 
chamber. Your mother has no rights… She is not a mother. She is 
just a dirty Jew who has soiled the Aryan landscape with another 
dirty Jew. (Leitner, 1978/1993, pp. 31–32)
Women were forced to kill infants in order to save the mother’s life. This murder 
of a newborn requires mothers to ‘…kill something of themselves, part of their 
own souls, part of the essence of the feminine’ (Patterson, 2013, p. 172). Further-
more, Patterson argues that the unique condition of the Holocaust caused ‘…the 
murder not only of human beings but of the very origin of human life and of 
human sanctity…the Jewish mother’ (Patterson, 2013, p. 171). Doris Roe describes 
giving birth to a little girl. A few weeks after the baby was born she informed the 
nurse that her baby was hungry. She recalls the nurse telling her that the baby 
would not cry for much longer: ‘[s]he walked up to the bunk and picked up my 
baby and slammed her head against the bottom of the bunk. I passed out’.15
In a similar incident, Eva Lassman recalls:
A woman was with me who was pregnant. They let her carry the 
baby to term. When she delivered, the Germans send in a Jewish 
man to take the baby away from her. And the baby was pinched by 
the nose. It was suffocated. She never saw her baby.16
13Interview 34942, USC Shoah Foundation testimony.
14Interview 9538, USC Shoah Foundation testimony.
15Interview 23687, USC Shoah Foundation testimony.
16Interview 51181, USC Shoah Foundation testimony.
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Let us reflect upon these stories in relation to the concept of essentialisation:
Essentializing the out-group means that there is something bad 
about all of  them, every one of  them … Nazis knew perfectly well 
that Jews were not literally rats … But they did believe that eve-
ryone in that category, old and young, strong and weak, threat-
ening and helpless–all must be exterminated, just as all vermin 
must be exterminated. Essentializing turns the enemy into a sin-
gle dangerous and irredeemable character. (Chirot & McCauley, 
2006, pp. 84–85).
Chirot and McCauley (2006, p. 86) further argue:
The very ideas of pollution and contamination require the idea of 
essence, an unseen spirit or nature that is endangered by contact or 
infection. The German volk had to be protected from the foreign 
and degrading Jewish essence.
Making a similar argument, Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008) argue that 
by definition, genocidal killing involves killing by category and by membership in 
a group rather than by individual guilt or criminality. Similarly, La Capra (1994, 
p. 104) refers to the Nazis’ ‘exorcism’ of the Jews through racial essentialism/
hypostatisation.
Based on these arguments, I argue that these assaults on motherhood were 
carried out on woman-as-Jew.
‘He Used to Pick the Most Pretty Girls’.17
Sharon Marcus (391 as cited in Flaschka, 2010, p. 78) states:
Masculine power and feminine powerlessness neither simply pre-
cede nor cause rape; rather, rape is one of culture’s many modes 
of feminizing women. A rapist chooses his target because he rec-
ognizes her to be a woman, but a rapist also strives to imprint the 
gender identity of ‘feminine victim’ on his target.
To paraphrase Flaschka (2010): if  we accept this position, then it makes theo-
retical sense to ask Jewish female survivors if  they understood their rape as a 
reminder that they were female/feminine in an environment that had stripped 
them of their feminine qualities. This question forms the basis of Flaschka’s argu-
ment. It supports my argument against the dehumanisation hypothesis. The tes-
timonies of female survivors who were raped and witnessed other rapes believed 
they were raped because of their female attractiveness.
17Interview 450, USC Shoah Foundation testimony.
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Here are two examples. Eve Gabori:
[T]hey looked at me, and I was a beautiful girl…I was all sunburned, 
even my hair grew about half an inch. I looked healthy my face was 
red and brown, because the sun was beating down. This girl was 
tall, huge, huge beautiful grey eyes, very delicate… they told us to 
go into the barrack to wash the floor…and it was horrible. We went 
in. They locked the door, grabbed this girl and went into this other 
small room. I heard her screaming. I knew what they were doing to 
her. I never saw the girl again.18
Ester Gomo:
He did not let me go. In his eyes I was very pretty. In his eyes. And 
he started to make me compliments. ‘Beautiful breasts’…that I’m 
very young…he says he can’t resist me. He took his right hand and 
twisted my breast.19
The concentration camps ‘challenged women’s identities as women’ (Flaschka, 
2010, p. 80). When women entered the camps their heads were shaven, and they 
were given formless clothing. Starvation meant loss of body weight, especially 
from their breasts and hips. This diminished their quintessentially feminine attrib-
utes (Flaschka, 2010). Perhaps the rape of these women served, paradoxically, to 
reinforce their gender identity that had hitherto been challenged by the camp 
environment. In this context, rape may have functioned to remind women that 
they were women in an environment that challenged their identities as women 
(Flaschka, 2010). In fact, the survivor accounts presented above – and many 
others – suggest that this was the case. This does not support the notion that 
victims were dehumanised before they were raped.
According to an anonymous female survivor, ‘[a]mong the many defeats at 
the end of  this war is the defeat of  the male sex’ (Anonymous, 1954/2011, p. 64). 
Based on the laws of  The Protection of German Blood and German Honor and 
Rassenschande, one way of  interpreting the actions of  soldiers of  the Third 
Reich is to view them as the actions of  weak men: their actions had an existen-
tial cost and undermined their German identity. This may have been the conse-
quence of  their actions, yet, what was their purpose? Mass rape in this instance 
did not occur. Its use was not explicitly genocidal. Impregnated women were 
killed so the aim of  rape in this context, unlike genocidal rape in other contexts, 
was not to contaminate the bloodline or to reproduce an ethnically mixed cohort 
of  children.
In terms of contextualising and interpreting the behaviour of German men, 
sexualised violence was not enacted upon a dehumanised body. It was carried 
18Interview 1544, USC Shoah Foundation testimony.
19Interview 23436, USC Shoah Foundation testimony.
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out on the reproductive bodies of Jewish women. It was, as Patterson (2013) has 
argued, an assault on Jewish motherhood, as the source of the Jewish people is 
the Jewish mother. The concentration camps were described as places that were 
the anti-thesis of the maternal. In the concentration camps, motherly love – preg-
nancy and maternity itself  – were capital crimes, often resulting in women’s imme-
diate death.
Forced sterilisation and forced abortion are acts of reproductive genocidal vio-
lence. Unlike the use of rape, they did not contradict the Nazi eugenic vision of 
creating an Aryan race. Their devastating genocidal logic is apparent. Both exam-
ples, however, benefit from an analysis which views Jewish women as an essential-
ised group: woman-as-Jew. Moving beyond the dehumanisation thesis allows us 
to understand the political, racial and gendered dynamics (intersubjective) and 
meanings (degradation/humiliation) behind this sexualised and reproductive vio-
lence. In the context of the Holocaust, I would argue that Jewish women faced a 
double jeopardy: first as women (as socially, economically and politically subor-
dinate to men) and second, as Jews (perceived to be racially inferior to Germans). 
From a gendered perspective, both the feminine/feminised (through rape) and 
maternal Jewish body were attacked.
Having considered sexualised and genocidal violence against Jewish women 
during the Holocaust, this chapter will now address both phenomena against 
Bengali women and girls during the 1971 Liberation War.
Rape and Genocidal Violence During the  
1971 Liberation War in Bangladesh
Following the partition from India during the 1940s, Pakistan was divided into 
West (now Pakistan) and East Pakistan. Following three decades of tension – 
stemming from the economic, political and racial marginalisation of East Paki-
stan by the West – in March 1971, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) declared its 
independence. This led to the 1971 Liberation War (Takai, 2011; see also Bose, 
2007; Brownmiller, 1975; Mookherjee, 2006, 2007, 2015; Sharlach, 2000). It is 
estimated that 3 million people died during this nine-month war (Mookherjee, 
2006, 2007, 2015; Sharlach, 2000).
There is a paucity of literature on the subject of the Liberation War in Bangla-
desh both generally and specifically on the use of rape and sexual violence during 
the war. As articulated by a survivor:
There is an erasure of the 1971 history of genocide committed 
by Pakistan in Bangladesh in the world holocaust archives … It 
is important to record that this is one of the world’s earliest and 
most heinous genocides, where perhaps the largest number of 
women were targeted by systematic rape, torture and subsequent 
execution. (Dr Rabbee, a survivor, as cited in Hossain, 2016)
Like with the other examples discussed, and as noted above, genocide was a 
feature of this war. This was a genocide committed by West Pakistanis against 
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East Pakistani Bengalis. West Pakistanis were an exclusively Muslin group, while 
East Pakistani Bengalis were an ethnic group comprised mainly of Hindus, as well 
as some Muslims. The former deemed the latter racially inferior (Sharlach, 2000; 
Takai, 2011). Responding to the genocide – and believing that non-Bengalis were 
supporting West  Pakistan – the Bengalis attacked and murdered 150,000 non-
Bengalis in East Pakistan (Sharlach, 2000). Over the course of the nine months, 
West Pakistani soldiers raided houses, killed men and raped Bengali women of all 
castes and religions (Brownmiller, 1975, Sharlach, 2000). And while it is impor-
tant to acknowledge that this was a genocide committed against the Bengalis 
as an ethnic group (see Beachler, 2007 for a detailed review of this genocide), 
gender played a significant role during this war. Gender-based violence (GBV) 
was committed against males and females during this war. While men and boys 
were executed and expelled during this genocide, regrettably there is a dearth of 
in-depth information about their experiences. By no means do I wish to diminish 
the violence(s) inflicted upon men and boys during this nine-month war however, 
given the focus of this chapter, I will be addressing the unique sex-based viola-
tions women and girls suffered during and in the aftermath of this war.
It is estimated that between 200,000 and 400,000 women and girls were raped 
during the genocide (Mookherjee, 2007, 2015; Sharlach, 2000; Takai, 2011. Some 
have contested these figures. See Bose (2007) for a more detailed discussion). In 
the words of a reporter:
A stream of victims and eyewitnesses tell how truckloads of Paki-
stani soldiers … swooped down on villages in the night, rounding 
up women by force. Some were raped on the spot. Others were car-
ried off  to military compounds. (War correspondent Joseph Fired 
as cited in Brownmiller, 1975, p. 79)
This is corroborated by a survivor who – translating an excerpt from the book 
Ami Birangona Bolchi (The War Heroine Speaks) – states:
[Women were] abducted, tortured and raped in concentration camps 
by the Pakistani army who set up rape camps in all towns and vil-
lages they went to. It was part of a systematic plan to disempower 
and destroy the vertebrae of Bengali society. (cited in Hossain, 2016)
The assaults against women were widespread and systematic: the Pakistani 
army raped hundreds and thousands of  Bengali women and girls leading, in 
part, to the ‘destruction of  the Bengalis as a group’ (Takai, 2011, p. 414). Rape, 
in this instance, was used as a weapon of  war. According to Newsweek (1971), 
it was used as a ‘…calculated policy of  terror amounting to genocide (as cited 
in Sharlach, 2000, p. 95). In a similar vein to the rape of  Jewish women by 
German men, this violence was not carried out on a dehumanised group: it 
was carried out on an ethnic group deemed racially inferior. Before moving on 
to consider rape and sexualised violence against Bengali women and girls, it is 
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worth pausing to outline the steps involved when dehumanising an ethnic 
group that has been identified as inferior.
This process of  identifying certain groups as lesser is based on the logic of 
‘us-them’ distinctions. This involves highlighting and exaggerating the differ-
ences between an in-group and an out-group. Closely related to this concept is 
moral disengagement. This involves a process of  detachment, whereby certain 
‘individuals and groups are placed outside of  the moral boundary’ (Waller, 2012, 
p. 88). For Waller (2012, p. 89) ‘[m]oral disengagement is facilitated by the dehu-
manisation of  the victims’. The argument goes like this: dehumanisation occurs 
when the target group is identified as a separate category of  people belonging 
to a distinct racial, ethnic, religious or political group that perpetrators view as 
inferior and/or threatening. I disagree. Surely identifying ‘them’ as belonging to 
an identifiable ‘group’ contradicts the central premise of  the dehumanisation 
argument? Furthermore, this ‘Othering’ of  the victim does not always involve 
dehumanising the victim. Less dramatic processes to that of  dehumanisation are 
that of  ‘difference’ and ‘distance’. The concept of  ‘difference’, which is based on 
‘us-them’ thinking or, ‘Othering’, creates a ‘social context for cruelty’ (Waller, 
2012, p. 92). In this context, victims, in this case the Bengali ethnic group, are 
placed in binary opposition to the perpetrators. They become the vessel onto 
which perpetrators project all of  their anxieties, insecurities and hostilities. The 
out-group are disparaged and treated as undesirable and unwanted elements of 
society (Lang, 2010).
Having outlined my opposition to the dehumanisation thesis, let us continue 
with our discussion of rape and sexualised violence committed against Bengali 
women and girls. The Women’s Media Centre, specifically the Women Under 
Siege journalism project, is dedicated to researching how rape and other forms of 
sexualised violence are used as weapons during war/armed conflict. In their sec-
tion on the war in Bangladesh, they outline how sexualised violence was used as 
a weapon during this war (see Women’s Media Centre (WMC), n.d.). The rapes 
involved sexual torture and gang rape. Women were often murdered after they 
were raped. Some women died from their injuries and some killed themselves fol-
lowing the assault (Sharlach, 2000). According to a local newspaper, others ‘…
fled to Pakistan with their Pakistani captors rather than face what awaited them 
in Bangladeshi society’ (WMC, n.d.).
Here I would like to remind readers of  Halbmayr’s (2010) notion of  sexual-
ised violence discussed above. Specifically, the idea that sexual violence encom-
passes both indirect and direct forms of  sex-based violations that include: 
humiliation, intimidation and destruction. Indeed, the impact of  sexual vio-
lence committed against Bengali women and girls was not just physical. It was 
also social and psychological (as in the case of  Rwanda and the former Yugo-
slavia discussed earlier). As established, the consequences of  genocidal rape 
are death, both literally and figuratively (social and psychological). In terms of 
the latter, in Bangladesh, female victims were ostracised; and their families and 
their communities were ‘spoiled’ (Brownmiller, 1975; Mookherjee, 2006, 2015, 
Sharlach, 2000).
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Becoming Abject: The Individual and Social Consequences 
of Rape
Here I will return to a point raised in the Introduction: pre-war gender arrange-
ments and social divisions. In the context of Bangladesh, the importance of 
pre-war gender relations needs to be considered alongside religious and cultural 
traditions. Prior to the war, Bengali women lived in strict isolation from men, 
both in public and in the home. Modesty and chastity were key features of this 
Purdah-based culture and family honour was linked to a woman’s status (Brown-
miller, 1975; Takai, 2011). Regarded as men’s private property, the rape of women 
in Bangladeshi society was treated as an insult to the husband (Mookherjee, 
2006). Following the war, female victims of genocidal rape were expelled from 
these respectable communities. They were blamed for bringing dishonour on their 
families and many families shunned these women (Sharlach, 2000; Takai, 2011). 
The deliberate use of rape to achieve this humiliation and the destruction of the 
group amounts to genocide.
Diken and Lausten (2005) discuss these ideas of  humiliation and shame in 
relation to abjection. In their article, Becoming Abject: Rape as a Weapon of War, 
they draw upon the concept of  abjection in their discussion of  the rape victim. 
Put simply, the abject is that which provokes disgust. It is that which is deemed 
perverse, dangerous and threatening (Kristeva, 1982). In her book, Powers of 
Horror: An Essay on Abjection, Kristeva (1982) provides a detailed analysis of 
abjection. Treating that which is abject as a form of pollution, she distinguishes 
between abjection from without (disease) and abjection from within (menstrual 
blood). Here, I am interested in applying her ideas about impurity, contamina-
tion and defilement to the excluded bodies of  women violated during war. To do 
so, I will draw on the work of  Diken and Lausten (2005, p. 113). They argue that 
rape victims often view themselves as abject, ‘dirty’ and morally inferior; and 
regard their bodies as marked by a stigma that is hard to remove. Key to my pur-
pose here is their assertion that abjection is communal as well as individual. This 
is because, according to the twisted logic of  the coding of  woman-as-nation, 
genocidal rape is not simply an attack upon an individual female, it is an attack 
upon the group to which she belongs. Diken and Lausten (2005) also discuss the 
pollution/contamination associated with rape and the impact this has on the 
purity of  the victim.
On the subject of both the physical and the social-symbolic element of geno-
cide, Card (2008, p. 180) argues that while ‘physical destruction’, as outlined in 
the genocide convention, can relate to mass murder or the ‘interference with bio-
logical reproduction’ (as in the case of forced pregnancy resulting from genocidal 
rape), there are other ways to physically destroy a community. Here she proposed 
the idea of genocide as ‘social death’; as the destruction of ‘social vitality’. By 
social death, she means that victims are stripped of their group membership and 
their social identities, of attributes that give their lives meaning.
While Diken and Lausten’s (2005) analysis is based on the Bosnian war. I want 
to apply their thinking, and Card’s (2008) notion of social death, to the 1971 
Liberation War in Bangladesh.
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Birangonas (war heroines) was the term used by the Bengali government to 
refer to all of the female victims of rape during the Bangladesh war (see Mookher-
jee, 2015 for a more detailed discussion). They set up rehabilitation centres for 
the survivors and offered rewards to men who would marry the raped women 
(Mookherjee, 2006, 2007, 2015). Yet, their attempts were unsuccessful. Instead of 
being valorised as war heroines, they were treated with disrespect (Takai, 2011). 
Most Bengalis refused to issue marriage proposals or allow survivors to return to 
their families (Sharlach, 2000). As a result, many fled to West Pakistan or com-
mitted suicide (Takai, 2011). Paradoxically, alongside these public attempts to 
reintegrate female victims/survivors, attempts were also made to conceal the sex-
ual violence that had occurred during the nine-month war.
Mookherjee (2006, p. 433) considers the silence and public secrecy surrounding 
the use of rape against Bengali women and girls. She highlights the contradictions 
between survivors’ ‘national position as icons of honor’ and their treatment in 
their communities where villagers would subject them to various forms of khota 
(sarcastic and scornful comments). As one survivor recalls: ‘I was branded a bad 
girl, a slut…by local people’ (Das, 2011). Based on the lives of three women, 
Kajoli, Moyna, and Rohima, from Enayetpur, a village in western Bangladesh, 
Mookherjee (2006) traces the various subjectivities that were constructed in rela-
tion to the raped women (see also Mookherjee, 2015). As a result of khota, which 
affected both the women and their families, the women refrained from mixing and 
socialising with others for fear of being scorned. They also refrained from talking 
about what had happened, believing it was too shameful. Shame in this context 
is linked to family and community. In addition, sexuality, purity and honour are 
linked with shame. Indeed, as relayed by the women, man ijjot – ‘meaning sta-
tus and honor linked to sexual relationships’ – is of the utmost importance (see 
Mookherjee, 2006, p. 438).
Understanding the Genocidal Rape in Bangladesh
Taking on board this work by Diken and Lausten (2005); Card (2008) and 
Mookherjee (2006), all discussed above, as well as evidence from survivors, 
reporters and eyewitnesses, I posit that the rape and sexualised violence com-
mitted against Bengali women and girls amounts to the crime of genocide. Here, 
physical destruction is not simply based on ‘killing members of the group or, 
causing serious bodily harm’, it is also caused through social death. The depiction 
of raped woman as abject, inferior, polluted and in need of expulsion, caused seri-
ous mental harm. This is included in the definition of genocide.
There is also evidence to suggest that forced impregnation (defined above) was 
the aim behind the mass rape of Bengali women and girls of reproductive age 
(Takai, 2011). In the words of a Pakistani soldier: ‘[w]e are going. But we are 
leaving our seed behind’ (as cited by Sharlach, 2000, p. 95). However, the claim of 
forced impregnation is hard to prove. Debates have emerged within the literature 
on the subject of genocidal rape. For some, forced impregnation is what consti-
tutes genocide, not the rape itself. For others, proving intent is problematic (see 
Card, 2008; Cudd, 2008; Sharlach, 1999, 2000). Indeed, I use these deliberations 
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to inform discussions with my students during seminars. A common response 
from these students is: ‘if  the consequences of an act are genocidal does it matter 
if  there was no intent…?’ The answer is yes. An act is defined as genocidal based 
on its intent to destroy. Herein lies the conundrum. Even if  the consequences of 
rape appear to be genocidal – that is they destroy in whole or in part members 
of a group – this is redundant if  genocidal intent was absent. Regardless then, if, 
in some instances, the consequences of rape may speak to some of the elements 
listed under the genocide convention: pregnancy following rape by members of 
a different ethnic group, expulsion of the group and so on, this will not count as 
genocide, unless enacted with the explicit intent of destroying members of the 
group. A prime example of this is the case of Bangladesh.
With regards to rape, as outlined above, there is sufficient evidence to sug-
gest that this was used as a genocidal tool. There is less support, however, for 
the case of  forced impregnation. Forced pregnancy, like rape, can constitute the 
crime of  genocide. Article 11(d) of  the Genocide Convention involves ‘impos-
ing measures intended to prevent births within the group’ (The Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of  the Crime of  Genocide, 2014). As mentioned 
earlier, forced pregnancy prevents women from carrying babies from their own 
ethnic group. And:
By preventing births within the target group, perpetrators of 
forced pregnancy are ‘deliberately inflicting’ on the target group 
conditions of life that will cause the destruction (i.e., weakening 
by de-population) of the target group. (Takai, 2011, p. 404)
According to numerous sources, 25,000 babies were born as a result of the wide-
spread use of rape during the 1971 war (Brownmiller, 2011; Takai, 2011). Viewed 
as a constant reminder of the assault on Bengali society, as well as its cultural 
identity, these war-babies were rejected by the Bangladeshi government. Female 
survivors were either forced to have abortions or give their babies up for adop-
tion oversees (Brownmiller, 1975, Mookherjee, 2007). I will discuss both of these 
issues in more detail below.
Despite the number of babies born as a result of the systematic rape of Bengali 
women, there are, Takai (2011) argues, problems in prosecuting forced pregnancy 
as a crime of genocide. In a very detailed article, Takai (2011) outlines the reasons 
for this. First, the perpetrators must be of a different ethnic group to the victims 
in order for it to contaminate the bloodline or to involve the ‘transferring of 
children’ from one group to the other. Therefore, to paraphrase Takai (2011), as 
the Bangladeshi government can only prosecute Bengali nationals with this crime 
(where perpetrator and victim are of the same ‘bloodline’), forced pregnancy 
cannot be tried and charged in this case. Second, within international criminal 
law (as outlined above), forced pregnancy requires the detention of the victim 
for the full length of the pregnancy (this is a theme I will return to in chapter 
4). Despite evidence that rape camps did exist (Brownmiller, 1975, WMC, n.d.), 
there is insufficient evidence to prove that victims were detained until they gave 
birth (see Takai, 2011 for more details). The legal requirements regarding forced 
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pregnancy notwithstanding, I would argue that these acts of sexualised violence 
are also examples of reproductive violence: pregnancies resulting from rape are a 
violation of women’s reproductive autonomy.
The Regulation of Women’s Post-war Reproductive Bodies
Even if  forced pregnancy, as an act of genocide, cannot be proven in the case of 
the 1971 war, it is still important to unpack the impact and implications these 
pregnancies had for female victims/survivors. In her research on raped Bengali 
women, and their ‘war-babies’, Mookherjee (2007) considers how the State 
attempted to rehabilitate these women and, in the process, regulate their repro-
ductive bodies. This speaks to Grey’s (2017) notion of reproductive violence.
Following the war, the new government set up rehabilitation centres offer-
ing women abortions or adoption for those too far along in their pregnancies to 
undergo an abortion (Mookherjee, 2007, see also Brownmiller, 1975). During this 
time, the State lifted the ban on both of these practices to facilitate the removal of 
these ‘war-babies’, who brought with them painful memories of war (Mookher-
jee, 2007). Motherhood, in the immediate aftermath of the war in Bangladesh, 
was premised on protecting raped women from ‘the emotions of motherhood’ 
through the use of these State policies (Mookherjee, 2007, p. 339). Furthermore, 
this construction of motherhood draws a distinction between legitimate and ille-
gitimate motherhood ‘…and emphasizes a nationalist project that seeks to con-
tain illegitimate motherhoods so that these same women might become available 
to nation-building programmes as legitimate mothers’ (Mookherjee, 2007, p. 350).
It can be argued that this removal of  ‘war-babies’ (Mookherjee, 2007) was 
part of  a cleansing ritual, designed to purify the abject, polluted woman. In the 
words of  one survivor: ‘Bangladesh became a free nation and I a fallen woman’ 
(Das, 2011). But more than that – and here we return to Cohn’s woman-as-
nation  thesis – these State policies restored national honour through the control/ 
regulation of  women’s sexual and reproductive bodies. In the context of  the 
Indian subcontinent, we might think of  Cohn’s phrase along these lines: nation-
as-mother and woman as mothers of  the nation.
This regulation of motherhood can be contrasted to the assault on Jewish 
motherhood (discussed above) in the following ways. In the context of the Holo-
caust, the separation of children from their mothers and the removal of their 
capacity to reproduce children from their own ethnic group (through forced abor-
tion and forced sterilisation) formed part of the Nazi genocidal campaign. In 
the case of Bangladesh, while the removal of ‘war-babies’ was not done through 
explicit use of force, this was, nevertheless, a State-wide policy. A policy carried 
out in response to genocide, rather than a component of it. It was the antidote, 
rather than the annihilation.
Concluding Comments
Both of the cases discussed in detail in this chapter are illustrations of the 
woman-as-nation thesis. In the first example, rape by German soldiers against 
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Jewish women was not an official strategy of the war. In the second example, rape 
was used as a tool of genocide. Yet in both examples, sexualised violence was 
genocidal. It was used as an attack upon the nation’s culture of women. Context-
specific analyses reformulate the coding of woman-as-nation to: woman-as-Jew, 
in the case of the Holocaust, and mother-as-nation, in the case of Bangladesh. 
It can be argued that less is known and/or has been written about the use of rape 
and sexualised violence during these genocides. Only recently has research been 
carried out on the subject of sexualised violence against Jewish women during the 
Holocaust (see Banwell, 2016 for a more detailed review). Unfortunately, research 
into rape and sexualised violence during the 1971 Bangladesh War remains lim-
ited. It is hoped that this chapter, which has also included the concept of repro-
ductive violence, has enriched the reader’s knowledge and understanding of the 
gender-specific and the unique ways in which women were targeted during these 
genocides. Moving on to more recent examples of gender and the violence(s) of 
armed conflict, the next chapter focuses on rape and sexual violence in the DRC.
Chapter 2
Conflict-related Sexual Violence  
in the DRC
Introduction
The book, A Thousand Sisters: My Journey into the Worst Place on Earth to Be 
a Woman, was written by Lisa Shannon. It is based on her ‘work’ in the DRC. 
Lisa first learned about rape and the crimes being committed in the Congo after 
watching an episode of Oprah. After conducting more research into the atroci-
ties being committed in the DRC, she asked herself: ‘what if  I had tried to help?’ 
(Shannon, 2011, p. 37). This question would lead Lisa to abandon her career, her 
fiancé and her comfortable life in the US to raise money and dedicate herself  to 
the plight of raped women in the DRC.
In the foreword to the book, Zainab Salbi (as cited in Shannon, 2011, p.12 
emphasis in the original) explains that for survivors, theirs is a story of ‘triumph 
over evil, the sheer force of will to survive and stand tall’. Shannon’s, on the other 
hand:
[…] is a heroine’s journey of a woman…who was not afraid to 
confront the conflict in the Congo, who did not worry about how 
much it would cost her personally to engage.
Zainab continues:
Lisa Shannon is one of those individuals who has decided to 
take a stand against an evil that does not oppress her directly but 
offends her with its very existence.
Shannon herself  admits that, despite living a good life before going to the DRC, 
she was not very happy. Her journey to the Congo, and her work with raped 
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women, gave her sense of meaning. These women inspired her, she explains, and 
she tried to restructure her life to emulate theirs. It is hard to separate Shannon’s 
own personal reasons for going to the DRC (her belief  that it would fill a void 
in her own life) from her genuine desire to address the atrocities being commit-
ted there. To clarify: I am not criticising Shannon per se. It is clear from survivor 
testimonies that they have benefited (perhaps only on a superficial level) from her 
fundraising activities and grassroots activism in the DRC. My concern is that 
this speaks to the broader pattern of the securitisation (Hirschauer, 2014) and 
fetishisation (Meger, 2016a, 2016b) of wartime rape and sexual violence outlined 
in the Introduction.
Baaz and Stern (2013) voice similar reservations regarding Lisa Shannon’s 
story. For them, Lisa Shannon’s journey to the Congo, and her work with victims, 
is an example of a gendered civilising mission. Lisa’s mission, according to their 
analysis of the postcolonial feminist critique, is an example of the ‘white savior 
narrative’, where marginalised women of colour in the Global South are ‘rescued’ 
by their more emancipated western sisters (recall my discussion in the Introduc-
tion of the visuality/master narrative of the GET CROSS! campaign). Let us 
unpack this postcolonial feminist critique in more detail. Postcolonial feminists 
challenge essentialist claims of ‘woman’ as a universal and homogenous category, 
recognising women’s diverse identities, locations and experiences (Agathangelou & 
Turcotte, 2015; Mohanty, 1988; Steans, 2013). Postcolonial feminists acknowl-
edge ‘…the impact and ongoing legacies of colonialism and imperialism [and] 
forms of neo-colonial and neo-imperialist domination’ (Steans, 2013, p. 124). 
This scholarship draws attention to inequalities and divisions between the Global 
North and the Global South, both past and present (Agathangelou & Turcotte, 
2015; McKinnon, 2016; Mohanty, 1988; Olivius, 2016a, 2016b; Spivak, 1988; 
Steans, 2013). It criticises hegemonic (read as western) discourses for oriental-
ist and ethnocentric depictions of individuals in colonised lands. Within these 
narratives, men are often depicted as other, inferior and savage (Steans, 2013), 
while the ‘average third-world’ woman is regarded as ‘…ignorant, poor, unedu-
cated, tradition-bound, religious, domesticated, family-oriented, victimized…’ 
(Mohanty, 1988, p. 65). And finally, postcolonial feminists problematise gender 
mainstreaming policy and practice (Agathangelou & Turcotte, 2015) by question-
ing the actions of privileged western women who claim to be speaking for, and 
working on behalf  of, their non-liberated, non-western, oppressed counterparts 
(Mohanty, 1988; Spivak, 1988).
Of particular note within the postcolonial feminist critique is Spivak’s pivotal 
essay, Can the subaltern speak? In this piece, Spivak (1988, p. 76) critiques western 
(postcolonial) academic writing – specifically Foucault and Deleuze’s conversa-
tions about power, desire and subjectivity – for the ways in which it/they speak 
for and re-present the subaltern. On the subject of epistemic violence, she states: 
‘[t]he clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orches-
trated, far-flung, and heterogenous project to constitute the colonial subject as 
Other’. Epistemic violence refers to the harm that is done through knowledge and 
discourse when certain voices/experiences are obscured (Teo, 2014). The example 
that Spivak (1988, p. 76) uses to illustrate this is ‘the epistemic violence of the 
Conflict-related Sexual Violence in the DRC   45
codification of Hindu Law’, specifically widow sacrifice in India. In a bid to ‘save’ 
and protect Indian women from this ritual, the British abolished widow sacrifice 
in 1829. As Spivak (1988, p. 94 emphasis in the original) explains:
[…] what interests me is that the protection of woman (today the 
‘third-world woman’) becomes a signifier for the establishment of 
a good society…In this particular case, the process also allowed 
the redefinition as a crime of what had been tolerated, known, or 
adulated as ritual…
Through this example, we see how western imperial powers make decisions on 
behalf  of women they deem as objects in need of protection; individuals who can-
not speak or make decisions for themselves.
Departing from this scholarship on the securitisation and fetishisation of rape 
and sexual violence in the Congo – as well as the gendered civilising missions that 
accompany these processes – I examine the feminist political economy of violence 
against women and girls in the DRC. Following on from the previous chapter, this 
facilitates an understanding of how gender informs the experiences of victims/
survivors and perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). It does so 
across three levels of analysis: macro- meso- and micro.
The feminist political economy approach addresses the relationship between 
the economic, the social and the political (see Alsaba & Kapilashrami, 2016; 
Davies & True, 2015; Meger, 2016a; True, 2010, 2012). It also addresses the macro- 
(global), meso- and micro- (local) contexts within which gender-based violence 
(GBV) occurs. It demonstrates how GBV is both produced and reproduced within 
and beyond the conflict zone. Existing research on the political economy of vio-
lence against women and girls in the DRC analyses the links between economic 
globalisation, neoliberalism (as it relates to the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund) and the violence(s) of armed conflict (see Leatherman, 2011; 
Meger, 2015; Mullins & Rothe, 2008; Turshen, 2016). I use this work as a spring-
board to provide a feminist analysis of rape and sexual violence in the DRC. I do 
so by drawing on the concept of globalisation masculinities. These include mas-
culinities of conquest and settlement, masculinities of empire and masculinities 
of postcolonialism and neoliberalism (Connell, 1998, 2005). In this chapter, I will 
consider masculinities of postcolonialism and neoliberalism, focusing mainly on 
the latter and how it interacts with economic globalisation and hyper-capitalism 
vis-à-vis the conflict in the DRC (more on this shortly).
As noted in the previous chapter, there are two main schools of thought 
within the literature on wartime rape and sexual violence. The first views sexual 
violence as a by-product of war/armed conflict: an inevitable part of conflict 
(for a more detailed discussion, see Baaz & Stern, 2013; Banwell, 2016; Cohen, 
Green, & Wood, 2013; Davies & True, 2015; Fogelman, 2012; Meger, 2016a; 
Schneider, Banholzer, & Albarracin, 2015; Wood, 2014). The second – the 
weapon-of-war paradigm – emphasises the strategic purposes of this violence 
(Askin, 2003; Buss, 2009; Card, 1996; Leatherman, 2011; Mackenzie, 2010). 
In the context of this chapter, and its analysis of the DRC, I will be arguing that 
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rape falls under this second category. Its use is widespread, and it is being used as 
a tactic by actors within and beyond the conflict zone.
When I first started writing about the Congo, back in 2011, rape was 
being used as a weapon of  war at an alarming rate (Africa Research Bulletin, 
2011; Holmes, 2007; Meger, 2010; Ohambe, Muhigwa, & Wa Mamba, 2005). 
When I wrote this chapter over the course of  2018–2019, fighting had resumed 
in the Congo and there was a resurgence in the use of  rape as a terror tactic 
against civilians. While improvements have been made with regards to inter-
national trade regulations, as well as Congolese rape laws, that armed groups 
and security forces still engage in the illegal exploitation of  minerals contained 
within the DRC – using rape to gain access to such sites – speaks to the per-
sistence of  CRSV in the Congo. What follows is an analysis that draws upon 
both of  these periods in order to best illustrate the conflict-related crimes being 
committed in the DRC.
Outline of the Chapter
This chapter argues that the rape and sexual violence committed in the DRC 
is being perpetrated and/or facilitated at the macro-, meso- and micro- lev-
els. Beginning with an outline of  the terminology used, the chapter then pro-
vides an overview of  the origins and current status of  the conflict in the DRC. 
This is followed with a review of  the use of  rape and sexual violence within 
the Congo. Drawing on the feminist political economy approach, the chapter 
then traces how GBV operates at all three levels in the DRC. It starts with 
an examination of  the macro-level. Here I tease out the economic dimension 
of  the conflict, drawing on globalisation masculinities to unpack the relation-
ship between neoliberalism, business masculinity, hyper-capitalism and the 
State-corporate crimes being committed in the DRC. The chapter then moves 
on to examine the meso-level, exploring heterosexual militarised masculinity; 
pre-existing gender inequalities within Congolese society, concluding with a 
review of  rape laws in the Congo. These sections comprise the main body of 
this chapter. They are followed by an analysis of  the micro-level. This section 
includes an exploration of  how individual men use rape and sexual violence to 
subvert their marginal positions within the gender hierarchy. While this section 
is shorter than the previous sections, nevertheless, it conveys how individual 
men contribute to, and gain from, the political economy of  this conflict. As a 
result of  these economic (hyper-capitalist), political and gendered (hegemonic 
heterosexual masculinity) aspirations – which operate at all three levels – rape 
is used as a weapon of  war against women and girls in the Congo. Not only 
does this breach international rape laws, it also implicates transnational com-
panies in State-corporate crimes.
The chapter closes with some suggestions on how we should respond to the 
war crimes and crimes against humanity being committed in the DRC. Here, the 
merits of using a gendered lens to tackle GBV at the macro-, meso- and micro-
levels is explored.
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Terminology
This chapter draws on the following definition of State crimes, as outlined by 
Mullins and Rothe (2008, p. 83):
Any action that violates international public law, and/or a [S]tates’ 
own domestic law when these actions are committed by individual 
actors acting on behalf  of, or in the name of the [S]tate even when 
such acts are motivated by their personal economical, political 
and ideological interests.
The term hyper-capitalism is used to convey the speed and intensity of the 
global market where business interests seem to dominate all elements of life 
(Gurashi, 2017; Vujnovic, 2017). ‘[C]ritical scholars believe that this new type 
of capitalist system has moved towards an extreme laissez-faire capitalism that 
is marked by greed, selfishness, destruction, wars, and exploitation’ (Ritzer, 2011 
as cited in Gurashi, 2017, pp. 184–185). In this chapter, I examine how hyper-
capitalism ‘…places the interests and demands of capital and its controllers above 
the interests and needs of…nations’ (Mullins & Rothe, 2008, p. 83) and creates 
criminogenic environments within the political economy of war.
The types of GBV being committed in the Congo include, but are not limited 
to: rape and sexual violence (both are linked to and separate from the conflict); 
sexual exploitation; forced and early marriage, as well as forced recruitment of 
child soldiers (both boys and girls); domestic violence; female genital mutilation 
(Home Office, 2018); and labour trafficking and trafficking for sexual purposes 
(Jenkins, 2012). CRSV refers to:
[R]ape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
forced abortion, enforced sterilisation, forced marriage and any 
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated 
against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly 
linked to a conflict. (United Nations (UN), 2018b, p. 3)
This chapter focuses on rape and sexual violence against women and girls in the 
DRC. In this context then, GBV and CRSV are limited to rape and sexual vio-
lence. I will use the term CRSV when referring to rape and sexual violence to 
acknowledge that this violence is linked to the conflict.
Before we begin unpacking the use of rape and sexual violence in the DRC, it 
will be useful to review the origins of this conflict.
The Conflict in the DRC: Past and Present
Space will not permit a detailed analysis of the origins of the conflict in the 
DRC (for a more detailed discussion of this history, see Human Rights Watch 
[HRW], 2005, 2008; Meger, 2010). Rather, what follows is a brief  overview of this 
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complex armed conflict. The armed conflict in the DRC dates back to 1998. Offi-
cially, the conflict ended in 2002 following a peace agreement. However, the fight-
ing did not cease and new rebel groups, to the time of writing, remain active in 
the eastern part of the Congo.
Often described as ‘Africa’s World War’ – as it involved at least nine African 
nations – this conflict is best understood in the wider context of other regional 
conflicts: the civil wars in Angola, Sudan and Uganda and the Rwandan geno-
cide (Meger, 2010, p. 124; see also Leatherman, 2011; Mantz, 2008, p. 35). Gov-
ernment forces of the aforementioned countries, along with foreign groups, have 
formed alliances with internal armed groups in the DRC creating both an internal 
and an international dimension to the conflict (HRW, 2005).
In 1996, Laurent Kabila overthrew President Mobutu, Zaire’s longstanding 
dictator. He was supported by both the Ugandan ‘People’s Defense Force’ and 
the Rwandan ‘Patriotic Army’ (Meger, 2010, p. 125). Once installed as president, 
Kabila renamed the country ‘The Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (HRW, 
2006). Despite their support, once in power, Kabila began removing Rwandans 
from senior positions within his government (HRW, 2002; Meger, 2010). This 
was met with hostility from Rwandan and Ugandan government forces who 
attempted a coup in 1998 (HRW, 2006; Meger, 2010). Their attempts to remove 
Kabila from power were unsuccessful. Due, in large part, to the support of Zim-
babwe and Angola, Kabila retained his position (HRW, 2002). The support pro-
vided by Zimbabwe and Angola was purely strategic: both countries had failing 
economies; access to Congolese minerals would alleviate their diminishing econo-
mies (Meger, 2010). After their unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Kabila, the 
governments of Rwanda and Uganda began supporting the various rebel groups 
who were fighting against Laurent Kabila’s government in the eastern provinces 
of the DRC. These rebel groups included: the Congolese Rally for Democracy, 
the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, as well as the community-based 
rebel group, the Mai Mai (HRW, 1999; Meger, 2010, p. 125).
Following the assassination of Laurent Kabila in 2001, fighting continued 
against the government led by Joseph Kabila, Laurent’s son. Instability char-
acterised the Congolese government during this period. Anti-government rebel 
groups, backed by Rwanda and Uganda, used this to their advantage to control 
access to the mineral-rich regions of the Congo (Meger, 2010). To complicate 
matters further, a number of extra-national militia groups subsequently joined 
the conflict, most notably the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda 
(FDLR). This group is mainly formed of Rwandan Interahamwe génocidaires, 
who were involved in the killings in Rwanda, but had fled into the region follow-
ing the end of the genocide in 1994 (The New Humanitarian, 2013). The FDLR 
resumed their violent campaign against Tutsis in the Congo. With a lack of sup-
port from the Congolese government, various Tutsi militia groups – most notably 
the National Congress for the Defense of the People headed by Laurent Nkunda 
– began fighting against both the Congolese army (Forces Armées de la Répub-
lique Démocratique du Congo – FARDC) and the FDLR (Meger, 2010; see also 
The New Humanitarian, 2013). Violence persisted in the eastern DRC, perpe-
trated by a complex network of armed groups. These included the Congolese 
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army (FARDC), the FDLR, Mai Mai groups and various other rebel groups (see 
The New Humanitarian, 2013 for a more detailed breakdown of these groups; 
see also HRW, 2006).
At the time of writing (2018), there had been renewed violence and political 
unrest in the DRC following President Joseph Kabila’s refusal to step down when 
his term ended in December 2016. Opposition groups were quickly repressed. 
Government security forces and various armed groups attacked civilians, shoot-
ing and killing a number of protestors (Burke, 2018; Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, 2018; HRW, 2018b). In addition to the political turmoil, violence between 
armed groups continues in the eastern part of the country. According to HRW 
(2018b), more than 100 armed groups remain active in North Kivu and South 
Kivu in the eastern part of the country. These groups, which include the FDLR 
and allied Nyatura groups, the Allied Democratic Forces, the Nduma Defense of 
Congo-Renové, Mai Mai groups and armed groups from Burundi, continue to 
attack and terrorise civilians. Indeed, many of the commanders of these groups 
are implicated in war crimes, including ethnic massacres, forced recruitment of 
children, and rape and pillage (HRW, 2018b, pp. 3–4). These groups continue to 
fund their activities through mineral exploitation (Burke, 2018; Council on For-
eign Relations, 2018).
Following the resurgence in fighting in the eastern part of the Congo, the 
humanitarian situation worsened, with, according to HRW (2018b, p. 4), ‘the 
country facing Africa’s largest displacement crisis in 2017.’ It is believed that 
more than 4.5 million people have been displaced, 2.7 million have been internally 
displaced, ‘famine is expected to affect 7.7 million Congolese and a national chol-
era epidemic is spreading across the country’ (HRW, 2018b, p. 4; see also Burke, 
2018; Council on Foreign Relations, 2018). Added to this, there has been a drop 
in international humanitarian funding (HRW, 2018b). Finally, exacerbating the 
situation, in June 2019 the DRC suffered an outbreak of Ebola.
Rape and Sexual Violence in the DRC
Referred to as ‘the rape capital of the world’ (Africa Research Bulletin, 2011), 
the eastern Congo has witnessed the rape of women and girls ‘…on a scale never 
seen before’ (Nolen, 2005, p. 56 cited by Meger, 2010, p. 126). The International 
Rescue Committee registered 40,000 cases of GBV in the DRC between 2003 and 
2006 (Dallman, 2009, p. 6). During this period, hundreds of thousands of women 
and girls were raped (Shannon, 2011). More than 32,000 cases of CRSV were 
registered in South Kivu between 2005 and 2007 (Holmes, 2007). It is believed 
that the actual number is more than double this (Turshen, 2016). Research by 
Ohambe et al. (2005, p. 33), based on interviews with victims and perpetrators, 
and an analysis of 3,000 files relating to cases of rape and sexual violence in the 
South Kivu region, identified four types of rape. These include: individual rape, 
gang rape, rape where victims are forced to rape one another, and rape where 
objects are inserted into women’s vaginas. The researchers also found that 70% 
of the rapes were planned in advance with a specific aim in mind: ‘to terrorize, 
loot, rape and then leave’ (Ohambe et al., 2005, p. 35). The perpetrators of CRSV 
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are not limited to armed groups, civilians are also guilty of this type of violence 
(Mertens & Pardy, 2017). Women and girls have also been subjected to sexual 
exploitation and abuse (SEA) by armed groups and UN peacekeepers (Lynch, 
2004 as cited in Meger, 2010). While this phenomenon (SEA by UN peacekeepers 
and humanitarian workers) will not be explored in the context of this chapter, it 
is an issue that I will address in subsequent chapters.
Despite the signing of  a peace agreement in 2002, the installation of  a tran-
sitional government in 2003, followed by general elections in 2006, CRSV con-
tinued to be a major problem in the DRC (Baaz & Stern, 2009; Shannon, 2011). 
During 2006, in the South Kivu province, 27,000 sexual assaults were reported 
(Onsrud, Sjøveian, Luhiriri, & Mukwege, 2008, p. 265). Due to the persistent 
use of  rape and sexual violence in the DRC, in 2008 another peace agreement 
was drafted. At this time, 22 armed groups signed a cease-fire agreement organ-
ised by the European Union, the US, the African Union and the UN (HRW, 
2008, p. 1). This peace programme contained instructions for the Congolese 
government ‘to protect civilians and respect international humanitarian and 
human rights law’ (HRW, 2008, p. 1). Yet, according to a report by HRW (2008), 
CRSV against females continued at its previous rate since the peace agreement 
was put in place. Fighting and violence continued in the eastern part of  the 
country in 2011: men, women and children continued to be targeted for crimes 
of  sexual violence. According to the UN, in 2010, 300 civilians were raped 
between July 30, 2010 and August 2, 2010, and, on New Year’s Day 2011, over 
30 women were raped in the town of  Fizi in South Kivu (see Africa Research 
Bulletin, 2011).
Renewed fighting in the DRC has led to a surge in CRSV (Burke, 2018; United 
Nations DRC, 2019). During 2018 The United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) recorded 1,049 
cases of CRSV. This figure is higher than the previous year (see United Nations 
DRC, 2019). Further evidence of the increase in rape and sexual violence is pro-
vided by a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) health worker who reported that 
60 women were raped by one armed group when it captured a village market in 
January 2018 (see Burke, 2018). The organisation found that incidents of CRSV 
had doubled each month in 2018 compared to 2017 (see Burke, 2018). There is 
a concern that, with the growing hostilities between the various ethnic groups 
who are competing over land in the Kivu region, as well as the competition over 
minerals contained in the mines, violence, including CRSV, will increase (Burke, 
2018; United Nations DRC, 2019).
In this preceding section I have provided various figures on rape and sexual 
violence in the Congo. Before we proceed, two points of clarification are required. 
First, caution must be taken when reviewing this data. To avoid engaging in the 
securitisation and fetishisation of rape and sexual violence in the Congo, we must 
remain cognizant of the various types of violence being committed there, as well 
as the fact that both genders are impacted. I am focusing on women and girls in 
this chapter as it relates to the discussion at hand. The experiences of men and 
boys will be addressed later in the book. Second, by providing this information, 
my intention is not to quantify or reduce victims’ experiences to numbers, my aim 
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is to illustrate that rape in the DRC is widespread and systematic, employed as 
a tactic and a weapon of terror in the political economy of this armed conflict.
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the feminist political economy 
approach traces the relationship between the economic, the social and the politi-
cal. It facilitates an understanding of how GBV – which affects individuals at the 
local/micro-level – is informed by institutions and global policies and practices 
that take place at the meso- and macro-levels, respectively. In the words of Leath-
erman (2011, p. 147): ‘[t]he global economy of sexual violence [in the DRC] oper-
ates at multiple levels of power and depravation’. The remainder of this chapter 
will unpack each stage of this process, beginning at the macro-level.
The Macro-level: Economic Globalisation and  
CRSV in the Congo
There is an obvious economic dimension to the sexual violence that is occur-
ring in the eastern provinces of the DRC. As noted in the Introduction, new 
war economies are decentralised and are open to the global economy (Chinkin & 
Kaldor 2013; Turshen, 2016). These wars are financed by violent and criminal 
activities. Relevant to my discussion of the DRC are the following activities: loot-
ing, pillaging, and the extraction, sale and illegal transport of minerals to trans-
national corporations through regional and international criminal networks.
Transnational corporations from various nations all compete for access and 
control over the extraction, sale and illegal transport of minerals contained in 
the eastern provinces of the DRC. Those involved include: government officials, 
foreign militia, foreign governments who back the militias, the Congolese army, 
the Mai Mai and other home-grown militia and the Interahamwe (Leatherman, 
2011; Mantz, 2008, 2010; Mullins & Rothe, 2008). According to the UN Report 
of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the DRC, 125 companies are involved in this global market, 
many of which are African-based companies, but a significant number of trans-
national corporations were also named. These included ones from UK and the 
US as well as Canada, Belgium, Germany, Israel, Switzerland and the Nether-
lands (see Mullins & Rothe, 2008, p. 92).
Combatants on the ground use rape as a tactic to terrorise the civilian popula-
tion. Using rape as a weapon allows them to maintain control over the mines that 
contain these minerals, as many of the villagers will flee their homes to escape 
the violence, thus leaving the land open to economic exploitation (Meger, 2010). 
Indeed, the DRC is believed to contain an estimated $24 trillion of untapped min-
eral resources (Council on Foreign Relations, 2018). Thus, there is an economic 
incentive for all involved to maintain the chaos of the conflict to sustain access 
to these minerals (Meger, 2010). In particular demand are gold, tin and coltan 
(Meger, 2010). The latter is a mineral used for the making of mobile phones and 
electronics, of which the DRC holds an estimated 80% of the world’s deposits 
(Leatherman, 2011; Mantz, 2008; Mullins & Rothe, 2008). Coltan, for example, 
is distributed through elaborate international channels. Whilst the government 
has attempted to issue authorised mineral extraction, official permissions are 
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redundant when, as Mullins and Rothe (2008, p. 81) note, transnationals will 
‘enter the Congolese jungles to negotiate with warlords to gain access to miner-
als’. The local militias who control access to these minerals will sell them to high-
level middlemen who in turn sell to South Africa, Rwanda, Belgium and others. 
These intermediaries then sell these minerals to customers in Europe, the US and 
Japan (Mantz, 2008). Hundreds of millions of dollars of illegally mined minerals 
continue to end up on the global market each year (see Global Witness, 2016). 
Gold, for example, passes through transit countries like Uganda, the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) and Switzerland; ending up in jewellery and electronic circuit 
boards (Global Witness, 2016, p. 2).
This illegal exploitation of conflict minerals in the DRC is not simply about 
the economic greed of particular groups within the Congo, but rather, it is an 
example of hypercapitalism and economic globalisation more broadly. Put sim-
ply, the chaos of the conflict in the DRC benefits those higher up the gender order 
who utilise the carnage of the conflict zone to obfuscate their illegal transactions. 
To draw on findings published by the ‘Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation 
of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the [DRC]’ (UN Security 
Council [UNSCR], 2002, p. 32): companies involved in the illegal exportation of 
DRC minerals contribute ‘directly or indirectly…to the ongoing conflict and to 
human rights abuses’. These internal and external actors, who rely on the chaos 
of the conflict to engage in these illegal transactions, are therefore complicit in 
committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.
In a recent study (2015), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) carried out a review of mining sites in the DRC to ensure that 
they were not contributing to the conflict through their resource procurement 
policies (OECD, 2015; see also the United States Agency for International Devel-
opment [USAID] Responsible Minerals Trade Program). Standards set by the 
OECD (2015) require that companies do not obtain resources from sites where 
there is a risk of direct or indirect support from non-State armed groups or secu-
rity forces. Data gathered from these artisanal mining sites found improvements 
in some areas, while others either stagnated or worse, witnessed an increase in the 
presence of armed groups. Data on conflict financing for 2013/2014 found that 
interference from criminal networks at mining sites involved the following: ille-
gal taxation of resources; illegal trading; digging for minerals; and forced labour 
(OECD, 2015; see also the letter of  the UN 2018a Group of  Experts on the 
DRC). Therefore, companies trading with these militarised mining sites (that are 
being exploited illegally) are not only in violation of the OECD Due Diligence 
Guidance, they are also guilty of contributing directly and indirectly to the con-
flict. And while trading has improved – the US for example, complies with supply 
chain checks that meet the OECD standard – transnational companies still fail to 
meet the minimal legal standards and therefore continue to engage in the illegal 
exploitation of minerals in the Congo (Global Witness, 2016; Institute for Secu-
rity Studies Africa, 2016; Pickles, 2016). Indeed, according to a recent survey, 
of the 275 US companies that took part, only 51% had revised how they moni-
tor their supply chains following concerns about human rights abuses. Across 
the globe, very few organisations actively monitor the supply chain risk (Pickles, 
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2016). In terms of the Congo, companies involved in the gold sector have been 
required by law, since 2002, to adhere to the OECD guidance. Many companies 
operating in the DRC have failed to meet these due diligence standards (Global 
Witness, 2016).
In order to understand the gendered nature of this enterprise, it is useful to 
draw on Connell’s gender hierarchy and her concept of globalisation masculini-
ties. For the purposes of this chapter, a brief  overview of the former will suffice. 
Connell (2005) identifies four types of masculinity: hegemonic, complicit, mar-
ginalised and subordinate. Hegemonic masculinity – as the most dominant form 
of masculinity – is positioned above the others. This is the idealised type of mas-
culinity. Complicit masculinity is available to men who enjoy the benefits of patri-
archy without displaying the dominance associated with hegemonic masculinity 
(Connell & Messerchmidt, 2005). Marginalised masculinity refers to men who 
are unable to meet the requirements of complicit or hegemonic masculinity, while 
subordinated masculinities are prevented from achieving hegemonic masculinity. 
Regardless of the historical period, hegemonic masculinity sits at the top of the 
world gender order, subordinating other masculinities and femininities. For men 
in receipt of the benefits of patriarchy and capitalism (complicit masculinity), 
hegemony does not require physical and/or sexual violence (although it may use 
force and competitive aggression); rather, as Connell and Messerschmidt (2005, 
p. 832) argue, it involves ‘ascendancy achieved through culture, institutions and 
persuasion’. For marginal masculinities, hegemony often relies on ascendancy 
through violence. In different contexts – across local and global planes – different 
methods of achieving hegemonic masculinity are employed.
Earlier I pointed to the emergence of globalisation masculinities within this 
world gender order. With regards to masculinities of postcolonialism and neo-
liberalism, to draw on Connell (1998, p. 15): the neoliberal world is a gendered 
world. It has ‘implicit gender politics and is based, in general, on the attributes 
and interests of the male entrepreneur’. It involves ‘the increasingly unregulated 
power of transnational corporations [which] places strategic power in the hands 
of particular groups of men’. In this context of a gender world order, and within 
the global arena of gender relations and global markets, ‘the hegemonic form of 
masculinity…is the masculinity associated with those who control its dominant 
institutions: the business executives who operate in global markets…’ (Connell, 
1998, p. 16). Connell refers to this as transnational business masculinity and, to 
return to the point I made above, this form of masculinity does not require physi-
cal force: ‘the patriarchal dividend on which it rests is accumulated by imper-
sonal, institutional means’ (Connell, 1998, p. 16). Indeed, as Connell and Wood 
note: ‘…[i]n discussions of contemporary capitalism, it is widely acknowledged 
that the most powerful institutions, excepting only major [S]tates, are transna-
tional corporations operating in global markets’ (Connell & Wood, 2005, p. 347).
Others have also argued that international trade and global markets are inher-
ently arenas of gender politics and gender hierarchies (Acker, 2004; Beasley, 
2008; Hooper, 2001). Furthermore, they suggest that there is an implicit mas-
culinisation that underpins these macro-structural systems in a world gender 
order (Freeman, 2001 as cited by Acker, 2004, p. 19). Hegemonic masculinity – or 
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more appropriately in this context, business masculinity – is described as 
‘aggressive, ruthless and competitive’ and ‘…is supported and reinforced by the 
ethos of  the free market, competition, and a “win or die” environment’ (Acker, 
2004, p. 29).
Let us apply this to the CRSV taking place in the DRC. At the macro-level, 
we see how international government bodies and transnational companies exploit 
economic opportunities in marginalised parts of the world; taking advantage of 
the chaos and disorder of war zones to serve their economic ambitions (Leather-
man, 2011). Business masculinity, which serves as a proxy for hegemonic mascu-
linity in this context, is deployed by elites working within these global institutions 
who take advantage of and exploit the subordinate position of allied masculini-
ties (the Congolese government and other local groups working on the ground). 
These are positioned lower down the hierarchy (Leatherman, 2011) As noted ear-
lier, as well as committing State-corporate crimes, the actions of these men – who 
are striving to achieve business masculinity within a neoliberal, gendered world 
- implicates them in war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The Meso-level: Heterosexual Masculinity and the Military
‘The militarized groups of the DRC are, like all militaries, a place where men 
learn to associate violence with masculinity’ (Meger, 2010, p. 128).
Indeed, to draw on Canning (2010, p. 854), an important aspect of rape in 
conflict is the construction of heterosexual masculinity through external social 
institutions and the socialisation process that takes place in the military. To para-
phrase Baaz and Stern (2009, p. 499): the institution of the military socialises 
men and boys to be masculine and aggressive through methods that are designed 
to produce soldiers who are able (and willing) to fight and kill (see also Canning, 
2010; Hooper, 2001; Leatherman, 2011; Meger, 2010, 2016b; Trenholm, Olsson, 
Blomqvst & Ahlberg, 2013; Zubriggen, 2010). This work stresses that this mili-
tarised heterosexual masculinity must be understood as an institutionalised and 
globalised phenomenon. With regards to the situation in the Congo, as Meger 
(2010, p. 128) argues, understanding why individual soldiers actively choose to 
engage in rape and sexual violence ‘…requires an understanding of the social 
constructions of masculinity both within Congolese society and, most impor-
tantly, within the military institution’. I will deal with these in reverse order when 
placing them at the meso- and micro-levels.
According to Ohambe et al. (2005, p. 46), the armies and militias, which con-
sist mostly of young men, are made up of individuals with very little education, 
some of whom are illiterate. The army offers these young men, whose lives are 
characterised by ‘extreme poverty and a lack of alternative employment oppor-
tunities’, a means of gaining an income and of acquiring ‘social promotion and 
power’ (Ohambe et al, 2005). Baaz and Stern (2009) explore the narratives of 
soldiers guilty of committing mass rape in the DRC. Their article focuses pri-
marily on the explanations the soldiers provide and argues that their explana-
tions of rape must be understood in relation to notions of different masculinities. 
The authors interview one of the main perpetrators of CRSV in the DRC: the 
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FARDC (Baaz & Stern, 2009). The discourses of the soldiers interviewed by Baaz 
and Stern (2009) relied heavily on constructions of masculinity (and femininity), 
which were formed and reinforced within the military institution. They state: 
‘[t]he main ideal of masculinity which the soldiers drew upon to explain sexual 
violence was that of the (hetero) sexually potent male fighter’ (Baaz & Stern, 2009, 
p. 505). Under this line of thinking, the soldier’s sexual needs are treated as a ‘nat-
ural driving force which required “satisfaction” from women whose role it is to 
satisfy these needs’ (p. 505). This depiction of masculinity, Baaz and Stern (2009) 
argue, is reproduced in many other military institutions across the globe. These 
ideas about satisfying sexual desires and the performance of militarised mascu-
linity are reproduced in the accounts of child soldiers interviewed by Trenholm 
et al. (2013) in the DRC.
The Meso-level: Pre-existing Gender Inequalities  
and CRSV in the DRC
As alluded to in the Introduction, women and girls in countries with high levels 
of gender-based discrimination and inequality are at a much higher risk of sexual 
victimisation during armed conflict (Leatherman, 2011). In the words of Freed-
man (2011, p. 171):
Sexual and gender-based violence in the DRC cannot be viewed 
merely as a product of conflict, but must also be considered in 
relation to persistent gender inequalities that characterize Congo-
lese societies.
As in the case of Iraq and Syria, these inequalities are exacerbated during conflict 
where women – who find themselves in the role of the head of household (in the 
absence of their husbands, who are missing or have been killed) – become respon-
sible for the survival of themselves and their children.
Historically, women have been victims of  domestic slavery, forced and 
unpaid labour in the Congo (I only touch upon these issues briefly here, for 
a more detailed account see Robertson & Klein’s, 1997, Women & Slavery in 
Africa). Domestic slavery was widespread throughout pre-colonial Africa. 
Slavery reduced women’s status from wife and mother to that of  commoditised 
property (Turshen, 2016, p. 45). Indeed, slave labour impacted gender relations 
more broadly. Even following abolition, women were still treated as the prop-
erty of  men and restrictions were placed upon their freedom (Turshen, 2016). 
Gender inequality remained a feature of  Congolese life post-slavery and during 
the colonial period. Women continued to face barriers in matters relating to 
land ownership, inheritance rights, access to meaningful education and access 
to divorce. These constraints would continue following independence in 1960 
(Mbambi & Faray-Kele, 2010; OECD, 2017). Within current Congolese soci-
ety, women remain disadvantaged socially, culturally and economically. For my 
purposes here, I will focus on women’s socio-cultural status. For a discussion of 
women’s economic position, see Turshen (2016).
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In terms of the socio-cultural landscape, Congolese customs place women at 
a lower status to men. Even though literacy and education rates for men are low, 
they are even lower for women, and it is uncommon for a woman to hold a posi-
tion of power or authority in Congolese society (Banwell, 2014; Meger, 2010; 
Ohambe et al., 2005). Access to education and healthcare, including reproductive 
healthcare, is severely diminished for women and girls in the DRC. With regards 
to the latter (see Emmanuel, 2016; Freedman, 2011; Luneghe, 2017), the scale 
of rape and sexual violence in the country increases the burden on an already 
deficient healthcare system (MSF, 2016). In terms of education, families make the 
decision to keep girls at home so they can assist with household tasks and provide 
additional income for the family (Freedman, 2011, p. 172) Indeed, many girls do 
not complete their primary school education (Freedman, 2011; see also Mbambi 
& Faray-Kele, 2010; OECD, 2017).
These inequalities are reflected in Congolese customary laws, which impact 
heavily on the lives of rural women. As will be discussed below, these customary 
laws at once reflect/reproduce women’s inferior status within Congolese society, 
while at the same time, they identify them as the core of the community (this is 
reminiscent of the woman-as-nation thesis and the notion of women as centres 
of gravity discussed previously).
The Family Code, a legal instrument which contains rules concerning the 
structure and organisation of the family, requires a woman to obtain her hus-
band’s consent before gaining employment or engaging in legal transactions 
(Home Office, 2018; Mbambi & Faray-Kele, 2010; OECD, 2019; Ohambe et al., 
2005). In Congolese society, women are responsible for childcare and all domestic 
responsibilities (OECD, 2019). They are, as Meger (2010) argues, considered the 
core of society. Thus (as demonstrated in the previous chapter), when a woman 
is raped, this is seen as an attack upon the entire community. It is also an attack 
upon men and (heterosexual) masculinity. A husband’s role, as outlined in Con-
golese Family Law, is to protect his wife. When a woman is raped or sexually 
assaulted, this sends a clear message to the husband that he has been unable to 
protect his wife and carry out his masculine duty (Meger, 2010). This, according 
to various writers, is why rape is such an effective weapon as it strikes at the heart 
of men’s masculine identities (Baaz & Stern, 2009; Meger, 2010). This further 
subordinates an already non-hegemonic masculinity.
The Meso-level: Rape Laws of the Congo
Before addressing how wartime rape and sexual violence are dealt with at the 
local level in the DRC, I will begin by tracing developments at the international 
level. Rape has been present in war/armed conflict throughout history. In new 
wars, its use is widespread and systematic (the weapon-of-war paradigm) (Baaz & 
Stern, 2009; Meger, 2010). Up until the 1990s, this crime remained largely invis-
ible (Dallman, 2009) or, at best, marginalised (Baaz & Stern, 2009) and was, as 
Canning (2010, p. 851) points out, ‘sidelined legally, academically, and politi-
cally’. During the last decade of the twentieth century, however, rape and sexual 
violence during armed conflict started to receive widespread media, political and 
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academic attention (Canning, 2010; Dallman, 2009, Dixon, 2002; Leatherman, 
2011; Mertus, 2004).
Following the genocides in Rwanda in 1994 and the former Yugoslavia 
between 1992 and 1995, CRSV was treated as a human rights violation (Skjels-
bæk, 2001). The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) in 1993 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
in 1994 were the first war tribunals to include rape and sexual violence as war 
crimes (Skjelsbaek, 2001). The ICTR was the first to treat rape as a crime against 
humanity and as an act of  genocide (see previous chapter). Prior to this, wartime 
rape and sexual violence were prohibited under the Geneva Conventions of  1949 
and their Additional Protocols of  1977. Since the ICTY and the ICTR, the UN 
Security Council  has passed a number of  resolutions to address rape and sexual 
violence during war/armed conflict: UNSCR 1325 (2000) which focuses on the 
impacts of  war/armed conflict on women and girls and UNSCR 1820 (2008) 
which treats wartime rape and sexual violence as war crimes (Canning, 2010, 
p. 849; see also UNSCR 1888 (2009a); UNSCR 1889 (2009b); UNSCR 1960 
(2010); and, UNSCR 2106 (2013a).
The creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998 was another 
important development for international humanitarian law and human rights 
(Canning, 2010; Dallman, 2009). This was the ‘first mechanism for holding lead-
ers of States accountable for genocide and other serious international crimes’, 
including wartime rape and sexual violence (Dallman, 2009, p. 1). Under Arti-
cles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, combatants guilty of committing 
widespread systematic sexual violence against any civilian population are charged 
with war crimes and crimes against humanity (Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 1998).
In addition to the provisions listed above, Just War Theory outlines the vari-
ous principles relating to the moral legitimacy of war. It is based on two ele-
ments: jus ad bellum – just war-making and jus in bello – just war-fighting. The 
first is based on the moral reasoning that justifies the resort to war. The second is 
based on the permissibility of the means used to wage war (Orend, 2000; Sjoberg, 
2006b). Just war-fighting contains the non-combatant immunity principle. This 
‘protects’ civilians during war, offering them ‘immunity’ from the violence(s) of 
war/armed conflict. Under this principle, ‘[no] intrinsically heinous means’ – such 
as mass rape campaigns – are to be employed (Orend, 2000, p. 121, emphasis in 
the original).
Prior to these developments in international law, rape and sexual violence were 
simply considered as the inevitable and unfortunate side-effects of war/armed con-
flict (Meger, 2010, p. 120; see also Canning, 2010). However, as is demonstrated 
in this chapter, the use of rape and sexual violence during war/armed conflict can 
be far more complex, widespread and systematic (Meger, 2010; Skjelsbæk, 2001). 
Indeed, as established so far: wartime rape and sexual violence do not happen 
in a vacuum. They are informed by gender politics and the pre-existing socio-
economic and cultural landscape (Baaz & Stern, 2009, 2013; Banwell, 2014, 2018; 
Davies & True, 2015; Freedman, 2011; Leatherman, 2011; Meger, 2010, 2016a; 
Ohambe et al., 2005; Skjelsbæk, 2001).
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Having addressed how rape and sexual violence are dealt with by international 
law and war crime tribunals, I will now review how these crimes are addressed at 
the meso-level in the DRC.
Rape and other types of sexual violence are dealt with in Congolese legis-
lation. However, compared with the scale of CRSV in the Congo, the num-
ber of those who have been convicted is relatively low. The Congo has ratified 
a number of Human Rights legislation; which includes regulations relating to 
the protection of women and girls during peacetime and armed conflict. These 
include rape, forced prostitution and sex-based discrimination. All armed forces 
in the Congo have been under increasing pressure to adhere to these rules 
(Dallman, 2009; HRW, 2005).
The ICC has held jurisdiction over crimes included in the Rome Statute and 
committed in the DRC from 2002. In the same year, the DRC ratified the Rome 
Statute. The court has been investigating war crimes and crimes against humanity 
in the DRC since the 1990s.This includes rape and sexual violence. However, of 
the two men who have been convicted – Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Germain 
Katanga – rape is not included in the list of convictions (The ICC DRC n.d.) Fur-
thermore, despite this work by the ICC, most trials involving rape are carried out 
by the FARDC’s military courts. Where, in the majority of cases, the accused are 
members of the FARDC (Stokes, 2014). Indeed, these courts, and the 2002 Mili-
tary Code more broadly, remain incompatible with international law (AfriMap & 
The Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 2009).
Despite improvements to local laws prohibiting the widespread use of  rape 
and sexual violence (Home Office, 2018), and the involvement of  the ICC, most 
perpetrators go unpunished (Goetze, 2008, Meger, 2010). The reasons for this 
include: women’s desire to remain silent (Ohambe et al., 2005; Stokes, 2014); 
difficulties in obtaining evidence (Stokes, 2014); high fees demanded by pros-
ecutors and judges; the difficulty victims face when trying to pay for their travel 
costs from the countryside to get to court (Goetze, 2008); the prohibitive cost 
of  mobile courts (Maya, 2012); commanding officers arranging for the accused 
to be transferred elsewhere; and, widespread corruption and the use of  bribes 
by judges to influence the result of  an investigation or trial (HRW, 2005, p. 42). 
However, the main obstacle continues to be the lack of  rape charges filed in the 
first instance. Survivors fail to file charges for a number of  reasons. In many 
instances, the women are unable to identify the perpetrator or are unable to 
locate them; in the majority of  the cases, the women fear retribution or have 
been bullied and threatened into remaining silent, or they are not aware that 
prosecution is even an option (HRW, 2005). Perhaps the main reasons for wom-
en’s silence are shame, guilt and fear of  being stigmatised by members of  their 
community (HRW, 2005, pp. 36–37).
There have been some steps in the right direction. Most notably is the convic-
tion and imprisonment of Lt. Col. Kibibi Mutware of the DR Congolese army 
(FARDC) for the mass rapes committed on New Year’s Day in 2011. Mutware 
was found guilty of committing crimes against humanity for ordering his troops 
to rape, beat and loot from the population of Fizi. Three officers serving under 
Mutware were also sentenced (Africa Research Bulletin, 2011; Smith, 2011).
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There was also a landmark case in 2014 where 39 members of the FARCD 
stood trial for committing rape. However, only two of the soldiers were convicted 
of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment (Stokes, 2014; Stokes & Muyali, 2014). 
The number of soldiers acquitted was 13 while 24 were found guilty of pillaging 
(Stokes & Muyali, 2014). Two years later, 12 members of a Congolese militia 
group were convicted of raping 37 toddlers and young girls (Maclean, 2017). Of 
these, 10 were also convicted of crimes against humanity (Maclean, 2017). And 
more recently, in 2019, Bosco Ntaganda was convicted by the ICC for war crimes 
committed in the DRC (see Burke, 2019).
The Micro-level: Rape and Hegemonic  
Masculinity in the DRC
Within the civil zone in the DRC, marginalised males try to live up to hegemonic 
constructions of masculinity. The particular version of hegemonic masculinity 
that these men aspire to is constructed as heterosexual and operates in contra-
distinction to homosexuality (Hooper, 2001). ‘Hegemonic masculinity’, Hooper 
(2001, p. 59) argues, ‘is tied to phallocentrism’. She continues:
[…] both the image of the penis as [a] weapon and the conven-
tional construction of heterosexual relations revolve around phal-
locentric discourse. Hegemonic masculinity, then, can be seen to 
be largely, but not exclusively, phallocentric…. (Hooper, 2001,  
pp. 59–60; see also Clark, 2017)
Men in Congolese society, according to these localised discourses of hegem-
onic heterosexual masculinity are supposed ‘…to have a high sex drive, to obtain 
multiple partners, to bestow gifts in exchange for sex, [and] to be financially capa-
ble of purchasing one or multiple wives’. In sum, they are expected to have ‘…
the physical, economic, and social power to protect their wives from other men’ 
(Mechanic, 2004, p. 15 as cited in Meger, 2010, p. 129). Various ethnic, cultural 
and socio-economic constraints prevent them from achieving this ideal. Subordi-
nate masculinity turns into hypermasculinity within the conflict zone to resolve 
this tension.
This enactment of hypermasculinity – which involves aggression, excessive 
toughness and violence – offers these marginalised men the opportunity to take 
advantage of the chaos of the conflict to challenge their marginal position within 
the gender hierarchy. Baaz and Stern (2009) discovered that for the soldiers of the 
FARDC it was their failure to live up to the expectations of ‘the provider’ (the cou-
pling of manhood with money and material wealth) and ‘the sexually potent fighter’ 
(Baaz & Stern, 2009, p. 511), alongside ‘negative and sexualized images of women’, 
that led them to rape (Baaz & Stern, 2009, p. 507; see also Trenholm et al., 2013).
At the meso-level, I discussed the socio-cultural (violence against women and 
girls) and socio-economic (poverty) climate in the DRC. I also discussed the insti-
tution of the military as a place where an aggressive hegemonic heterosexual mas-
culinity is reinforced. Both of these coalesce with the construction of hegemonic 
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violent heterosexual masculinity at the micro-level – where individual men use 
rape and sexual violence to achieve this type of masculinity – to create a situation 
where such violence(s) are expected and accepted.
Responding to War Crimes and Crimes Against  
Humanity in the DRC Through a Gendered Lens
The United Nations office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Pro-
tect provides detailed information regarding the history, nature and current 
meaning of  the terms crimes against humanity and war crimes. What follows is 
a summary of  this information. Crimes against humanity have been dealt with 
under international law through international courts such as the ICC, the ICTY 
and the ICTR. The 1998 Rome Statute of  the ICC contains the most com-
prehensive and up-to-date definition. Article 7 of  the statute includes a list of 
acts that are ‘committed as part of  a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of  the attack’. Of  relevance 
to this chapter are the following acts: ‘rape…or any other form of  sexual vio-
lence of  comparable gravity’; and ‘[o]ther inhumane acts of  a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental 
or physical health’ (United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the 
Responsibility to Protect: crimes against humanity). All those guilty of  com-
mitting acts of  rape and sexual violence in the DRC are guilty of  committing 
crimes against humanity. I would also argue that transnational corporations 
involved in the illegal exportation of  minerals contained within the DRC, who 
rely on the use of  CRSV to engage in these activities, are also guilty of  commit-
ting crimes against humanity.
War crimes are listed in ‘international criminal law treaties’, ‘international 
humanitarian law’ and ‘international customary law’ (United Nations Office on 
Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect: War crimes). Acts relat-
ing to my discussion here are those that wilfully cause ‘great suffering, or serious 
injury to body or health’. This includes: ‘[c]ommitting rape…or any other form 
of  sexual violence’; ‘[i]ntentionally directing attacks against the civilian popula-
tion as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities’ 
and ‘[p]illaging a town or place, even when taken by assault’. Furthermore, war 
crimes contain two main elements: a contextual and a mental element. The for-
mer means that ‘the conduct took place in the context of  and was associated 
with an international/non-international armed conflict’ while the latter, refers to 
‘intent and knowledge both with regards to the individual act and the contextual 
element’ (United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility 
to Protect: war crimes). I argue that combatants on the ground, who use rape 
and sexual violence as a tactic to terrorise the local population to gain access to 
the minerals contained in the DRC, are guilty of  committing war crimes. Based 
on the contextual and mental element, transnational corporations involved in 
these illegal transactions are also complicit in committing war crimes.
At the macro-level then, companies and transnational corporations directly 
involved in the illegal exportation of the Congo’s minerals should be prosecuted 
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for committing State-corporate crimes. They should also be found guilty of 
committing war crimes and crimes against humanity either ‘directly or indirectly’ 
(UNSCR, 2002, p. 32). Government forces, militia groups and civilians involved 
in the conflict in the DRC, specifically the use of rape and sexual violence, are also 
guilty of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Gender relationships, the construction of hegemonic masculinity, and ideas 
about women and femininity need to be tackled at the meso- and micro-levels, 
both within and outside the conflict zone. Firstly, at the meso-level, attention 
must be paid to the military and the issue of militarisation: ‘after all, it is mili-
taristic culture that legitimates violence as a way of solving conflict’ (Farwell, 
2004, p. 394; see also Baaz & Stern 2009; Canning, 2010; Meger, 2010; Zubriggen, 
2010). Within the context of the armed conflict in the Congo, empirical research 
demonstrates that constructions of masculinity, along with soldiers’ engagement 
with the discourse of the ‘heterosexual potent male fighter’ (Baaz & Stern, 2009) 
are reinforced by the military institution which normalises rape and sexual vio-
lence. This culture of militarised heterosexual masculinity needs to be reformu-
lated and negative and sexualised images of women removed from the vocabulary 
of motive/justification.
Secondly, at the meso- and micro-levels, gender discrimination needs to be 
eliminated and replaced with an emphasis on equality between the sexes. This 
must be extended to men and boys who are not part of  the military or quasi-
military groups, as an increasing amount of  rape is committed by civilians and 
militias (Mertens & Pardy, 2017). Women also need to be given equal rights to 
men, and outdated laws that restrict women’s autonomy need to be abolished. 
Expansion upon existing education programmes to teach women about their 
human rights, the law, and other rights awareness-raising issues (Ohambe et al., 
2005) is also needed.
With regard to the jus in bello principle of  Just War Theory it is clear from 
the mass rape committed in the DRC that this has been violated, and women (as 
well as men) have not been protected under the non-combatant immunity prin-
ciple. What is needed is a gendered analysis of  CRSV, an approach that unpacks 
the root causes of  such violence and introduces tools to prohibit it. Feminists 
should reformulate the discussion by connecting it to real people’s lives. Sjoberg 
(2006b, p. 102) labels this reformulation ‘empathetic war-fighting’ which consid-
ers ‘…the impacts of  in bello decision-making on real people’s lives – both in 
the short and in the long term’. According to this feminist revision, the lives 
of  civilians are of  paramount concern. Here, it is worth quoting Sjoberg (2013, 
p. 298) at length:
[A] feminist ethic generally moves away from abstracting human 
suffering in war…and toward assigning culpability for all of the 
effects of war-fighting – immediate or long-term….It therefore 
pays attention to the impacts of strategic and tactical decision-
making on ‘real’ people’s lives particularly at the margins of global 
politics, making a special effort to take note of those impacts least 
likely to be taken into account in traditional war theorizing…
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This commitment to addressing the lives of  civilian women and girls is 
evident in the work being carried out by the UN and various NGOs in the region 
as well as various projects carried out by feminist charities (see Baaz & Stern, 
2013; Meger, 2016b, Mertens & Pardy, 2017 for a critical review of  this type of 
work). Although I have only focused on one example of  the CRSV that is being 
perpetrated in the Congo (rape and sexual violence), it is vital that advocacy 
groups, alongside UN policies, address the range of  conflict violence commit-
ted against both genders in the DRC. An inclusive approach, that includes the 
participation of  all those affected by the conflict, is critical for securing peace 
and stability in the DRC
According to Orend (2000), Just War Theory as it stands is incomplete. If  we 
are to provide a comprehensive and compelling account of the ethics of war and 
peace, Just War Theory needs to incorporate a new category: jus post bellum – just 
peace. For Bass (2004, p. 404), a central element for achieving jus post bellum will 
be the use of war crimes trials. We have witnessed some arrests and convictions 
of those guilty of committing rape and crimes against humanity in the DRC, 
however, we need a more thorough and robust investigation into these violations 
of international law. As a minimum, rape laws in the Congo must be enforced and 
all allegations of CRSV must be fully investigated.
It is worth repeating: rape and sexual violence during armed conflict are 
linked to pre-established gendered relationships (Leatherman, 2011; Meger, 2010; 
Ohambe et al., 2005). In the context of the Congo, this means revising the current 
socio-structural, cultural and economic landscape. If  we are to change the belief  
that the ‘Congo is the worst place on earth to be a woman’, then the post-conflict 
responsibility lies in establishing a more gender-just society at both the meso- and 
micro-levels in the manners suggested above.
Conclusion
Hooper (2001) argues that hegemonic masculinity is in a constant state of 
production and reproduction ‘…in the micropolitics of everyday life in local situ-
ations’ (p. 230). To this, I would like to add the macro-politics of globalisation, 
specifically economic globalisation and masculinities of postcolonialism and 
neoliberalism. Viewing the CRSV that is being committed in the Congo within a 
context of globalisation is key to understanding this aspect of the armed conflict. It 
is also key to ending this type of violence against civilian women and girls.
State-corporate crimes are being committed through global markets and 
global trade that are both directly and indirectly related to the CRSV that is being 
committed in the Congo. Given that these two things cannot be separated, trans-
national corporations, and companies involved in the illegal exploitation of the 
Congo’s natural minerals and resources, need to be brought to justice and pros-
ecuted for committing State-corporate crimes.
Returning to Hooper’s (2001, p. 230) ‘micro-politics of everyday life’, in the 
Congo, hegemonic masculinity is enacted within the military institution which 
promotes sexual violence. Individual men are also relying on constructions of 
hegemonic masculinity or, rather, hypermasculinity (alongside the use of rape) 
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to restore lost hegemony. In all three instances, gender plays a central part in 
explaining CRSV in the Congo. In line with Sjoberg’s (2006b) notion of a femi-
nist ethics of war, Leatherman (2011, p. 173) argues that ‘[g]endered advocacy 
must be both moral advocacy and policy advocacy’. In the case of the former, this 
needs to identify and raise awareness of the structural forms of injustice and the 
network of power relations that enable sexual violence as a weapon of war. An 
ethics of care places emphasis on sensitivity, empathy, responsiveness and taking 
responsibility. It requires:
[…] that we care about each other as fellow members of a com-
munity and also of the global community. In contrast to the indi-
vidualism that underlies rationality and masculinist thinking in 
hegemonic approaches to international relations, an ethics of care 
emphasizes persons as ‘relational and interdependent’. (Leather-
man, 2011, p. 175)
Together, a feminist ethics of  war (Sjoberg, 2006b) and an ethics of  care 
(Leatherman, 2011) can reformulate the non-combatant immunity principle 
to ensure that it protects women and girls (as well as men and boys) from the 
violence(s) of  war/armed conflict. (Sjoberg, 2006a, 2006b). Ultimately what 
is needed is the ending of  impunity for all perpetrators and accomplices of 
CRSV in the Congo.
This chapter has illustrated the ways in which gender informs the experiences 
of both those who experience the violence(s) of armed conflict, as well as those 
who perpetrate such acts. Furthermore, in the case study reviewed here, we see how 
constructions of femininity, in conjunction with constructions of transnational 
business masculinity (at the macro-level) and hegemonic heterosexual masculin-
ity (at the meso- and micro-levels), have deleterious effects on victims, survivors 
and actors within and beyond the conflict zone. The feminist political economy 
approach facilitated my analysis of these three levels of analysis. At the macro-
level, I explored the global gender hierarchy, within which globalisation masculini-
ties are situated. Focusing on masculinities of postcolonialism and neoliberalism, 
I examined the relationship between business masculinity (a ruthless and competi-
tive masculinity enacted by men within transnational organisations), economic 
globalisation and new war economies. I then traced how all of these phenomena 
interact to implicate these transnational companies (and the men within them) in 
State-corporate crimes, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
At the meso- and micro-levels, criminal activities within these new war 
economies – which rely upon rape and sexual violence – are carried out against the 
backdrop of institutional and individual enactments of hegemonic (heterosexual) 
masculinity. Here, I examined how rape is employed as a tactic to secure access to 
the mineral wealth in the DRC. Both internal and external actors, involved in the 
political economy of this conflict, benefit from this strategic use of rape. All of 
these actions have devastating effects on women and girls at the local level. The 
next two chapters continue with the theme of the political economy of violence 
against women and girls in Iraq and Syria, respectively.
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Chapter 3
Empire-building and Coerced  
Sexual Activities in Post-invasion/
occupation Iraq
Introduction
In an interview with Nicola Pratt (2011, p. 613), discussing United Nations Secu-
rity Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, Susan Abbas, director of the Iraqi wom-
en’s leadership, stated:
I do not believe that there are any women that faced the challenges 
of lack of security and peace more than women in Iraq. For a very 
long time, women in Iraq have been living with wars, conflicts, and 
occupation.
Before the First Gulf War, Iraqi women enjoyed relatively good socio- 
economic, cultural and political conditions. However, both the 1991 and the 2003 
US-led invasions had a detrimental effect on the Iraqi economy. With regards to 
sexual gender-based violence (SGBV), while this may have been an issue prior to 
these invasions, the 2003 Anglo-American military intervention contributed to an 
increase in SGBV and a decline in women’s rights. It is useful to unpack this in a bit 
more detail. During the 1970s, women’s status and rights were formally encoded 
within the new Iraqi Provisional Constitution. This granted women equal rights 
before the law. Changes were also made to labour, employment and Personal Sta-
tus Laws. These granted women enhanced education and workplace opportuni-
ties and greater equality in marriage, divorce and inheritance (Human Rights 
Watch [HRW], 2011). However, after over three decades of conflict, Iraq’s politi-
cal and economic landscape had weakened dramatically. This can be attributed to 
the 1980 attack on Iraq, the 1990 invasion and occupation of Kuwait – followed 
Gender and the Violence(s) of War and Armed Conflict:  
More Dangerous to be a Woman?, 65–83
Copyright © 2020 by Stacy Banwell. Published by Emerald Publishing Limited.  
This work is published under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence.  
Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create derivative works of this work  
(for both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full attribution to the original 
publication and authors. The full terms of this licence may be seen at http://creativecommons.org/ 
licences/by/4.0/legalcode” Knowledge Unlatched Open Access
doi:10.1108/978-1-78769-115-520201005
66   Gender and the Violence(s) of War and Armed Conflict
by the coalition military response in 1991 – and the subsequent economic 
sanctions endorsed by the Security Council (see Kamp, 2009, p. 197). Following 
Iraq’s defeat during the First Gulf War, in order to consolidate power, Saddam 
Hussein turned to religious fundamentalists and conservatives for support. This 
had a detrimental effect on women. Restrictions on their freedom of movement 
were reinstated and their protections under the law were removed (HRW, 2011). 
Following the most recent US-led intervention in Iraq (2003–2011), insecurity 
and sectarian violence increased exponentially. Social and economic instability, as 
well as looting and violent attacks, characterised the post-invasion period in Iraq. 
Iraqi women and girls became victims of domestic violence, abduction, honour 
killings and rape (Al-Ali, 2018; HRW, 2003, 2011, 2014a, 2014b; Oxfam Interna-
tional, 2009).
Islamic State of  Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have committed serious human rights 
violations, crimes against humanity and war crimes, including genocidal vio-
lence, in both Iraq and Syria. As ISIS will be revisited in the following chapter, 
it is worth taking a moment to trace the origins of  this extremist group. The 
roots of  ISIS can be traced back to 2004 and Musab al-Zarqawi. Al-Zarqawi, a 
Jordanian, formed al-Qaeda (AQI) in Iraq, pledging his allegiance to Osama Bin 
Laden (The Week, 2019). Zarqawi was killed by a US drone strike in 2006. Fol-
lowing his death, AQI was merged with other insurgent groups to form Islamic 
State in Iraq (ISI) (Muir, 2017). After a series of  interventions by the US-led 
coalition in Iraq, resulting in the death of  the new ISI and al-Qaeda leader, 
 Ibrahim Awad al-Badri (also known as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) became leader. 
In 2013, he consolidated forces in Iraq and Syria to create ISI and Syria Levant 
(The Week, 2019).
In 2014, the group announced the creation of a caliphate in Iraq, renaming 
themselves Islamic State (Muir, 2017, The Week, 2019). As Muir (2017) notes, 
the group has undergone a series of name changes throughout the course of its 
history. This, he argues, reflects the ever-changing nature of its members and their 
manifestos. ISIS came into use when the group began taking over large parts of 
northern and eastern Syria in 2014. ISIS is the name I will be using in this and in 
the following chapter. While it is generally agreed that the caliphate in Iraq and 
Syria has collapsed (Chulov, 2019), at the time of writing (July 2019), the group 
itself  has not been defeated (The Week, 2019).
In Iraq, ISIS have used suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices, as 
well as car bombings, to kill civilians. This is in addition to launching chemical 
attacks against civilian infrastructure and populated areas. They have engaged in 
unlawful killings and executions, including public beheadings and other acts of 
torture. Rape and sexual slavery, as well as other acts of sexual violence have also 
been committed by the group.1 Other crimes perpetrated by ISIS include: forced 
marriage, trafficking and the recruitment of child soldiers (HRW, 2017, 2018a). 
1Al-Ali (2018) provides a critique of the selective focus on rape and sexual violence at 
the expense of other forms of SGBV perpetrated by ISIS in Iraq. See also Foster and 
Minwalla (2018) for a critique of the media’s reporting of these crimes.
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They have also imposed severe restrictions on women’s freedom of movement 
(HRW, 2017, 2018a). As noted above, a more detailed analysis of ISIS is pro-
vided in the following chapter with reference to the atrocities committed in Syria. 
Given the aim of this chapter – to examine the gendered impact of the US inva-
sion on civilian women – the focus of analysis is limited to the period up to, 
and including, the formal withdrawal of western forces in December 2011. Here 
is a brief  overview of this time period. In March 2003, the US-led invasion of 
Iraq was launched, and formal occupation commenced in May 2003 (Hagan, 
Kaiser,  Rothenberg, Hanson, & Parker, 2012). Saddam Hussein was captured in 
December 2003 and coalition forces withdrew from Iraq in 2011. My reason for 
focusing on this period is to illustrate the cause-and-effect relationship between 
the invasion and occupation, and women and girls’ involvement in coerced sexual 
activities within and beyond the conflict zone.
In terms of the post-invasion period, and the removal of Saddam Hussein, a 
key focus of this chapter is UNSCR 1483 (2003, p. 4). Of relevance to this chapter 
is section 14, which states:
[T]he Development Fund for Iraq shall be used…to meet the 
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for the economic recon-
struction and repair of Iraq’s infrastructure, for the continued 
disarmament of Iraq, and for the costs of Iraqi civilian adminis-
tration, and for other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq.
We will examine the impact of the US economic regime in more detail in due 
course. Briefly, according to Whyte (2007), this economic ‘shock therapy’ experi-
ment was based upon the profit-seeking activities of US companies. This was a 
western capitalist agenda that did not benefit the Iraqi people (Whyte, 2007; see 
Hagan et al., 2012 for a detailed review of the economic cost of the conflict). 
Throughout the course of this chapter, I examine its impact on women and girls.
Outline of the Chapter
This chapter addresses both the direct and indirect consequences of the 2003 Iraq 
invasion and occupation. Criminologists have described this offensive action in 
Iraq as a State crime, a crime of aggression and an illegal intervention under 
international law (Kramer & Michalowski, 2005, 2011; see also Whyte, 2007 who 
describes this economic agenda as a war crime that violates the Hague and Geneva 
treaties). What follows is a gendered analysis of this criminal invasion and occu-
pation. Pre-war security and gender relations in Iraq will be compared with the 
situation post-invasion/occupation. Using the example of forced prostitution – 
and drawing on women’s and men’s differential involvement in informal econo-
mies – I will argue that economic policies, specifically the privatisation agenda of 
the west and its illegal occupation, resulted in women either being forced into the 
illicit economy as a means of survival or, trafficked for sexual slavery by profit-
seeking (male) criminal networks who exploited the informal economy in post-
invasion/occupation Iraq.
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By focusing on the experiences of  women and girls, I am not suggesting 
that men and boys have not suffered in the aftermath of this invasion/occupation. 
Indeed, we know that men and boys have been victims of  the follow-
ing: abductions, executions, beheadings and religiously motivated attacks, 
sexualised violence and torture in detention (this is unpacked in detail in 
Chapter 6), as well as forced disappearance and forced recruitment. They 
also make up the majority of  casualties and fatalities (Inter-agency Infor-
mation and Analysis Unit [IAU], 2008). However, my reasoning for focus-
ing on women is threefold. First and foremost, I want to move beyond the 
immediate impact of  the invasion and occupation to draw attention to 
structural as well as interpersonal forms of  violence (distinction provided 
below). Second, by focusing on women’s situation pre- and post-invasion/ 
occupation, I am able to scrutinise the gendered justificatory narratives used 
in the lead up to the military intervention. Briefly, the war on terror narra-
tive – created by the Bush administration – used the long-term oppression 
of  women as a justification for invading Iraq (Nayak, 2006; Shepherd, 2006; 
Stabile & Kumar, 2005; Steans, 2008). However, in the context of  Iraq, as will 
be demonstrated, this was not the real motivation for the invasion (more on this 
shortly). And third, focusing on women and girls underscores how SGBV is 
part of  a continuum of  violence that is both produced and reproduced during 
armed conflict.
As with the previous chapters, I will examine how gender and the violence(s) 
of war/armed conflict are connected at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels. While 
certain forms of SGBV existed prior to the invasion/occupation, this chapter 
demonstrates how they were exacerbated as a result of US and UK economic 
policies linked to the invasion. While it is possible to attribute the rise of ISIS 
to the power vacuum that was left behind following the withdrawal of coalition 
forces in 2011, this is not the focus of this chapter.
The chapter begins with a discussion of the terminology and analytical frame-
works that are used. This is a followed by a critical reading of the lead up to the 
invasion and the justificatory narratives surrounding it. To underscore the fallacy 
of this narrative, pre-war gender arrangements and forms of GBV are compared 
with the situation post-invasion/occupation. Before exploring the informal econ-
omy in post-invasion/occupation Iraq – specifically Iraqi women’s involvement in 
forced prostitution – we will examine women’s involvement in coerced sexual activi-
ties in both old and new wars. In this section, I will also review the various feminist 
positions on this. Up to this point in the book, we have considered two examples 
of the deliberate targeting of women during war/armed conflict. In the first case, 
we explored the woman-as-nation thesis and how women and their reproductive 
bodies became victims of genocidal violence. In the second case, we examined the 
tactical use of rape within new war economies. In this and the following chapter, 
we will advance our discussion by considering examples of women who are victims, 
survivors and agents. We do so by unpacking their victimisation vis-à-vis coerced 
sexual activities, as well their participation in such (forced) acts.
Drawing on the political economy approach, the latter part of the chapter 
will demonstrate how GBV, in the form of forced prostitution, can be linked to 
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top-down macro-level economic policies and practices such as global capitalism 
and neoliberalism. In simple terms, and for the purposes of this chapter, neolib-
eralism, to borrow from Isenberg (2011), involves transferring the control of the 
economy form the public to the private sector. The goal is to create a more effi-
cient and effective government, while at the same time strengthening the economy 
of the country (Isenberg, 2011). Returning to Connell’s (1998, 2005) globalisa-
tion masculinities (discussed in the previous chapter), this chapter argues that 
the invasion of Iraq was a pre-emptive strike based on masculinities of empire, 
postcolonialism and neoliberalism.
Terminology
Article one of The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women 
[DEVAW] (United Nations General Assembly, 1993, p. 2) defines violence against 
women as:
[A]ny act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to 
result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to 
women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary dep-
rivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.
The definition of violence against women contained within the DEVAW also 
includes trafficking and forced prostitution.
GBV refers to two broad categories of  violence against women: interper-
sonal and institutional/structural (see the report of  the Special Rapporteur on 
violence against women, United Nations General Assembly, 2013a). The for-
mer includes physical, sexual, economic, emotional and psychological forms of 
violence and abuse. The latter refers to any form of  structural inequality or 
discrimination that maintains women’s subordinate position (United Nations 
General Assembly, 2013a). Structural violence is particularly gendered. It refers 
to women’s lack of  access to employment, education, welfare, healthcare and 
social, economic and political infrastructure. Women are vulnerable to this 
type of  violence during war/armed conflict. They are also vulnerable to it in 
peacetime societies, particularly ones that are deeply patriarchal, where mate-
rial inequalities between men and women are high and women’s status as equal 
citizens is undermined. In this chapter, forced prostitution is considered a form 
of  structural GBV. As will be demonstrated in due course, on an architectural 
and systemic level, women were denied access to the formal labour market 
as a result of  the invasion/occupation. As such, their involvement in forced 
prostitution – resulting from a lack of  employment opportunities – constitutes 
a form of  structural violence.
This chapter will also consider cases where women and girls were trafficked 
for sexual purposes and forced into prostitution. Both trafficking (for sexual pur-
poses) and forced prostitution (as a form of structural GBV) are included in the 
DEVAW and increases in both can be traced back to the US-led invasion/occupa-
tion. Distinctions between these two will be addressed in the latter part of this 
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chapter however, for now, and for ease, forced prostitution will be used to refer to 
both practices.2
Analytical Framework
This chapter draws on the feminist political economy approach (outlined in the 
previous chapter) to examine coerced sexual activities in post-invasion/occupa-
tion Iraq. True (2010, pp. 44–45) identifies three elements within the feminist 
political economy model: the first is the division of labour within the gendered 
public–private sphere; the second is the ‘contemporary global, macro-economic 
environment’; and the third is the ‘gendered dimensions of war and peace’. This 
chapter will draw on the second and third elements, demonstrating how they are 
interconnected in the case of Iraq. In my example of forced prostitution in post-
invasion/occupation Iraq, a political economy approach enables an analysis that 
links macro-level economic and political foreign policy agendas, such as neolib-
eralism, with GBV (forced prostitution) taking place at the local level within and 
beyond the conflict zone.
Empire-building in Iraq
Now that I have outlined the terminology and the analytical framework, I will 
examine the motivations for the invasion and occupation of Iraq. For certain 
criminologists, ‘economic interests, geopolitical concerns, military power pro-
jection, and imperial domination were the primary motives for invading Iraq’ 
(Kramer & Michalowski, 2011, p. 106). This argument made by Kramer and 
Michalowski (2011) is one that I share. In my own work, however, I unpack the 
gendered impact of this imperial geopolitical endeavour. I will do so here in rela-
tion to the public face (i.e. the justificatory narrative) of the Bush administra-
tion’s war on terror. Following the 9/11 attacks, the US began its war on terror. 
Since then it has attempted to overthrow regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. The 
US reoriented its security strategy to create the right of pre-emptive self-defence. As 
Kramer and Michalowski (2005, 2011, p. 101) note, according to the principles 
of international relations, as reflected in the UN Charter, the fact that a US-
led coalition invaded ‘a sovereign nation without provocation or legal authori-
zation’ makes this act illegal and a State crime. Official narratives used by the 
Bush administration in the run-up to the invasion used the plight of Iraqi women 
to justify its political and economic interests in Iraq. Indeed, during this time, 
the US State Department publicised the abuses (e.g. rape, torture and behead-
ings) women had suffered under the Iraqi regime (Al-Ali, 2018). Likewise, in the 
UK, under the direction of Tony Blair, the then Prime Minister, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office were vocal about human rights abuses against women in 
2Although referred to as ‘the war in Iraq’, this invasion and occupation and, perhaps, 
more importantly, the consequences of this offensive action, are best aligned with the 
new war doctrine (see Introduction).
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Iraq (Al-Ali, 2018). Many have criticised the timing of this sudden interest in the 
human rights abuses taking place under Saddam Hussein. For years, activists had 
been trying to draw attention to these crimes, and yet, by and large, their voices 
went unheard (Al-Ali, 2018).
Jabbra (2006) provides a detailed analysis of  representations of  American 
and middle eastern men and women following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. These, 
she argues, were used as part of  the campaign to promote military interven-
tion in Iraq, as well as Afghanistan. These gendered and racialised images in 
newspapers, news-magazines, advertisements and internet sites,  played a crucial 
role in the justificatory war narrative (Jabbra, 2006). As Jabbra (2006, p.252) 
argues, colonial and imperial histories were drawn upon ‘to sell a war agenda’. 
Readers will recall my discussion of  the postcolonial feminist critique in the 
previous chapter. Framing our analysis within masculinities of  empire and post-
colonialism, we can use this critical feminist postcolonial lens to reveal how the 
ostensible rescue narrative of  ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’ 
(Spivak, 1988, p. 92) was, in reality, a hyper-masculine, orientalist pursuit to ‘re-
masculinise’ the US empire following the 9/11 attacks (Al-Ali & Pratt, 2009b; 
Nayak, 2006; Richter-Montpetit, 2007; see also Foster & Minwalla, 2018). As 
succinctly put by Riley (2013, p. 51) and Cockburn (2012, p. 29) respectively: 
‘the U.S does “do women”, but only when it suits the goals of  empire-building’ 
and ‘wars are not fought “for” gender issues in the way that they are some-
times fought “for” oil resources or “for” national autonomy’. Indeed, we see 
this reflected in US foreign policy spending. According to the US State Depart-
ment, during 2003–2004, the US committed $21 billion to the reconstruction 
project in Iraq (Caprioli & Douglass, 2008). Yet only a fraction ($500 million) 
was allocated to supporting the social and political needs of  Iraqi women 
(Caprioli & Douglass, 2008).
GBV Before and After the 2003 ‘Humanitarian’  
Intervention in Iraq
Examining ‘society’s hierarchy of gender, ethnicity, political and civil rights’ 
(Davies & True, 2015, p. 7) in pre-conflict situations will facilitate a better under-
standing of how and why GBV is used during war/armed conflict (see Alsaba & 
Kapilashrami, 2016; Leatherman, 2011). Furthermore, if  we want to unpack the 
gendered dimensions of war/armed conflict we need to pay attention to ‘local 
histories and prewar gender relations’, as well as to the ‘global processes…within 
which they are embedded’ (Cohn, 2013, p. 27). To this end, the chapter will now 
consider pre-war gender relations in Iraq, comparing them with the situation 
post-invasion/occupation. I will also consider the impact of macro-level eco-
nomic policies on local gender relations, specifically women’s and men’s differen-
tial involvement in the informal economy.
Even under Saddam Hussein’s regime of religious conservatism, women still 
enjoyed certain freedoms. These included freedom of movement, access to educa-
tion and access to employment opportunities (Al-Ali, 2005, 2018). However, as 
Al-Ali (2018) points out, when we consider the 35-year (1968–2003) history of 
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the Ba’th regime,3 it is important to acknowledge the contradictory and changing 
policies towards women and gender. This, as she notes, challenges any general-
ised or indeed simplistic assessments of this period. For example, women living 
in urban parts of the country, who were not engaged in opposition politics, fared 
better than those based in rural areas or those affiliated with opposition groups 
(Al-Ali, 2018; see also Sjoberg, 2006b, 2007). However, this changed significantly 
following the US-led invasion.
In the words of Susan Abbas - interviewed by Nicola Pratt (2011, p. 614):
The presence of the occupying international troops in Iraq has 
contributed to the increase in violence against women and girls, 
because the occupation has caused the collapse of [S]tate insti-
tutions, the disintegration of social control mechanisms, and the 
spread of extremist groups that target and use women. Extremist 
groups deliver their messages by targeting women, either by kill-
ing them or kidnapping them, or even threatening them, leading 
to forced migration.
Let us unpack this in more detail.
Increases in violence, fear of rape and sexual violence, as well as the military 
presence, excluded women and girls from participating in public life and from 
attending school, going to work and accessing health care, or simply leaving their 
homes (HRW, 2003). Professional women and female political activists were 
killed, and armed groups attacked women’s organisations and family-planning 
clinics (Lee-Koo, 2011; Peterson, 2009). To reiterate: even before the 2003 inva-
sion and occupation, the 1990 economic sanctions had a considerable impact on 
the basic infrastructure of Iraq. This led to major social and economic strain for 
ordinary Iraqi families. Limited electricity, restricted access to healthcare and a 
shortage of food and water made women’s domestic responsibilities even more 
demanding and labour-intensive post-2003 (Peterson, 2009). Al-Ali (2005, p. 744) 
lists child mortality, malnutrition, increased rates of cancer, ‘epidemic diseases 
and birth defects’ as some of ‘the most obvious “side-effects” of the sanctions 
regime’. High unemployment and the breakdown of the economy also had a huge 
impact on the day-to-day lives of Iraqi women (Al-Ali, 2005).
In addition, the level of everyday violence in Iraq increased throughout the 
invasion/occupation. Despite the promises, freedom and democracy did not pre-
vail following 2003. Instead, Iraq was plagued by waves of violence as well as 
social, economic and political chaos. As a result of the invasion/occupation, there 
was an increase in women’s victimisation of random ‘street’ violence; domestic 
violence; violence perpetrated by militias and armed groups; targeted abuse and 
abduction; rape and sexual abuse; and violence committed by the multi-national 
3This was a totalitarian Arab-socialist regime that governed life in a one-party State 
under the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. This party ruled over every aspect of pub-
lic and private life (see Faust, 2015).
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forces in Iraq (Oxfam International, 2009, p. 5; see also HRW, 2003, 2011, 
2014b; Lee-Koo, 2011; Peterson, 2009). Accurate data on SGBV in Iraq during 
this period (2003–2011) is hard to come by. However, the IAU (2008) provides a 
detailed review of 113 reports documenting GBV in Iraq between 2003 and 2008. 
They recorded 21,000 cases of GBV between March 2003 and May 2008. These 
included murder, abduction and the ill treatment and torture of male detainees; 
honour-related violence; religiously motivated attacks; the killing of male and 
female professionals; trafficking and forced prostitution; as well as rape and sex-
ual violence. According to one report, between April 2004 and September 2005, 
400 women and 35 men were raped in Baghdad alone, and 60 females were raped 
between February and June 2006, while 80 were sexually assaulted. In the conclu-
sion of their report, the IAU (2008, p. 22) noted: ‘[i]t appears that the situation, 
rather than improving, has worsened especially in the context…of the ongoing 
war in Iraq’.
Given the stigma attached to victims of rape, it is plausible that the actual 
number of victims and survivors is much higher than the figures provided above. 
What seems to be clear is that there was an increase in rape against women 
during this period (2003–2011). This rise in sexual violence accounts for the 
dramatic increase in honour killings during this time. Honour killings were used 
to remove the shame attached to raped women and restore lost family honour 
(Lee-Koo, 2011). The Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) Ministry for 
Human Rights reported 166 honour killings in 2007 and 163 in 2008 (see United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, 2008). The KRG passed the Family Vio-
lence Law in 2011 with the aim of criminalising domestic violence and honour 
killings. However, officials did not enforce this law, and HRW (2014b) reported 
that male family members continued to attack and kill female relatives following 
the implementation of the law.
A Feminist Analysis of Informal Economies in Iraq
To reiterate: a political economy approach looks at the relationship between GBV 
and macro-level processes of political and economic power. When the formal 
economy collapses, people are forced into illicit economies (Sjoberg, 2013). ‘[A] 
key feature of illicit economies is the re-commoditization of women and chil-
dren as “resources” to be trafficked and exploited’ (Raven-Roberts, 2013, p. 45). 
Following military intervention and the collapse of the formal economy in Iraq, 
women were pushed into prostitution as a means of survival (see Dakkak, 2007; 
Enloe, 2010; Peterson, 2009; Riley, 2013; Sjoberg, 2013; Zoepf, 2007). Alterna-
tively, they were trafficked for sexual slavery by profit-seeking criminal networks 
who exploited the informal economy. In both examples, female bodies were 
reduced to commodities and used as currency within the informal economy in 
post-invasion/occupation Iraq.
Informal economies in post-conflict situations consist of coping, combat 
and criminal (Peterson, 2009). To paraphrase Peterson (2009, pp. 42–43), cop-
ing economies are aimed at survival and the social reproduction of families and 
households. Strategies may include trading organs, selling infants for adoption, 
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entering children into sexual slavery and/or selling daughters into early marriage. 
Combat economies are motivated by military goals. They directly supply and sup-
port fighters and insurgents. Finally, criminal economies are concerned with profit 
making. They directly or indirectly supply and fund conflict-related activities.
Informal economies are gendered in the case of Iraq (Banwell, 2015b; Peterson, 
2009). Despite unemployment levels rising for both men and women in post- 
invasion Iraq, men were much more likely to resort to combat and criminal 
activities. Conversely, women were much more likely to engage in coping econo-
mies, involving informal activities which included, but were not limited to, forced 
prostitution. Feminists have suggested that, as a result of their perceived impo-
tence and emasculation – caused by unemployment, an inability to provide for 
and support their families and the presence of foreign forces – men engaged in 
aggressive behaviours (Lee-Koo, 2011; True, 2012) Indeed, as Lee-Koo (2011, 
p. 1629) notes, the decision by the Coalition Provisional Army to remove the Iraqi 
Army left 300,000 Iraqi men unemployed. As argued in the previous chapter, mar-
ginalised masculinities resort to aggressive behaviours to reconstitute subordinated 
masculine identities. In this case, these behaviours manifested both directly, through 
physical violence, and indirectly, through engaging in combat and criminal econo-
mies. Involvement in the latter included, but was not limited to, trafficking, looting 
and/or kidnapping to support financial and political endeavours (Peterson, 2009).
As discussed above, decades of conflict had devastating consequences on the 
economy of Iraq. Another effect of over three decades of conflict was (and is) 
the large number of widows and female-headed households in Iraq. Margaret 
Owen provides a sobering account of the plight and needs of conflict widows and 
wives of the disappeared in her article Widowhood Issues in the Context of United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. Referring to the UN Division for the 
Advancement of Women (UNDAW) 2001 report, she states: ‘[w]idowhood is one 
of the most neglected of all gender and human rights issues’ (Owen, 2011, p. 616). 
At the time her article was published, it was estimated that there were between one 
and five million widows and wives of the missing in Iraq. Describing widowhood 
as a ‘social death’, Owen (2011, p. 618) argues that, because of discriminatory 
practices in matters relating to ‘inheritance, land and property rights’, generally 
speaking, these women are among the ‘poorest of the poor’ (see previous chapter 
for a discussion of this in the DRC). As a ‘survival’ strategy, children of widows 
were removed from school to help support the household. Daughters were more 
at risk of having their education revoked and were at a higher risk of underage 
marriage or trafficking (Owen, 2011). The following section of this chapter will 
address coerced sexual activities (and others) in more detail.
Sexual Slavery and Coerced Sexual Activities  
During Old and New Wars
The distinction between old and new wars was established in the Introduction. 
Despite the differences, coerced sexual activities have existed across both types. 
Indeed, throughout history, women have been enslaved for sexual purposes and, 
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as Kempadoo (2001, p. 30) notes, prostitution around military bases has been 
well documented in ‘India, Hawaii, Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan and Korea’. 
She states:
[T]he operation of foreign…troops at various times in history 
has produced particular forms of prostitution where the military, 
often in collusion with the local [S]tate or government, tolerated, 
regulated, or encouraged the provision of sexual services by local 
women to the troops.
It is interesting that Kempadoo (2001) uses the term prostitution rather than 
forced prostitution as I would argue that women, in these situations, have been 
coerced into providing sexual services. In this book, coerced sexual activities will 
refer to forced prostitution, sexual slavery and survival sex (also referred to as 
transactional sex). I will define each of these before considering their prevalence 
across old and new wars and the feminist contribution to this subject.
Forced Prostitution
In the document, Elements of Crimes (International Criminal Court (ICC), 2011, 
p. 9) enforced prostitution is defined as:
The perpetrator caused one or more persons to engage in one or 
more acts of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coer-
cion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, 
psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person 
or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coer-
cive environment or such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give 
genuine consent.
It is also acknowledged that ‘force’ does not necessarily involve ‘coercion from 
a third party’. It can also reflect a lack of alternative means of survival (End 
Violence Against Women, 2014, p. 3). Article 6 of the UN General Recommenda-
tion on VAW acknowledges that poverty and unemployment can ‘force’ females 
into prostitution (as cited in End Violence Against Women, 2014). Furthermore, 
understanding force or coercion as a feature of women and girls’ poverty and 
unemployment, means treating gender inequality as a form of force (End Vio-
lence Against Women, 2014). In this sense, forced prostitution is a form of struc-
tural GBV. In my discussion below, I will consider forced prostitution as a form 
of structural violence as per the definition of force outlined above. I will also 
address instances where women and girls are trafficked for sexual purposes and 
are forced into prostitution. Human trafficking, as defined by Article 3 of the Pro-
tocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, can be demarcated 
along three lines: the act (recruitment, transportation and transfer); the means 
(threat or use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud and deception); and finally, the 
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purpose (sexual exploitation, forced labour and slavery (see United Nations 
Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2010).
Sexual Slavery
Sexual slavery is listed as a crime under the Rome Statute of the ICC. It is defined 
in Elements of Crime (ICC, 2011, p. 8) as:
The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the 
right of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchas-
ing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by 
imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty.4
The perpetrator must also have ‘caused such person or persons to engage in 
one or more acts of a sexual nature’.
Survival Sex
This refers to situations where individuals provide sex in exchange for food, 
shelter, accommodation or any other means of survival (Chalmers, 2015; Leven-
kron, 2010).
Coerced sexual activities vis-à-vis war/armed conflict are both historical and 
contemporary. As established in Chapter 1, Bengali women were forced into pros-
titution during the 1971 Liberation War; and across Europe, the Nazis created a 
system of ‘[S]tate-controlled brothels’ during the Second World War (Chalmers, 
2015, p. 186; Levenkron, 2010; Sommer, 2010; see also Person, 2015 for a discus-
sion of forced prostitution in the Warsaw Ghetto). Reports note that both sexes 
engaged in survival sex during the Holocaust (for a more detailed discussion, see 
Chalmers, 2015; Fogelman, 2012; Levenkron, 2010). However, as Collins (2017) 
argues, the most prominent example of sexual slavery during this time took 
place in Asia. Thousands of women from Korea, China, Japan and the Philip-
pines were forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese army (Heit, 2009; O’Brien, 
2016). As many as 200,000 women, mainly Korean, were forced into prostitution 
during this time (Heit, 2009). Referred to as ‘comfort women’, their role was to 
provide sexual services to soldiers located at ‘comfort stations’5 (Argibay, 2003; 
4Elements of Crime is a document that contains more information regarding articles 
6, 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute.
5It was believed that the institutionalisation of  prostitution would prevent further 
incidents of  rape and sexual violence against local women. Prior to the establish-
ment of  the comfort stations, members of  the imperial army had raped and muti-
lated Chinese women in 1937 in the city of  Nanking (Argibay, 2003; Collins, 2017; 
Heit, 2009). Referred to as the ‘Rape of  Nanking,’ estimates suggest that between 
20,000 and 80,000 Chinese women were assaulted (Collins, 2017). The Rape of  Nan-
king was part of  a larger targeted attack against civilians by the Japanese army 
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Collins, 2017; Motoyama, 2018; O’Brien, 2016). These stations were situated in 
Japan, the Philippines, China, Indonesia, Hong Kong and Thailand. For most 
of the comfort women, recruitment involved deception, coercion and force, and 
once recruited they were beaten and raped. The stories of the comfort women 
remained untold until the 1980s and 1990s. In 1992, the UN identified the com-
fort women system as a crime against humanity, and as a system of sexual slavery 
contrary to international law. Then finally in 1993, following a long period of 
denial, Japan finally accepted responsibility for the comfort stations (see Motoy-
ama, 2018 for more details). As noted above, more recently ISIS abducted and 
enslaved Yazidi women and forced them into sexual slavery (more on this in the 
following chapter).
The subject of coerced sexual activities in the context of war/armed conflict 
is a contentious one. Feminists disagree on where female victimisation ends, and 
agency, if  exhibited at all, begins. Let us explore this in more detail.
Feminist Debates About Coerced Sexual Activities
We begin with Fogelman (2012). Fogelman (2012, p. 22) prefers to use the term 
‘entitlement rape’, rather than survival sex. For her, terms such as ‘sex in exchange 
for food’ facilitate victim precipitation. According to her analysis of ‘survival 
sex’ during the Holocaust, this was an act of rape, where, in this example, the 
male perpetrator feels entitled to rape the female victim because he believes he 
has done her a favour. In line with Fogelman’s analysis, more recently scholars 
have described coerced sexual activities, particularly when children are involved, 
as sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) (Ferris, 2007, Freccero, Biswas, Whiting, 
Alrabe, & Seelinger, 2017; Highgate, 2007; Karim & Beardsley, 2016; Mudgway, 
2017; Nduka-Agwu, 2009; O’Brien, 2011; Olivius, 2016a, 2016b).
Since the 1990s, there have been reports of this violence against local women 
and children by aid workers, peacekeepers, humanitarian workers and commu-
nity leaders in post-conflict, crisis and emergency settings. In 2003, the Secretary 
General produced a Bulletin entitled Special Measures for Protection from Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. In it, sexual exploitation is defined as:
[A]ny actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, dif-
ferential power, or trust, for sexual purposes including but not lim-
ited to profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual 
exploitation of another.
(Heit, 2009). According to estimates, between 260,000 and 350,000 civilians were 
shot, stabbed and burned alive during the massacre ( Collins, 2017). Based on the 
‘pressure cooker theory’, discussed in Chapter 1, it was believed that these ‘comfort 
stations’, by offering sex on demand, would satisfy men’s innate sexual appetites. 
This would then curtail their desire for/need to rape.
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While sexual abuse is defined as: ‘the actual or threatened physical intrusion of 
a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal coercive conditions’ (United 
Nations Secretary General’s Bulletin, 2003). This type of survival/transactional 
sex has been documented in peacekeeping missions in Kosovo, the DRC, West 
Africa, Haiti, East Timor and Cambodia (Karim & Beardsley, 2016; O’Brien, 
2011). In this context, local women and children provide sex in exchange for food 
or other aid.
Many of the allegations of SEA by peacekeepers emerged prior to 2000. It was 
only in 2003 that the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, prohibited SEA 
by UN forces (Mudgway, 2017; see Ferris, 2007 for more details of the responses 
by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN more generally). Since 
this time, the UN has adopted a zero-tolerance approach to SEA, banning peace-
keepers from exchanging sex for money or for food. Despite this, transactional 
sex between peacekeepers and local women persists (Karim & Beardsley, 2016). 
In the last few years, research has uncovered SEA against young male refugees 
(Freccero et al. 2017; I will return to this in Chapter 6).
Feminists have criticised the UN zero-tolerance approach for the lack of 
agency women are afforded and for failing to consider the legitimacy of  survival/
transactional sex (Mudgway, 2017). Feminists such as Diane Otto (2007 as cited 
in Mudgway, 2017; Nduka-Agwu, 2009) believe that ‘survival sex’ – even when 
entered into as a result of  poverty/unemployment – does involve consent and 
therefore should be treated differently from sexual offences such as rape, forced 
prostitution or sexual slavery. However, as Mudgway (2017, pp. 1456–1457) 
states:
The assumption that these women are exercising agency in their 
‘choice’ to engage in survival sex oversimplifies the reality of such 
relationships. It is not about agency…it is about survival.
And yet, Otto is not alone. Other feminists have raised concerns about reductive 
explanations of women’s involvement in survival/transactional sex and the global 
sex trade more broadly (see Kempadoo, 2001; Kimm & Sauer, 2010; Sjoberg, 
2013; Sullivan, 2003). In particular, concerns are raised around either/or binary 
positions that frame actions as either free or forced; voluntary or involuntary 
(O’Connor, 2017, p. 9). These writers encourage us to adopt a more nuanced 
approach, one that appreciates the complex nature of the choices women make in 
conflict and post-conflict settings.
These debates can be mapped onto larger debates about sex work and prosti-
tution. Briefly, these fall into two main categories: abolitionists/radical feminists 
and sex radicals (Carline, 2011). The former view prostitution as a form of vio-
lence against women. They believe violence is intrinsic to prostitution and ‘the 
distinction between “forced” and “voluntary” prostitution is… a myth’ (Weitzer, 
2005, p. 935). For these feminists, some type of coercion, exploitation and domi-
nation is always present (Weitzer, 2005). At the other end of the spectrum are 
the sex radicals who adopt a more progressive outlook. They reject the notion 
that prostitution or sex work more generally, ‘…is always already exploitative and 
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victimizing…’ (Carline, 2011, p. 316). They prefer to use the term sex worker and 
argue that sex work can and should be regarded as a legitimate from of labour.
While I recognise the merits (and indeed the shortcomings) of both view-
points, I believe that, in the context of coerced sexual activities during war/armed 
conflict, we should adopt Liz Kelly’s (1988) notion of a continuum of sexual 
violence, where at one end of the spectrum we have rape and aggressive acts of 
sexual violence, and at the other end, we have a range of consensual acts that are 
submitted to under duress and coercion. For my discussion of forced prostitution 
and survival/transactional sex in Iraq and Syria, respectively, I will employ Sjoberg 
and Gentry’s (2008, p. 18) ‘relational autonomy approach’. This approach views 
individual choices as ‘…neither completely independent of context (reactively 
autonomous) nor entirely involuntary (dependence), but somewhere in between, 
where they maintain identity independence but decide in a socially constrained 
world’. Put simply, ‘…no choice is completely independent either of its chooser 
or its context’ (see also Sjoberg, 2007).
In cases where women have been trafficked for sexual purposes (Iraq) or have 
been enslaved for sexual purposes (Syria), I lean more towards the radical femi-
nist viewpoint and regard these as acts of violence against women, where coer-
cion, exploitation and domination are clearly present.
Having outlined the various types of coerced sexual activities relative to war/
armed conflict, as well as the debates that arise when we try to understand women 
and girls’ relationship to these behaviours (victims or agents), we will now con-
sider such activities in post-invasion/occupation Iraq.
Trafficking, Sexual Slavery and Forced Prostitution  
in Post-invasion/occupation Iraq
The Forced Migration Review reports that almost 3,500 Iraqi women went miss-
ing between 2003 and 2007. The likelihood is that many were trafficked for the 
purposes of sexual slavery and forced prostitution (Dakkak, 2007; HRW, 2011; 
Marcovich, 2010). In a more recent report for Reuters, Emma Batha reports that 
at least 10,000 women and girls were abducted or trafficked for sexual exploita-
tion since the start of the war in 2003 (Batha, 2015). Iraq is the country of origin. 
Key destinations include Syria, the United Arab Emirates and other countries in 
the Gulf (HRW, 2011).
In a report for BBC news, Lina Sinjab (2007) investigated the experiences of 
Iraqi female refugees in Syria. She shares the story of Rafif, a 14-year-old Iraqi 
girl who, banned from earning money in the formal economy, was forced into 
the illicit economy in order to survive. She worked in clubs making $30 dollars 
a night but could earn $100 dollars if  she agreed to go with men to their private 
villas. She says:
A woman came and spoke to my mother, who agreed to send me 
to these places. We needed the money. I have already been arrested 
for prostitution and sent back to Iraq, but I came back with a false 
passport.
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As Sinjab reports, not all women ‘chose’ to enter the industry. Nada, a 16-year-old 
Iraqi girl, was left by her father at the Iraq–Syria border where five men kid-
napped her and took her to Damascus. She was raped, sold and forced to provide 
sexual services. Hassan (2007), reporting for The Independent in Damascus, came 
across a similar story of female Iraqi refugees forced into the illicit economy in 
order to survive. She states: ‘no one knows how many end up as prostitutes, but 
Hana Ibrahim, founder of the Iraqi women’s group Women’s Will, puts the figure 
at 50,000’ (Hassan, 2007). Hassan (2007) interviewed Fatima, an Iraqi refugee and 
mother of two, who went to Syria after her husband was killed. Like Rafif, she 
was denied access to formal employment and had to resort to selling sex in order 
to survive. These are three examples, but they represent a larger problem. As a UN 
refugee worker noted at this time: ‘[w]e are coming across increasing numbers of 
women who do not manage to make ends [meet] and are therefore more vulner-
able to exploitative situations such as prostitution’ (as cited in Sinjab 2007).
In their 2010 report, Prostitution and Trafficking of Women and Girls in Iraq, 
the Organization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq (OWFI) documented over 70 cases 
of trafficking and forced prostitution in 2008. They estimated that at least 200 
women and girls were sold into sexual slavery each year. The report is based on 
a police investigation into a criminal ring responsible for trafficking 128 women 
from the province of Diyala in 2007 (HRW, 2011; OWFI, 2010). Many of these 
women and girls, some of whom were as young as 12, had been displaced and had 
either been tricked into prostitution as part of the criminal economy or sold sex 
as a survival mechanism (coping economy) (Zoepf, 2007). In addition, prostitu-
tion exposed these women to sexual violence and abuse, which can lead to sexu-
ally transmitted diseases and exposure to HIV/AIDS (Sjoberg, 2013).
Arranged and forced marriages were also used as a means for traffickers to 
transport women internally and internationally. In some cases, the families were 
responsible for forcing the girl into marriage in order to alleviate dire economic 
circumstances (HRW, 2011; U.S. Department of State, 2012). Here, we can draw 
on Cohn’s (2013) observation that women’s unequal status and vulnerability leave 
women and girls open to sexually exploitative relationships. The activities of traf-
fickers can be placed in Peterson’s criminal economy. As HRW (2011) note, these 
are sophisticated and complex criminal networks. Younger girls, especially those 
under the age of 16, were the most lucrative. Girls as young as 11 and 12 were sold 
for up to $30,000, while older women were sold for around $2,000 (HRW, 2011).
In terms of forced prostitution, as a form of structural GBV, OWFI (2010) 
report a substantial rise in the number of women who engaged in forced prostitu-
tion following the 2003 invasion/occupation (see also Marcovich, 2010; Micha, 
About-Atta, Macaud, & Barnes, 2011).
Jamjoom (2009) shares the story of Wedad, who recounts her experience of 
becoming a prostitute:
It was extremely difficult to make the decision to do this, because 
nobody goes into this wanting to do it. My situation forced me 
into it because I couldn’t find a job and the government didn’t have 
a job for me.
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Yanar Mohammed, who works for OWFI, estimates that there were thousands 
more women like Wedad, who were forced into prostitution. Speaking in 2009, 
she states: ‘[i]n many of the cases, this is what happens. She is either a widow or 
an orphan of this war, and she has no alternatives’ (see Jamjoom, 2009). Similarly, 
in 2007, in an interview with Zoepf (2007) in The New York Times, Sister Marie-
Claude Naddaf – a nun from the Good Shepherd convent located in Damascus – 
stated: ‘so many of the Iraqi women arriving now are living on their own with 
their children because the men in their families were killed or kidnapped’. She 
continues: ‘I met three sisters-in-law recently who were living together and all 
prostituting themselves. They would go out on alternate nights…and then divide 
the money to feed all the children’.
According to a report by HRW, in 2011, female victims of trafficking, and 
those who engaged in forced prostitution, were subjected to harsh and unfair 
treatment by the Criminal Justice System. Many of the women and girls caught 
up in the illicit economy found themselves in prison. The Iraqi government pros-
ecuted and convicted female victims for illegal acts committed while they were 
being trafficked, for example, for using false documents and engaging in prosti-
tution (HRW, 2011). At the time of their report, HRW (2011) accused the Iraqi 
government of doing little to tackle the trafficking of women and girls. They 
highlighted the lack of criminal prosecutions brought against those engaged in 
human trafficking and the negligible support for victims. Furthermore, despite 
the implementation of counter-trafficking laws in 2010, enforcing this law was not 
a priority for authorities (HRW, 2011).
At this point, it will be useful to return to our discussion of coping, combat 
and criminal economies. For Peterson, prostitution is a reflection of how these 
economies intersect (Peterson, 2009, p. 56). She states:
[…] an upsurge in prostitution subjects increasing numbers of 
women and girls to adverse conditions that impede their role in 
social reproduction, while it simultaneously ‘satisfies’ male desires 
for access to women’s bodies in the combat economy (occupying 
forces as well as Iraqis), and provides illicit profits for pimps and 
traffickers in the criminal economy.
Employing a gendered lens allows us to appreciate that forced prostitution – 
either as a coping strategy or through trafficking – is not a natural or necessary 
part of war/armed conflict. As argued earlier, it is linked to macro-level, struc-
tural exploitative economic systems.
Masculinities of Empire, Postcolonialism and Neoliberalism
Forced prostitution (as a means of  survival) and the trafficking of  females 
for sexual purposes are examples of  the physical and structural GBV that 
was perpetrated against women and girls in and out of  Iraq. True (2010, p. 
40) argues that, when trying to address global violence against women, many 
approaches fail to make connections between the impact of  the ‘…financial 
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crises, macroeconomic policies and trade liberalisation’ and the occurrence of 
GBV. What is missing is a political economy approach that provides a thorough 
gendered analysis of  the socio-economic (and political) conditions that facili-
tate GBV. Attention needs to be paid to the relationship between global eco-
nomic processes, such as neoliberalism, which operate at the macro-level, and 
forced prostitution (both as a means of  survival and as a result of  trafficking), 
which operates at local level.
Jacobson (2013, p. 228) argues that the neoliberal model has had a profound 
global impact across the ‘industrialized North and the developing South’. She 
traces the implementation of this model to the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank (this was also discussed in the previous chapter; see also Kem-
padoo, 2001 who discusses this in the context of the global sex trade). As a result 
of war/armed conflict, and the economic crises of the 1980s, national govern-
ments in developing regions borrowed from these two western institutions. Their 
loans were approved on condition that these countries adopted the neoliberal 
model (Jacobson, 2013). As Isenberg notes, military subcontracting and privati-
sation are just some elements of neoliberalism (Isenberg, 2011). In the context of 
Iraq, and under the leadership of the Bush administration, to paraphrase Looney 
(2004, p. 1):
Globalization, free markets, and reduced government involvement 
in the marketplace were regarded as the necessary components for 
rapid economic recovery in Iraq. For Iraqis, however, neoliberal-
ism, particularly in its ‘shock therapy’ form, is just another exam-
ple of an imprudent [w]estern experiment imposed upon a fragile 
state.
The key political justification for the imposition of this neoliberal regime was 
the argument that it was the only way to eradicate corruption from within Iraq’s 
public sector (see Whyte, 2007 for a more detailed discussion). Yet, neoliberal 
reform in Iraq has come under widespread criticism from both within and out-
side the country (Duncanson, 2013; Looney, 2004). Herring and Rangwala (2005, 
p. 668), for example, argue that the economy of Iraq has been reconstituted from 
the top and from the bottom, reflecting a range of globalising agendas. Further-
more, they argue that, in order to understand how Iraq was reconstituted, we 
need to consider ‘national, international and transnational’ currency and invest-
ments; ‘institutions of global neoliberalism’ and US empire-building (Herring & 
Rangwala, 2005). Put simply, the Iraqi State, contrary to section 14 of UNSCR 
1483 (2003), was locked into a neoliberal economic model. This is a constitu-
ent element of ‘imperial globalization’, a term coined by Herring and Rangwala 
(2005, p. 668). As such, we can apply Connell’s masculinities of empire, post-
colonialism and neoliberalism (Connell, 1998).
Space will not permit an in-depth review of the various Executive Orders 
(aimed at privatising the Iraqi economy) that were issued by the Coalition Pro-
visional Army (see Whyte, 2007). Suffice to say, in addition to the ‘profound and 
Empire-building and Coerced Sexual Activities   83
perhaps irreversible structural consequences for the Iraqi economy’, under the 
Anglo-American privitisation agenda, ‘national and international laws were…
subordinated to neoliberal principles of economic organization’ (Whyte, 2007, 
pp. 182, 186). In other words, this top-down socio-economic model, endorsed by 
the Coalition Provisional Army, involved western corporations and elites (those 
at the top), taking control over Iraqi oil revenue (those at the bottom) (Whyte, 
2007; see also Duncanson, 2013).
Jacobson (2013, p. 229) argues that the neoliberal agenda – clearly a vio-
lation of  UNSCR 1483 (2003), specifically the section concerning the devel-
opment fund for Iraq – had gendered impacts. Speaking specifically about 
the gendered impact on war-shattered economies, she notes that neoliberal-
ism involves ‘shrinking the [S]tate’, which leads to cuts in welfare and public 
spending. This monetary reduction, Jacobson argues, has an impact in pre-
cisely the areas that could be most enabling and empowering for women and 
girls affected by conflict. As demonstrated in this chapter, the privatisation 
of  the economy in Iraq had a detrimental effect on females, particularly wid-
ows and female-headed households, where women and girls were forced into 
prostitution as a survival mechanism or, were trafficked for sexual slavery by 
profit-seeking criminal networks who exploited the informal economy in post-
invasion/ occupation Iraq.
Conclusion
A feminist ethics of war (discussed in the previous chapter) pays attention to 
interpersonal and structural forms of GBV during war/armed conflict. In the 
context of Iraq, this means acknowledging, as I have done in this chapter, the 
gendered consequences of this invasion and occupation, particularly for civilian 
women and girls, but for civilians more broadly.
The goal of this chapter was to unpack how neoliberal policies inform the 
violence(s) (both interpersonal and structural) of armed conflict. This chapter 
has demonstrated how the privatisation agenda of the west triggered the collapse 
of the formal economy in Iraq. This was replaced by an illicit economy which 
resulted in interpersonal and structural violence against women and girls. The 
detrimental impact of globalisation masculinities in Iraq forced women and men 
into the illicit economy. This chapter provides another example of how gender 
informs the experiences of victims, survivors and perpetrators, revealing the ways 
in which armed conflict impacts males and females in qualitatively different and 
differential ways.
Although the time period referred to in this piece is between 2003 and 2011, 
we can observe more recent examples of  men’s and women’s engagement in 
informal economies within and beyond the conflict zone. This will be done in 
the following chapter with reference to Syria. Departing from the analysis pro-
vided here, in my discussion of  survival sex in Syria and beyond, I unpack the 
relationship between extreme weather events, such as droughts, and coerced 
sexual activities.
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Chapter 4
Structural Violence Against  
Conflict-affected Females in Syria
Introduction
Wars are being fought on the bodies of women and children. 
Leymah Gbowee from the Women, Peace and Security Network 
(Taken from a video clip from the Stop Rape Now Website, n.d.)
Sexual violence is the monstrosity of our century. Dr Denis Muk-
wege Director of Panzi Hospital (Stop Rape Now Website, n.d.)
Sexual violence in conflict represents a great moral issue of our 
time and it merits the concerted focus of the Security Council. 
[It] casts a long shadow over our collective humanity. Statement 
made by Zainab Hawa Bangura, Special Representative of  the 
Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (United Nations 
Office for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
Sexual Violence in Conflict [UN SRSG-SVC], 2015).
The statements above, made by an activist, a doctor and Zainab Hawa Ban-
gura, respectively, reveal two things: (1) wartime rape and sexual violence are 
prioritised and indeed politicised within international security and (2) women 
(and children) are regarded as particularly at risk of such violence (Banwell, 2018; 
see also Aoláin, 2016; George & Shepherd, 2016; Puechguirbal, 2010; Shepherd, 
2011; United Nations Security Council Resolutions [UNSCR], 1820, 2008; 1888, 
2009a; 1960, 2010; 2106, 2013a). As I argued elsewhere (see Banwell, 2018), this 
two-part message is reproduced within news media, policy and advocacy.1 It is 
1This chapter draws on my previous work on the securitisation of wartime rape and 
sexual violence in Syria. See Banwell (2018).
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the securitisation narrative discussed in the Introduction. Here, as promised, 
I unpack it in more detail.
Writers from a variety of disciplines have drawn attention to the securitisation 
of wartime rape and sexual violence against women and girls (Baaz & Stern, 2013; 
Banwell, 2018; Crawford, Green, & Parkinson, 2014; Henry, 2014; Hirschauer, 
2014; Kirby, 2015b; Mackenzie, 2010; Meger, 2016a, 2016b; Mertens & Pardy, 
2017; True, 2010). Meger (2016a, 2016b), in her analysis of the securitisation of 
rape and sexual violence, draws upon Marx’s (1867) concept of the commod-
ity fetish to fully explain the processes at work. The commodity fetish, explains 
Meger (2016b), is where a material object, when it is exchanged for money, gains 
value that is independent from, and goes beyond, its obvious worth. As Meger 
(2016b, p. 151) states: ‘[t]he direct social relations that went into the production 
of the object become obscured behind the monetary value ascribed to it’. She 
believes that ‘securitization similarly takes the securitized object as an independ-
ent material reality, and thereby obscures the underlying social relations that pro-
duce and give value to the object’.
There are, as Meger (2016a, 2016b) notes, three stages to the fetishisation of 
rape and sexual violence. First, sexual violence is homogenised as a discrete thing. 
It is identified as the most dangerous form of conflict violence. This removes it 
from the continuum of GBV that takes place during war/armed conflict (Meger, 
2016b). It is also ‘…generalized across conflict-affected situations’ (Meger, 2016a, 
p. 23 emphasis in the original; see also Meger, 2016b). Second, it becomes rei-
fied within media, policy and advocacy discourses. These influence international 
security agendas and practices. The third stage is about persuading donors that 
exceptional measures are required to address rape and sexual violence (Meger, 
2016a; see also Baaz & Stern, 2013; Henry, 2014; Kirby, 2015b).
With reference to the securitisation of wartime rape in Syria, and following 
on from the previous chapter, this chapter examines structural forms of GBV 
in Syria: denial of reproductive healthcare (specifically a lack of access to safe 
abortion) resulting in unwanted pregnancy; denial of education, exacerbated by 
the use of early and forced marriage; and denial of employment opportunities, 
which leads to coerced sexual activities. Given that coerced sexual activities were 
discussed in the previous chapter, more time will be spent discussing the first two 
examples of structural GBV.
Fig. 1 (see page 87) is a perfect illustration of the securitisation of wartime rape. 
This figure and the press release that accompanied it (provided below) is another 
example of the visuality of master narratives discussed in the Introduction. The 
figure also exemplifies the rape-as-a-weapon of war narrative discussed in Chapters 
1 and 2. In this figure, the penis and bullet are elided. It, and its ability to penetrate 
through rape, is presented as a weapon: one that is more effective than a gun. The 
poster was used by Amnesty International in 2009 as part of their 14-day London 
Underground poster campaign to draw attention to the use of rape as a weapon 
of war. The accompanying website stated that: ‘[t]he objective of the campaign is to 
highlight the effects of war on women and girls’ (Amnesty International, 2009a). 
This focus on women and girls was reiterated in the Amnesty International press 
release by Kate Allen (Amnesty International, 2009b) who stated:
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In previous and current conflicts, such as in Darfur and eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo, hundreds of thousands of Wom-
en’s rights [are curtailed] and girls…are subjected to horrific acts 
of rape and sexual violence by armed forces and their perpetrators 
regularly go unpunished.2
As established, women and girls are often depicted as wartime victims. This 
equation is often presented – both implicitly and explicitly – in visual form (this 
idea, and its visual representation, will be challenged in the following chapter 
when we consider images of women engaging in acts of sexualised violence). 
At first glance, the poster appears gender-neutral: men and boys can also be vic-
tims of wartime rape. However, for many of us – particularly those familiar with 
the securitisation of wartime rape and sexual violence – the gender of the per-
petrator and victim is implied. For those in doubt, see the press statements cited 
above where women and girls are clearly marked as victims. I will return to the 
power of the visual within War Studies and International Relations more broadly 
shortly. First, I will outline the content and main arguments of the chapter.
Outline of the Chapter
The chapter begins with an outline of the terminology used and the analytical 
frameworks that are drawn upon to examine structural GBV in Syria. This is fol-
lowed by an overview of the Syrian conflict. In order to redress the security agenda 
that prioritises rape and sexual violence against women and girls in Syria, I exam-
ine three examples of structural GBV. I start by examining women’s access to 
safe abortion in conflict and/or crisis situations, arguing that the denial of repro-
ductive healthcare services violates a number of international instruments that 
address GBV. Denial of reproductive healthcare will be discussed in relation to the 
Trump administration’s foreign policy on abortion, specifically the defunding of 
2 This image was designed for Amnesty International UK by Different Kettle (2009a).
Fig. 1. Amnesty – Rape Is Cheaper Than Bullets.2
88   Gender and the Violence(s) of War and Armed Conflict
the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in Syria.3 The chapter then moves 
on to consider the importance of girls’ access to education and how this is being 
curtailed by practices of early marriage that have increased since the onset of the 
conflict in Syria. Here, I demonstrate how fathers’ use of early marriage forms 
part of the landscape of violence against women and girls in Syria. In my final 
example of structural violence, I examine how women resort to selling sex and/or 
providing sexual services as a means of survival within the informal economy in 
Syria and beyond. This is in response to increases in poverty and unemployment 
levels. I argue that both of these phenomena (poverty and unemployment) were 
exacerbated by the drought in Syria.4 While a number of academics and experts 
alike have attributed the unrest in Syria, which led to the conflict, to the long-term 
drought (see Femia & Werrell, 2012; Gleick, 2014; Kelley, Mohtadi, Cane, Seager, 
& Kushnir, 2015), this is not my focus here. In Chapter 6, drawing on my concept 
of glocalisation masculinities, I explore the causal link between climate variability, 
extreme weather events (such as droughts) and armed conflict. My interest in this 
chapter is in exploring how these weather events – and the impact they have on the 
formal labour market – lead to coping, combat and criminal informal economies 
in Syria and beyond. While it is not possible to discern a simple cause-and-effect 
relationship between climate variability and the drought in Syria, research sug-
gests that there is a correlation between these phenomena (Al-Riffai, Breisinger, 
Verner & Zhu, 2012; De Châtel, 2014; Gleick, 2014; Kelley et al., 2015). It is this 
research that I will draw upon when examining these issues.
This chapter offers a snapshot of three examples of structural GBV within 
and beyond the Syrian conflict zone. A chapter alone cannot do justice to each of 
these topics. Elsewhere I, and others, have written more extensively about these 
subjects (Banwell, 2018, 2019; Bartels et al., 2018; Foster, 2016; Foster, Arnott, & 
Hobstetter, 2017; Foster et al., 2016; Freedman, 2016; Mourtada, Schlecht, & 
DeJong, 2017). My purpose here is threefold: (1) to highlight the implications 
of the securitisation of rape and sexual violence (2) to broaden what is meant by 
GBV during armed conflict and (3) to link these examples of structural GBV to 
broader macro- and meso-level economic, environmental, political and institu-
tional policies, practices and events.
Terminology and Analytical Frameworks
Structural violence, as defined in the previous chapter, refers to women’s lack of 
access to healthcare, education and formal employment. As noted in Chapter 1, 
3Elsewhere I have written about Trump’s foreign policy on abortion in relation to gen-
der essentialism and structural inequalities between the Global North and the Global 
South. See Banwell (2019).
4While Syria has experienced a number of droughts, the latest, which lasted two 
seasons, starting in 2006 and lasting until 2011, is considered to be the worst in the 
country’s history (Gleick, 2014). This had a devastating effect, particularly in rural 
areas, on the country’s agriculture, its livestock and its workforce (see Richani, 2016).
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the definition of forced pregnancy, as outlined by the International Criminal 
Court, necessitates that a woman be forcibly made and kept pregnant, commonly 
through confinement. This then, ‘…excludes situations where the victim becomes 
pregnant by force but is not subsequently confined’ (Grey, 2017, p. 921). I will 
adopt the term unwanted pregnancy when referring to Syrian women and girls 
who are raped and impregnated then subsequently denied access to safe abortion. 
It is my argument that this lack of access to safe abortion – which also denies 
women decision-making powers – is a form of structural violence that main-
tains women and girls’ subordinate position (Banwell, 2019, p. 4). In this chapter, 
I reveal how the Trump administration’s foreign policy on abortion, not only 
exacerbates females’ experiences of interpersonal violence (wartime rape and 
forcible impregnation), it is also responsible for their experiences of structural 
violence (denial of access to safe abortion) (Banwell, 2019).
The feminist political economy approach demonstrates how females’ social, 
political and economic marginalisation can be linked to macro-level systems and 
practices. In the context of this discussion, these will include economic globalisa-
tion and neoliberalism. The impact of these macro-level policies and practices, as 
well as State-level cultural and political policies and practices in Syria – patriarchy 
and neoliberalism – will be discussed in relation to all three examples of structural 
GBV. Whilst Syrian men and boys are victims of GBV within and beyond the 
conflict zone – indeed, their stories will be told in Chapter 6 – the fetishisation 
of rape and sexual violence in Syria occurs in relation to female victims. As such, 
women and girls’ experiences of structural violence will form the basis of the 
discussion here.
Before we proceed, I want to return to a concern raised earlier in the book 
(see Chapter 2 for a discussion of the feminist postcolonial critique). Selective and 
sensationalist accounts of wartime rape and sexual violence are only part of the 
securitisation/fetishisation problem. A related issue is the tendency to speak for, or 
on behalf of victims/survivors. This often forms part of the broader western civilis-
ing mission. To redress this, this chapter will draw, as far as possible, on the words 
and statements of victims/survivors. For each of the examples of structural GBV, 
in addition to drawing on academic materials, I reference empirical research (in the 
form of published reports) carried out by NGOs and humanitarian organisations 
working on the ground in crisis settings. And for my discussion of unwanted preg-
nancies in Syria, I draw on data gathered by the Women’s Media Centre (discussed 
in Chapter 1), which includes testimonies from witnesses and survivors.
The Conflict in Syria5
What follows, for the purposes of this chapter, is a brief  overview of the con-
flict. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
5A comprehensive analysis of the origins, nature and current status of the conflict in 
Syria can be found in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly reports: The Inde-
pendent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic.
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11.7 million people in Syria require humanitarian assistance. Their 2019 report 
notes that extreme poverty and displacement continue to be key concerns, fur-
ther stating: ‘[t]he widespread destruction of  civilian infrastructure, depleted 
savings and limited economic opportunities have forced many to resort to 
harmful coping strategies. The result is extreme vulnerability’ (United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs, n.d.). The latest figures 
(for the period March 2011–March 2019) published by The Syrian Network for 
Human Rights, places the civilian death toll at 224,948 (Syrian Network for 
Human Rights, n.d.).
At the time of writing, 2019, the crisis in Syria had reached its eighth year. It is 
likely that the conflict in Syria will be ongoing at the time this book is published 
and that the dynamics and actors involved will have changed considerably. The 
details provided below are based upon the period from when the conflict started, 
2011, to the time of writing, July 2019.
The origins of the conflict can be traced to the Arab Spring pro-democracy 
demonstrations that took place in the southern city of Deraa in 2011 (BBC, 
2019b). These started as peaceful protests against the government, but soon esca-
lated into violent confrontations between government forces and armed rebels 
(BBC, 2019b). The conflict in Syria is complex. This is mainly due to the sheer 
number of actors involved. The US Defense Intelligence Agency has recorded 
as many as 1,200 different rebel groups involved in the fighting (see Schmitt & 
Mazzetti, 2013).
The situation is further compounded by regional and international support, 
for both sides of the conflict, in the form of military, financial, material and polit-
ical assistance. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey provide financial support 
to oppositional forces in Syria (Gupta, 2016; Richani, 2016). Turkey, for example, 
provides assistance to Islamic groups (ISIS and the Al Nusra Front) who are 
competing for control of the border-crossing points between Syria and Turkey 
(Richani, 2016). The trading of stolen goods, money laundering and arms sales 
take place within these cross-border points (Richani, 2016, p. 57). Recruitment 
and rearmament have also taken place in Turkey. For Abboud (2017), the war 
economy in Syria is facilitated by the rise of this conflict elite. So, although these 
actors do not have direct control over these oppositional groups, their financial 
involvement – in the form of transactions and payments that secure the flow of 
goods and materials into regime areas – has contributed to the continuation of 
the conflict (Abboud, 2017; Banwell, 2018).
In terms of international support, the UK, France and the US assist groups 
opposing President Assad. Shia militias, including Hezbollah as well as Iraqi and 
Iranian militias, provide regional support for the Syrian government, while Russia 
provides international support (Banwell, 2018; Gupta, 2016; see Richani, 2016, 
for a more detailed breakdown of how these various actors have funded opposi-
tion groups in Syria). Russia was directly involved in the conflict from September 
2015. It carried out airstrikes against opposition groups and provided support to 
soldiers on the ground (Beauchamp, 2017).
In 2014, Islamic State seized large parts of Iraq. Taking advantage of the 
chaos of the conflict in Syria, they secured land and power in the eastern part of 
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the country. This meant that Assad and his army, as well as the numerous rebel 
groups, were then fighting a separate conflict against IS (BBC, 2019a). The latter – 
who changed their name to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) – faced resist-
ance from government forces, rebel groups and Kurdish groups. This weakened 
their stronghold in northern and eastern parts of Syria (BBC, 2019a). In addi-
tion, Russia and a US-led multinational coalition conducted airstrikes against 
ISIS during this time. While ISIS were defeated in Raqqa, a city situated in the 
northeast of the country, in 2017 they were replaced by the extremist Al-Qaeda-
linked group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) (Cockburn, 2017). The latter gained 
full control of Idlib province and began using ‘re-radicalisation’ propaganda to 
recruit fighters from rival extremist groups to engage in further ‘jihadist attacks’ 
(Browne, 2018). Air strikes by the US, UK and France continued in 2018 and in 
2019 Kurdish groups seized Baghouz in the eastern part of Syria (CNN, 2019). 
Despite numerous ‘UN-mediated peace talks’ (BBC, 2019b), confrontations 
between the different factions continue to this day, with opposing groups refusing 
to negotiate and agree a ceasefire (BBC, 2019a).
The Securitisation of Rape and Sexual Violence in Syria: 
What About Other Types of GBV?
Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) (as defined in Chapter 2) encompasses a 
whole range of behaviours, and yet:
[…] both media and policy reports tend to either focus on rape at 
the expense of other forms of CRSV or, CRSV at the expense of 
other forms of conflict violence. This creates a hierarchy of vic-
timization, placing rape and sexual violence above all other types 
of violence. (Banwell, 2018, p. 20)
The two main paradigms within the literature on wartime rape and sexual 
violence – rape as a by-product versus rape as-a-weapon of war – have already 
been discussed (see Chapters 1 and 2). Despite numerous critiques of the weapon-
of-war paradigm (see Crawford, 2013; Kirby, 2012; Skjelsbæk, 2001), it is repro-
duced within media and policy documents, resulting in diverse behaviours being 
dealt with under the same security measure (Meger, 2016a). Here, the homogenis-
ing of sexual violence, as part of the securitisation process, leads to its fetishisa-
tion (Meger, 2016a).
This securitisation of  rape and sexual violence can be applied to Syria. This 
has marginalised other forms of  GBV (Alsaba & Kapilashrami, 2016; Craw-
ford et al., 2014; Freedman, 2016; Meger, 2016a, 2016b). It is important at this 
point to review the violence(s) committed against women and girls in Syria. 
This includes: abduction and kidnapping to extract information (FIDH, 2012; 
The International Rescue Committee [IRC], 2013; UNFPA, 2017b; Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom [WILPF], 2016); forced deten-
tion (FIDH, 2012; United Nations General Assembly, 2015; UNFPA, 2017b); 
forced recruitment (WILPF, 2016); and restrictions on females’ freedom of 
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movement (UNFPA, 2017b). Female political activists, and females who are 
related to male activists, have been subjected to forced detention and forced 
disappearance (Alsaba & Kapilashrami, 2016; HRW, 2014c; WILPF, 2016). 
Women have also been detained by the Syrian government for the purposes 
of  weapons trading (WILPF, 2016). In addition, they have ‘…been executed, 
tortured and enslaved; denied access to fair trials; and denied access to health-
care’ (Banwell, 2018, p.17). To this spectrum of  violence against women and 
girls in Syria, I add my three examples of  structural violence. I will begin with 
the denial of  reproductive health care that leads to unwanted pregnancies.
Fig. 2 shows the image of President Donald Trump signing the anti-abortion 
Executive Order. This reinstates the Global Gag Rule that was introduced by 
Ronald Reagan in 1984. While this is a partisan issue within US politics – every 
Democratic president has revoked the policy since its implementation, while 
every Republican president has reinstated it – the order signed on the 23 Janu-
ary 2017, goes further than any previous Republican-endorsed reinstatement. In 
brief, this Global Gag Rule withdraws US funding to international NGOs that 
either perform abortions as part of their family planning services or, ‘provide 
abortion-related services’ 6 (see Banwell, 2019, p. 1).
6As I write this chapter, the US has been criticised for threatening to veto a UNSCR 
on wartime rape because it offered sexual and reproductive healthcare to survivors. 
Concerned that this language was in fact referring to abortions, the US only agreed 
to sign the document once the language had been removed (see Ford, 2019 for more 
details).
Fig. 2. President Donald Trump Signing the Anti-abortion Executive Order, 
2017 (Wikimedia.org, 2017).
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For Rhiannon Cosslett, writing in The Guardian (2017), ‘this photograph 
is what patriarchy looks like – a system of  society or government in which 
men hold the power and women are largely excluded’. For me, the image was a 
reminder of  Schweickart’s essay, entitled Reading Ourselves: Toward a Feminist 
Theory of Reading. In this essay, Schweickart (1986) describes ‘androcentric 
reading strategies’. This approach identifies texts that reproduce gender hier-
archies, ascribing agency and universality to the ‘male’, while objectifying and 
immascualting [sic.] the ‘female’. Here, we have both the text and the image of 
men authorising that text. Together they signify women’s powerlessness and 
inferiority within a patriarchal political system. Here, it is useful to draw on the 
work of  Christine Sylvester who uses art metaphors to understand the land-
scape of  international relations. In her chapter, Feminist Arts of International 
Relations (2002), Sylvester (2002) outlines two feminist methods through which 
theories of  the visual arts can be used to understand visual representations 
within international relations. The first is outlining. This involves ‘inserting 
women…into the architects of  war’ (p. 276). The second is inlining. This rec-
ognises the difficulty of  adding women into the existing landscape. The task, as 
identified by Sylvester (2002) and Managhan (2012), is to sight and cite what is 
marginalised, distorted and excluded from view. In Fig. 2., ‘woman’ is absent 
yet present. She is cited: The Anti-abortion Executive Order is based on women 
and their reproductive bodies. Yet, she is not sighted. She is figuratively and lit-
erally absent from the picture. Figuratively, she has no decision-making power 
in this situation.
In the same year as President Trump reinstated the Global Gag Rule, the US 
defunded UNFPA. While both are key elements of US foreign policy on abortion 
under the Trump administration, as UNFPA provides reproductive healthcare 
to women and girls affected by war/armed conflict, this will form the basis of 
the discussion here (for a detailed analysis of President Trump’s revised Global 
Gag Rule, see Banwell, 2019). I included the image of President Trump as yet 
another example of the visuality of master narratives (see Introduction). Before 
we unpack the defunding of UNFPA, I will review the various instruments that 
have been put in place to address sexual GBV.
International Treaties that Address Sexual GBV  
Against Women and Girls
There are a number of  international instruments that set out provisions for 
tackling sexual GBV. These are The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Discrimination against Women 1981 (CEDAW) (United Nations General 
Assembly, 1981); The United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women 1993 (DEVAW) (United Nations General Assembly, 1993); and 
The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 1995. The Beijing Declaration 
and Platform for Action (1995, p. 34) states that ‘women have the right to the 
enjoyment of  the highest attainable standard of  physical and mental health’. 
This right, which is regarded as ‘vital to their life and well-being’, includes 
access to safe abortion.
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Article three of the DEVAW declares that: ‘[w]omen are entitled to the equal 
enjoyment and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field’. Among other things 
these include, ‘…[t]he right to be free from all forms of discrimination’ and ‘[t]he 
right not to be subjected to torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment’ (United Nations General Assembly, 1993, p. 2). As noted in 
the previous chapter, violence against women and girls, as defined by the DEVAW, 
is any type of GBV that results in ‘physical, sexual or psychological harm or 
suffering’ (United Nations General Assembly, 1993). This is inclusive of physi-
cal, sexual and psychological violence committed or condoned by the State. These 
definitions encompass both interpersonal and structural violence.
In terms of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), UNSCR 2122 
(2013b, p. 2) acknowledges women’s right to ‘access…the full range of sexual and 
reproductive health services, including…pregnancies resulting from rape, without 
discrimination.’ While UNSCR 1889 (2009b, p. 4) addresses women’s reproduc-
tive rights, their mental health and their ‘access to justice, as well as enhancing 
[their] capacity to engage in public decision-making at all levels’. In addition, 
‘[t]he Geneva conventions guarantee the rights to non-discriminatory medical 
care, humane treatment and freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment’ (Global Justice Centre, 2011, p. 22). Put simply, these conventions 
pledge comprehensive medical care for all individuals ‘wounded and sick’ in 
armed conflict (Global Justice Centre, 2011, p.1). Denial of access to safe abor-
tion for women and girls impregnated through wartime rape violates their right 
to access the full and necessary medical care as guaranteed by Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions (Global Justice Centre, 2011).
To reiterate, US foreign policy on abortion has (1) banned new funding to 
NGOs that either perform abortions or, provide abortion-related services and 
(2) defunded UNFPA. As this policy marginalises women by denying them full 
decision-making power, it counts as a form of structural violence. In addition, this 
denial of access to safe abortion – which violates the international treaties and 
conventions listed above – is considered a form of torture. To place the defunding 
of UNFPA in context, let us review existing reproductive healthcare services for 
conflict-affected populations.
Reproductive Healthcare Provisions for Female  
Conflict-affected Populations
As the empirical research highlights, reproductive healthcare services for sur-
vivors of CRSV (see Onyango et al., 2016; Rouhani et al., 2016), particularly 
rape, are inadequate (Hakamies, Geissler, & Borchert, 2008; Krause et al., 2015; 
Masterson, Usta, Gupta, & Ettinger, 2014; Tappis, Freeman, Glass & Doocy, 
2016; West, Isotta-Day, Ba-Break, & Morgan, 2016). Indeed, in cases of sexual 
violence-related pregnancies, there is a link between rape used in conflict and/or 
crisis situations and high rates of abortion (House of Lords, 2016). In countries 
that have restrictive abortion laws, the rate of unsafe abortion is high (Foster, 
2016). This is also the case in crisis and conflict settings. As Foster (2016) notes, in 
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such contexts, this has the greatest impact on young, poor, displaced and refugee 
women. It is estimated that unsafe abortions account for 25% of maternal deaths 
in crisis settings (Foster, 2016), while globally, every year, 50,000 deaths are caused 
by unsafe abortions (Foster, 2016; see also Bouvier, 2014; Shah, 2016). Accord-
ing to estimates provided by the World Health Organisation (WHO), 22 million 
unsafe abortions are performed annually (WHO, 2011 cited by Bouvier, 2014, 
p. 579). Unsafe abortions are defined as: ‘[p]rocedures for terminating an unin-
tended pregnancy, carried out either by persons lacking the necessary skills or in 
an environment that does not conform to minimal medical standards, or both’ 
(WHO, 2011 cited by Bouvier, 2014, p. 579; see also Foster et al., 2016; Schulte-
Hillen, Staderini, & Saint-Sauveur, 2016).
Access to emergency contraception and/or safe abortion are vital resources for 
those forcibly impregnated as a result of rape (Bouvier, 2014; see also Duroch & 
Schulte-Hillen, 2015). Unfortunately, in conflict/crisis and post-conflict/crisis set-
tings, where such resources are limited, our knowledge of sexual violence-related 
pregnancies is compromised (Onyango et al., 2016; Rouhani et al. 2016). While 
researchers have addressed the issue of women’s access to safe abortion in human-
itarian settings (Duroch & Schulte-Hillen, 2015; Foster et al., 2016; Foster et al., 
2017; Schulte-Hillen et al., 2016; Tousaw et al., 2017), only research by Onyango 
et al. (2016) and Rouhani et al. (2016) specifically addresses the experiences of 
raped women seeking abortions in conflict/crisis settings (see Banwell, 2019, for a 
more detailed review).
For NGOs working with survivors of rape, aside from the chapter on abor-
tion care in the revised Inter-agency Working Group (IAWG) Field Manual on 
Reproductive Health in Crises 2010, and some reference to abortion in the Clini-
cal Management of Rape Survivors (WHO, 2004), there are very few guidelines 
on safe abortion and post-abortion care for survivors. This is also the case for 
the Minimum Initial Service Package for reproductive health. This package – 
which outlines the set of priority activities to be implemented at the onset of an 
emergency – aims to ‘prevent and manage the consequences of sexual violence’ 
(see Inter-agency Working Group on Reproductive Health in Crises, 2011). And 
yet, access to safe abortion following rape is afforded very little attention. It is 
against this backdrop that I review President Trump’s foreign policy on abortion.
As noted earlier, the political economy approach attributes women’s social, 
political and economic marginalisation to macro-level systems and practices. 
In this example of structural GBV, I consider economic globalisation. To para-
phrase Shangquan (2000), economic globalisation, at its simplest, refers to the 
interdependence of world economics and increases in the international trade of 
commodities and services (Shangquan, 2000). It is a system that can create barri-
ers for the provision of universal reproductive healthcare. For illustration, I will 
review the impact of the defunding of UNFPA.
The Defunding of UNFPA and its Impact in Syria
According to their website, UNFPA is responsible for the reproductive healthcare 
of women and youth in over 150 countries. To put it another way, this translates 
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to over 80% of the world’s population. This provision extends to women and 
girls in crisis situations (UNFPA, n.d., About Us). Although UNFPA does not 
promote abortion, it promotes ‘universal access to voluntary family planning’. In 
contexts where abortion is illegal, UNFPA believes women should have access to 
post-abortion care, particularly when it is needed to save their lives. In countries 
where abortion is legal, UNFPA advocates for women’s access to safe abortion 
(UNFPA, n.d., FAQ). UNFPA receives approximately $75m in financial support 
from the U.S. (Sampathkumar, 2017). During 2016, UNFPA (with this financial 
support from the US) prevented 2,340 maternal deaths, ‘[prevented] 947,000 unin-
tended pregnancies’ and ‘[prevented] 295,000 unsafe abortions’ (UNFPA, 2017a).
The US is one of UNFPA’s largest donors (Banwell, 2019). During 2017 and 
2018, the Trump administration implemented the ‘Kemp-Kasten amendment’ 
thereby withholding funding from UNFPA. Dating back to 1985, this policy 
is based on the conviction that UNFPA supports coercive abortion in China. 
Despite the lack of evidence to support this claim (see Kaiser Family Founda-
tion, 2019), the US State Department still withheld $32.5m from the 2017 budget 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2019; Sampathkumar, 2017). This policy will impact 
vulnerable women and girls in crisis and emergency situations who require com-
prehensive reproductive healthcare, including access to safe abortion (Banwell, 
2019).
Let us consider the impact of the defunding of UNFPA for women and girls 
affected by the conflict in Syria. In 2016, UNFPA provided services to victims 
of GBV both within and beyond the conflict zone (UNFPA, 2017a). Victims 
included women, men and children. Women and girls of reproductive age, who 
were victims of child and/or forced marriage, were exposed to forced and unpro-
tected sex (more on child marriage shortly). This also placed them at an increased 
risk of  unwanted pregnancies (see Save the Children, 2014). In cases of unwanted 
pregnancies, the defunding of UNFPA has impacted their access to safe abortion 
should they require it. The defunding of UNFPA also has implications for female 
victims of wartime rape in Syria.
Research shows that rape has been used as a weapon of war in Syria (UN 
General Assembly, 2013b; UN SRSG-SVC, 2015; Human Rights and Gender 
Justice, MADRE, The WILPF, 2016). The Women’s Media Centre has docu-
mented 162 stories on rape and sexual violence in Syria between March 2011 and 
March 2013 (Wolfe, 2013). While other reports have documented the abduction 
(for purposes of sexual slavery) and rape of Yazidi women by ISIS (see Human 
Rights Council [HRC], 2016; Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2015a). Details of 
the impregnation (resulting in unwanted pregnancies) of  Yazidi women and girls 
are also included in these reports. While some women were forced to take birth 
control during their captivity, this was not the case for all women and some were 
impregnated following rape (HRC, 2016).
A number of women gave birth while they remained in captivity, some gave birth 
after they had been released and others gave their babies away (HRC, 2016). Trying 
to retrieve accurate data on the number of women and girls who were raped and 
impregnated during the Syrian conflict is challenging. This is due to abortion laws 
in Syria. In this context, abortion is only permitted if  the woman’s life is in danger. 
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For women and girls who do not meet Syrian abortion law requirements, there 
was a reluctance to discuss pregnancies resulting from rape, especially when sur-
vivors wanted to terminate those pregnancies (HRC, 2016). This is supported 
by Stoter who states: ‘[t]he women hardly talk about pregnancy. Many pregnant 
women seek abortions to avoid being stigmatized after spending months in sexual 
slavery by IS militants’ (Stoter, 2015).
Despite the law surrounding abortion in Syria, survivors have sought and 
undergone abortions. Those working in the medical profession report that they 
have provided girls with abortion pills or performed abortions themselves (Stoter, 
2015). This is corroborated by the UK select committee who interviewed survi-
vors about access to safe abortion following rape and forced impregnation (House 
of Lords, 2016). The WMC also includes cases of women seeking to terminate 
pregnancies resulting from rape.
The head of the UNFPA, Dr Babatunde Osotimehin, has voiced her concerns 
about the number of pregnant Syrian refugees who are displaced (see Spencer, 
2016). According to reports, 500,000 pregnant Syrian women remain in the coun-
try or neighbouring regions (van der Mensbrugghe, 2016). As van der Mensbrug-
ghe (2016) points out:
More than ever, access to abortion services is a critical form of 
medical care for these wartime rape victims, as well as a protected 
right under the Geneva Conventions. Yet safe abortion services 
remain woefully lacking.
As a result of the conflict, which began in 2011, the maternal mortality ratio 
in Syria has increased from 49% to 68% per 100,000 (see Centre for Reproduc-
tive Rights, 2017). These maternal deaths are attributed to the delays and over-
all challenges in accessing necessary reproductive healthcare, including access to 
safe abortion (Centre for Reproductive Rights, 2017). Those working within and 
beyond the conflict zone have highlighted the importance of providing contracep-
tion as both a safety and survival mechanism. A lack of access to contraception, 
including emergency contraception, leaves victims dealing with both the physical 
and psychological consequences of rape and, in cases of forced impregnation, the 
unwanted pregnancy that follows (see Women on Waves, n.d.).
As a reminder: in 2017, the Trump administration defunded UNFPA. This 
resulted in a funding gap of $16 million in Syria (Merelli, 2017). In their annual 
review of Syria for 2015, UNFPA note that 4.2 million of the 13.5 million people 
who required humanitarian aid within the conflict zone, were females of repro-
ductive age (UNFPA, 2015). Of the five million women and girls who have been 
displaced and affected by the conflict, 430,000 require reproductive healthcare. 
They will be impacted by these funding cuts. The increased risk of unwanted preg-
nancies for victims of sexual violence-related pregnancies is also addressed in the 
report and UNFPA explain how cuts to funding impedes their ability to deliver 
the necessary reproductive healthcare to these female survivors (UNFPA, 2015).
With the support of US funds, UNFPA set up a survivors’ centre in Duhok, 
Iraq. Among other things, it provides reproductive healthcare to Syrian women 
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and girls who were raped and held captive by ISIS. This centre will be impacted 
by the defunding of  UNFPA (Cauterucci, 2017). Likewise, the maternity hos-
pital in the Za’atari refugee camp in northern Jordan, which is run by UNFPA, 
will also be impacted by US funding cuts (Cauterucci, 2017). This hospital 
offers reproductive healthcare to Syrian women and girls who face challenges 
such as ‘lack of  proper medical care, poor access to reproductive health ser-
vices [and]unwanted pregnancies’. In terms of  reproductive healthcare, the 
clinic provides ‘family planning, post abortion care and counselling, prevention 
and management of  sexually transmitted infections [and] clinical management 
of  rape’. In addition, the clinic provides services for girls who have been exposed 
to forced and/or unprotected sex as a result of  forced marriage (European 
Commission, n.d.).
And finally, UNFPA provides support for 19 safe spaces across Jordon. The 
list of services provided by these safe spaces includes emergency reproductive 
healthcare, which can include abortion (Sutton, Daniels, & Maclean, 2017). They 
also ran Minimum Initial Service Package training workshops and distributed 
reproductive healthcare kits (these were mainly rape kits) to Syrian refugees in 
Lebanon (Masterson, 2013).
In relation to the conflict in Syria, the defunding of UNFPA has impacted 
the lives of women and girls who are seeking to terminate sexual violence-related 
pregnancies. To reiterate, denying females’ access to safe abortions, which results 
in unwanted pregnancies – themselves a result of forcible impregnation – should 
be considered a form of structural violence. It is a type of violence that is obscured 
by a security agenda that focuses narrowly on rape and sexual violence.
While UNFPA is a UN agency, it delivers vital reproductive healthcare services 
in developing countries. In the context of economic globalisation – where world 
economies are interdependent (Shangquan, 2000) – the defunding of UNFPA has 
a detrimental impact on developing countries who rely upon this support from 
UNFPA to deliver requisite reproductive healthcare to their citizens. Indeed, in 
the context of Syria, as we will see, economic crises, extreme droughts, increasing 
engagement with neoliberal policies, as well as the impact of the current conflict, 
have all ‘devastated the economy’ (Gobat & Kostial, 2016, p. 10). This means that 
the country continues to rely on foreign aid to deliver, among other things, repro-
ductive healthcare (see Banwell, 2019).
We now move on to consider the second example of structural GBV in Syria: 
denial of education.
Child Marriage and the Denial of Education
Before we delve into this example, I want to outline the relationship between child 
marriage and the denial of education. The relationship between these two phe-
nomena is circular; the destruction of education facilities and the chaos of the 
armed conflict have led to an increase in early and forced marriage in Syria (used 
mainly as a social and economic coping mechanism). The use of early and forced 
marriage prevents girls from accessing/completing their education. The impor-
tance of education, particularly for vulnerable populations, is included in goal 4 
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of the UN Sustainable Goals. This includes women and girls in conflict-affected 
areas. Let us review this in more detail.
At the age of  14 Malala Yousafzai was shot in the head by a member of 
the Taliban for her beliefs about women’s right to education. In 2014, Boko 
Haram abducted 276 girls from a school in Chibok, Nigeria. This denial of 
education, and the violence used to achieve this, constitutes both physical and 
structural violence as outlined in the DEVAW (defined in the previous chapter; 
see also John, 2016). Visible cases such as Malala and the Chibok girls – which 
involved direct physical violence and the use of  arms – have received interna-
tional attention. Whilst they draw attention to the global problem of  violence 
against women and girls, they overshadow more subtle forms of  structural vio-
lence that impact women and girls’ access to education (John, 2016). As John 
(2016, p. 195) highlights:
While such attention is important and necessary, there is an on-
going, less direct and less physical but equally powerful and pain-
ful violence that continues to slowly, and less visibly, disrupt and 
prevent girls and women from their rightful education endeavors – 
this is the hidden hand of poverty, patriarchy and power struggles 
which constitute systemic and structural violence.
Here, I broaden what is meant by GBV by examining the impact of both physical/ 
direct and structural violence on girls’ access to education within the Syrian con-
flict zone.
According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights (2013), 1,000 schools 
have been used to detain and torture civilians. Girls’ access to education is fur-
ther compromised by the use of explosive weapons in civilian-occupied zones 
(UNFPA, 2017b). In their global analysis of attacks on schools between 2011 and 
2015, Save the Children reported that over half  of these occurred in Syria (Save 
the Children, 2015). And a report published by the World Bank in 2017 noted 
that 53% of schools had been damaged in Syria, while 10% had been completely 
destroyed (as cited in Save the Children, 2018). Various reports detail the level 
of damage and destruction to Syrian schools since the conflict began in 2011. 
This information is collated by The International Center for Transnational Justice 
(hereafter ICTJ) in their 2018 report – ‘We didn’t think it would hit us’: Under-
standing the impact of attacks on schools in Syria.
This deliberate targeting of education facilities has implications for GBV. 
Not only does this destruction to property curtail girls’ future career prospects – 
thereby maintaining their subordinate position, which speaks to the definition 
of structural violence outlined in this book – it can also be linked with other 
forms of GBV: early and forced marriage (International Center for Transnational 
Justice [ICTJ], 2018; Save the Children, 2014; the United Nations Children’s Edu-
cation Fund [UNICEF], 2014; UNFPA, 2017b; Women’s Refugee Commission 
[WRC], 2016).
As a result of the crisis in Syria, practices of early and forced marriage 
have increased (Bartels et al., 2018; Mourtada et al., 2017; UNICEF, 2014). 
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Child marriage, in many cases, is used to alleviate extreme poverty among Syr-
ian girls (HRC, 2016; Inter-agency, 2013; The Freedom Fund, 2016; Spencer 
et al., 2015; WILPF, 2016). Despite these attempts to provide for and protect 
their daughters, family use of  child marriage is problematic. It involves young 
girls marrying much older men, which increases the risk of  sexual exploitation 
and abuse (Save the Children, 2014). It also, as noted above, impedes access to 
education (UNICEF, 2014; WRC, 2016). Females who enter into marriage at a 
young age are required to leave school in order to care for their husbands or to 
begin their childbearing and childrearing responsibilities. As articulated by a 
Syrian woman from Daret Azza sub-district, in Aleppo: ‘[s]ome say that when 
a 14-year-old girl is made to marry, she must leave school and be controlled 
by a man who will prevent her from leaving the house’ (as cited in UNFPA, 
2017b, p. 67).
This denial of  education is both situational (resulting from the conflict) and 
cultural (rooted in patriarchal beliefs about gender roles and gendered divisions 
of  labour). And, as noted above, the relationship is circular. Before unpack-
ing this in more detail, it is important that we clarify what is meant by child 
marriage.
Child marriage refers to the marriage of a girl or boy under the age of 18. It 
includes both formal marriages and informal unions (the latter involves children 
living together as though married; UNICEF, 2016 as cited in Bartels et al., 2018). 
It is a practice that affects both genders, with girls making up the majority of 
cases. Broadly speaking, early marriage encompasses child marriage. Forced mar-
riage is a marriage where one, or indeed both parties, have not provided their full 
and free consent to the union (Bartels et al., 2018). This can and does include chil-
dren under the age of 18 (Bartels et al., 2018). Forced marriage was a key feature 
of the 1991–2002 civil war in Sierra Leone where thousands of women and girls 
were abducted by insurgents and taken into the bush and forced to marry their 
kidnappers (Haenen, 2013). Referred to as bush-wives, these women and girls 
were victims of rape, forced impregnation, forced pregnancy and forced abortion 
(Gong-Gershowitz, 2009; Haenen, 2013; see also O’Brien, 2016). Forced mar-
riage may also involve various forms of productive and domestic labour and may 
be used to punish and humiliate the enemy as well as reproduce the nation (Aijazi 
& Baines, 2017, p. 466).
Child marriage and forced marriage are global issues (Girls not Brides, 2017), 
however, my focus is on Syria. Whilst it is true that child and forced marriage can 
cause long-term physical and mental harms,7 in order to move beyond examples 
of interpersonal violence, as per the current security framework, my focus is on 
structural violence, specifically girls’ lack of access to education.
Child marriage is considered a human rights violation (this is recognised 
by a number of Conventions; see Bartels et al., 2018, p. 2 for a detailed list). 
7This may include but is not limited to, an increased risk in intimate partner violence, 
sexually transmitted diseases and sexual exploitation and abuse (Save the Children, 
2014).
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In addition, various UN documents and international conventions provide 
guidance to States on how they can meet their human rights obligations in rela-
tion to early and forced child marriage. These include, but are not limited to, 
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women; The Com-
mittee on the Rights of the Child; The Human Rights Committee; The Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; The Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights; and The Committee against Torture. To follow on from my 
discussion of unwanted pregnancy as a form of torture, in a recent statement, the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, argued that child and forced marriage should be considered 
forms of GBV that amount to torture. Finally, child, early and forced marriages 
were included under Goal 5 of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (United 
Nations General Assembly, 2016).
Early Marriage in Syria
Empirical research has found that early marriage – a long accepted practice in 
Syria – has increased since the conflict began, changing from a cultural practice 
to a coping mechanism (Bartels et al., 2018; ICTJ, 2018; UNFPA, 2017b; see 
also Mourtada et al., 2017). Child marriage is of particular concern for ‘Syrian 
girls in refugee communities in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey’ (Girls not 
Brides, 2017). In Jordan, for example, registered marriages involving girls under 
the age of 18 have increased from 12% in 2011 to 18% in 2012 and from 25% in 
2013 to 32% in 2014 (Girls not Brides, 2017; see also UNICEF, 2014). As a result 
of the conflict, and increasing engagement with neoliberal policies, employment 
and livelihood opportunities for Syrians have diminished. Let me provide some 
historical context. During the 1980s, armed conflict and economic crises plagued 
the Arab region. As a result, Syria experienced a reduction in social spending. 
This ultimately led to the collapse of the economy and the withdrawal of public 
services and subsidies (Alsaba & Kapilashrami, 2016; Banwell, 2018). From 2000 
onwards, the government adopted the neoliberal model. This involved transfer-
ring the control of the economy from the public to the private sphere (Abboud, 
2017; Gobat & Kostial, 2016). This facilitated the rise in poverty and unemploy-
ment levels (Gobat & Kostial, 2016).
Despite the efforts of  host countries, accommodating the influx of  refu-
gees fleeing the war in Syria has been challenging. HRW (2016a, 2016b) 
outlines some of  the practical and institutional barriers Syrian refugees 
face in Lebanon and Jordan when trying to enrol their children in school. In 
Lebanon, these include: the imposition of  additional school enrolment require-
ments; strict regulations relating to legal residency; employment-related restric-
tions (which impacts families’ ability to pay for school-related costs, such as 
travel and school equipment) and classes being taught in unknown languages 
(HRW, 2016a). In Jordan, these barriers include ‘refugee registration polices’ 
that require children to provide identification cards to enrol in school as well as 
‘certification and documentary requirements’ that many refugees do not have 
(HRW, 2016b).
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Concerns about the lack of access to education, as a result of the conflict, were 
captured during focus group discussions with Syrian refugees:
We were all pro-education; the priority was education before mar-
riage. We wanted our daughters to reach at least the secondary 
education level. Things have changed now. Many young girls are 
resorting to early marriage due to their fear of the ambiguous 
future. I married off  two daughters after the war, one was 18 and 
the other one was 12.
‘We wished to study and get married, but now the situation is dif-
ferent’ (as cited in Mourtada et al., 2017, p. 58).
During these focus group discussions, many of the participants admitted that 
they were against child marriage, but with the chaos of the conflict and the dis-
placement that followed, some recognised the potential advantage of early mar-
riage, particularly in relation to protecting a woman’s honour (referred to as al 
Sutra) (Mourtada et al., 2017, p. 58). In the words of one participant:
Fear of insecurity is a major factor. They are marrying early 
because of al Sutra. We have war. Many women are afraid of 
being raped, and if  a married woman is raped, she is more likely to 
be forgiven by her husband but if  an unmarried woman is raped, 
it will destroy her life. (as cited in Mourtada et al., 2017, p. 58).
Research by Save the Children (2014) has found that forced marriage – reportedly 
taking place in refugee camps – is used to restore family honour following rape. 
As one GBV expert noted (as cited in UNFPA, 2017b, p. 20):
Forced marriage of a young girl to her cousin at a certain age 
existed before the crisis, but this practice has increased during the 
crisis because of the need to seek protection, the lack of men, the 
worsening economic situation, or because the girls are exploited, 
or threatened at gunpoint.
In addition to the use of early and forced marriage as a coping mechanism, 
research has also found that families are also relying on temporary marriages 
to protect their daughters from abduction. Ironically, however, these temporary 
marriages expose young girls to sexual exploitation and abuse as many are only 
married for a few hours before the marriage is annulled. In cases where the girls 
become pregnant, the lack of official registration of these marriages means that 
‘husbands’ are exempted from any parental responsibility for the child (UNFPA, 
2017b).
In this example, we move between a macro- and meso-level analysis. Here, 
using the feminist political economy approach, we can unpack how neoliberalism, 
at the macro-level informed/informs State-level economic policies and practices 
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in Syria which, along with State-level cultural and patriarchal practices, heightens 
girls’ exposure to GBV in the form of child marriage. This, and the concomitant 
denial of education, facilitates structural GBV. Regrettably, the preoccupation 
with wartime rape and sexual violence occludes this type of violence.
We will now move on to consider the final example of structural violence 
within and beyond the Syrian conflict zone: denial of formal employment oppor-
tunities; resulting in coerced sexual activities.
Survival Sex in Syria
Forced prostitution, trafficking and sexual slavery, outlined and defined in the 
previous chapter, form part of the landscape of coerced sexual activities in Syria 
(see The Freedom Fund, 2016; Shaheen, 2017). However, in order to cover the 
range of coerced sexual activities during war/armed conflict, as well as the multi-
ple and complex causal factors, I will focus on survival sex in the context of Syria. 
Drawing on my analysis of forced prostitution (see previous chapter) as a form of 
structural violence, survival sex – which does not include the term ‘forced’, but is 
the result of poverty and unemployment – will also be understood as behaviour 
that emerges from a lack of alternative means to support oneself  and/or family. 
It is examined here against the backdrop of a security agenda that constructs 
women as always and already vulnerable victims. By broadening our analysis of 
the violence(s) of war/armed conflict – to consider, in this instance, women’s use 
of survival sex – we can begin to see women as three-dimensional characters; both 
victims and agents, who exercise relative autonomy (discussed in the previous 
chapter). This is not to underestimate the extreme conditions under which women 
make these coerced decisions.
As noted above, armed conflict and economic crises have resulted in the 
collapse of the formal economy in Syria resulting in mass poverty and unem-
ployment. In 2015, poverty levels reached 83.5% in Syria, with extreme poverty 
reaching 69.3% (Gobat & Kostial, 2016; The Syrian Centre for Policy Research 
[SCPR], 2015). Exacerbated by the drought (see Gupta, 2016; Richani, 2016), and 
the increasing engagement with neoliberal policies, these conditions were height-
ened within the conflict zone (Banwell, 2018). Here, loss of property and employ-
ment, as well as the destruction of health and education services, has affected 
more than two-thirds of Syrians (Gobat & Kostial, 2016). In their review of six 
cities (Aleppo, Deraa, Hama, Homs, Idlib and Latakia) - which covers agricul-
ture, health, education, housing, transport and energy – The World Bank’s Syria 
Damage Assessment note that ‘[t]he conflict has set the country back decades 
in terms of its economic, social, and human development’ (as cited in Gobat & 
Kostial 2016, pp. 21, 23). Here, I want to focus on the impact of the drought in 
more detail.
As Femia and Werrell (2012) note, the human and economic cost of the 
drought in Syria is substantial (see Al-Riffai et al., 2012 for a detailed assessment 
of the impact of the drought). As a result of the impact to livestock and agri-
culture, thousands of Syrians – particularly those in the northeast of the coun-
try, who rely on agricultural farming – have lost their livelihoods (Gupta, 2016; 
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Richani, 2016; Sohl, 2010). At least a million were left ‘food insecure’ and, as 
unemployment levels increased, millions of Syrians found themselves living in 
abject poverty (Gobat & Kostial, 2016; Gleick, 2014; Richani, 2016; Sohl, 2010). 
Over a million farmers fled to the cities in search of employment, however finding 
work was extremely difficult (Femia & Werrell, 2012; Gupta, 2016). This influx of 
people placed an increased strain on Syria’s ‘economically-depressed cities’ where 
the ‘[p]oor have been forced to compete with poor not just for scarce employment 
opportunities, but for access to water resources as well’ (Femia & Werrell, 2012; 
see also Gobat & Kostial, 2016). According to reports, 36,000 households from 
Al-Hassake Governorate (this amounts to around 200,000–300,000 people), for 
example, have moved to urban areas such as Damascus and Aleppo (Sohl, 2010). 
Accommodating this displaced population, as well as the million refugees fleeing 
from war-torn Iraq, further diminishes access to limited resources, particularly 
employment (De Châtel, 2014; Kelley et al., 2015; Sohl, 2010; see also The New 
Humanitarian, 2009).
It is within this context that the illicit economy flourishes (Gobat & Kostial, 
2016). Informal economies were discussed in detail with reference to Iraq. Here, 
I will provide a brief  reminder. In conflict zones, illicit economies consist of three 
types: coping, combat and criminal (Peterson, 2009). Coping economies revolve 
around survival, while combat and criminal economies are driven by military 
objectives and profit-making activities (Peterson, 2009). As noted by the Syrian 
Center for Policy Research (SCPR) in 2015, due to extreme poverty, and the lack 
of employment options, a huge number of Syrians were forced to work in the 
informal economy (as cited by Gobat & Kostial, 2016; see also De Châtel, 2014). 
This can be broken down by gender. Men from the various warring factions in 
Syria turned to combat and criminal activities (Banwell, 2018). They engage in 
activities such as kidnapping (HRW, 2015a; United Nations General Assem-
bly, 2013b; WILPF, 2016); trafficking for sexual purposes (Freedman, 2016; 
The Freedom Fund, 2016; WILPF, 2016); economic and aid blockages (HRW, 
2014c; United Nations General Assembly, 2015a); extraction and smuggling of 
oil (Gupta, 2016; Richani, 2016); trading in weapons (WILPF, 2016); and the 
smuggling of women and girls (Freedman, 2016; HRC, 2016). Conversely, Syrian 
women resorted to coping economies in the form of survival sex.
As established, in the absence of their husbands, who are missing or have been 
killed during the conflict, women become the head of the household. Faced with 
an increasing lack of employment opportunities, which were exacerbated by the 
drought, Syrian women have been providing sexual services in exchange for food 
and accommodation for their families (Amnesty International, 2016; Banwell, 
2018; Spencer et al. 2015; The Freedom Fund, 2016; UNFPA, 2017b; United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2015). As articulated by a 
GBV expert working on the ground in Syria: ‘[t]here are many cases of “sex for 
money”, more than before, because of the economic situation and the absence of 
the male factor for various reasons’ (as cited in UNFPA, 2017b, p. 30).
As well as the lack of access to formal employment, women are also denied 
access to the labour market in their host communities. The combination of the 
conflict, rising unemployment levels and the increased cost of living, resulting 
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from the drought, has meant that many Syrians have fled to neighbouring regions 
such as Jordan and Lebanon in order to survive (Banwell, 2018). In these host 
communities, many female Syrian refugees are forced into the informal economy 
when restrictions are placed upon their right to access formal employment in 
these settings (Anani, 2013; Banwell, 2018; The Freedom Fund, 2016; UNHCR, 
2015). In Lebanon, for example, many refugees resort to ‘survival sex’ to pay for 
increased living costs (The Freedom Fund). In 2012, the International Rescue 
Committee, in collaboration with ABAAD-Resource Center for Gender Equal-
ity, conducted a rapid assessment of GBV in Syria (see Anani, 2013). Survival 
sex was identified as one example of GBV experienced by Syrian women and 
girls (Anani, 2013). In the words of one focus group participant: ‘… if  you want 
other help from other NGOs you should send your daughter or your sister or 
sometimes your wife… with full make-up so you can get anything… I think you 
understand me’ (as cited in Anani, 2013, p. 76). More recently, The Freedom 
Fund (2016) found that Syrian refugee women were providing sexual favours in 
return for rent, food and employment in Lebanon.
In addition, empirical research has found that Syrian women seeking refuge in 
Europe are also impacted by this type of structural GBV (see Freedman, 2016). 
In this context, women provide sexual services to fund their travel to Europe 
(Freedman, 2016). Indeed, for women in refugee camps across Calais in France, 
coerced sex is a common survival strategy (Freedman, 2016). In other cases, 
women and girls find themselves victims of sexual harassment. Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) (2015b), for example, reported incidents of sexual harassment of 
female refugees in detention in Macedonia where women were offered preferen-
tial treatment in exchange for sex. Asma, a 20-year-old Syrian woman, shares her 
experience of being harassed by a police officer:
He tried whatever he could to get me alone in a room with him. He 
used to approach me and whisper to me that I am very beautiful 
and that he would help me out, that he would personally look into 
my case. (HRW, 2015b, p. 17)
Coerced sexual behaviour, in the form of survival sex, relies on an understand-
ing of coercion as a condition of unemployment (see previous chapter) and, as 
such, conceptualises survival sex as a form of structural violence. In Syria macro- 
and meso-level exploitative systems such as neoliberalism resulted in an increase 
in poverty and unemployment levels. These, in turn, were exacerbated by the 
drought. As a result, both genders were forced into the informal economy. Depart-
ing from the other examples in this chapter (and indeed coerced sexual activities 
in Iraq) the macro-level in this instance, not only takes into account economic and 
political foreign policy agendas, as well as global drivers, it also considers envi-
ronmental forces. Indeed, moving beyond the fetishisation of wartime rape and 
sexual violence – to consider women’s engagement with coerced sexual activities – 
necessitates that we extend the diagnostic framework to consider how climate 
variability and the extreme weather events it leads to (in this case, droughts), 
diminishes employment opportunities which, in turn, leads to coping, combat 
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and criminal coping informal economies. As demonstrated, these are demarcated 
along gendered lines. This expansion of the analytical framework enables a holis-
tic analysis of the causes and consequences of the structural and interpersonal 
violence(s) of war/armed conflict.
Conclusion
This chapter has exposed the shortcomings of the securitisation of wartime rape 
and sexual violence. By moving beyond examples of interpersonal violence to 
address structural forms of GBV in relation to the Syrian conflict, the discussion 
broadens our understanding of the violence(s) of war/armed conflict. All three 
examples of structural violence – denial of reproductive healthcare, resulting in 
unwanted pregnancies; denial of education, exacerbated by the use of child mar-
riage (and vice versa); and denial of employment opportunities, leading to sur-
vival sex – are linked to broader macro- and meso-level economic, cultural and 
political policies and practices. In all three examples, we see how these exploita-
tive systems and institutions (economic globalisation, neoliberalism, patriarchy) 
are exacerbated during conflict, thereby, at the very least, maintaining, but all 
too often, increasing women and girls’ exposure to GBV. In case of survival sex, 
this form of structural violence can be linked to extreme weather events, such 
as droughts, caused by climate variability. The political economy approach was 
utilised to examine these examples of structural violence. In the next chapter, 
returning to examples of interpersonal violence, we expand our discussion of the 
use of the visual in representations of armed conflict. Here, focusing on male vic-
timisation – thereby posing a challenge to the title of this book – I unpack female 
perpetrators of sexualised violence and torture.
Chapter 5
War-on-terror Femininity and the 
Sexualised Violence(s) at Abu Ghraib
Introduction
In 2016, while staying in New York City (NYC), I attended Laura Poitras’s 
immersive installation, Astro Noise, at the Whitney Museum of American Art. 
Curated by Jay Sanders, this experience builds upon themes found in Poitras’ 
earlier work documenting life in post-9/11 America. Among other things, the col-
lection addresses: the war on terror, the US drone programme, Guantánamo Bay 
and themes of occupation and torture (Laura Poitras Astral Noise). In one of the 
video installations of Astro Noise, we watch New Yorkers respond to the smok-
ing pit of Ground Zero (the relevance of this will become clear shortly). Despite 
its critical appraisal, unlike my experience at the 9/11 Memorial and Museum site 
later that same day, this installation did not leave a lasting impression. At Ground 
Zero, I watched teenagers take ‘selfies’ of themselves next to the North and South 
Pools before asking the adults with them: ‘What happened here?’, ‘What are 
the pools for?’, ‘Whose names are these?’ While ‘[t]aking selfies at horror sites, 
like concentration camps, Ground Zero or disaster-stricken areas, has become 
a growing trend on social media websites…’ (Hodalska, 2017, p. 407) – and can 
be placed within the broader landscape of dark tourism, which involves travel 
to sites of tragedy and death – what I witnessed at Ground Zero was not quite 
the same. For these teenagers, there was a tacit understanding that they were at 
a memorial site of some sort. However, they were unaware of the exact details. 
They had not chosen to explicitly engage in dark tourism. In this instance, they 
appeared to have happened upon a ‘horror site’. The details of what, when and 
who the memorial site was paying tribute to, did not seem to matter. Taking a 
picture (with a smile on their faces) and being ‘seen’ at or being superimposed 
onto history, is what mattered. Whose or what history was less important. 
Incidentally, the teenagers I observed, continued to take ‘selfies’ once they had 
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learned of the mass death and destruction that had taken place at this site. As 
Hodalska (2017, p. 416) notes, ‘[s]elfies taken at places of horror are ghoulish 
souvenirs, mobile memories’.
These are not the only ‘mobile memories’ we can associate with 9/11 and the 
war on terror that followed. As we will see in this chapter, seven US soldiers also 
used mobile phone cameras to pose with smiling faces; only this time it was to 
document the sexualised violence and torture of Iraqi prisoners. To be clear, 
I am not equating teenagers taking ‘selfies’ at Ground Zero with the behav-
iour of the American soldiers. What happened at this memorial site, on the 
11th  September 2001, was the catalyst for the war on terror. On this now historic 
day, the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda hijacked four US passenger planes. Two 
of the planes were crashed into the North and South towers of The World Trade 
Centre in NYC. The third crashed into the Pentagon while the fourth crashed into 
a field. In response to these attacks, the US launched the war on terror. Part of 
this campaign involved the invasion and occupation of Iraq (see Chapter 2). The 
sexualised violence and torture committed at Abu Ghraib (a prison in Iraq) falls 
within this ‘war’. What took place at this prison was captured on mobile phone 
cameras by the soldiers involved. Thirteen years later, mobile memories, in the 
form of ‘selfies’ at the Ground Zero memorial site, still form part of the post-9/11 
story. It is this that I reflect upon here.
Outline of the Chapter
This chapter provides a gendered analysis of  the war on terror. This is a macro-
level foreign policy agenda launched by the Bush administration following the 
9/11 terrorist attacks. It is not limited to the US. Other nations, most notably 
the UK, also joined in this global fight against terrorism. As this chapter will 
focus on a particular enactment of  the war on terror – the invasion and occupa-
tion of Iraq and the sexualised violence and torture at Abu Ghraib – I will limit 
the focus to US involvement. As such, at the meso-level, I will examine the US 
military, as well as militarised femininity. At the micro-level, the chapter will 
unpack the involvement of  female soldiers in the violence(s) that took place. 
American exceptionalism is at work across all three levels. It is also worth noting 
that the events at Abu Ghraib took place against the backdrop of the neoliberal 
agenda discussed in Chapter 2. While these three levels of  analysis are dealt with 
implicitly, the explicit focus of  this chapter centres on challenging wartime gen-
der essentialism and ontological constructions of  females as always and already 
innocent victims. Adding to my discussion in the previous chapter – where, in 
response to the fetishisation of rape and sexual violence, I examined structural 
forms of GBV – this chapter considers women as perpetrators of  the violence(s) 
of  armed conflict.
The chapter begins by outlining the terminology and the analytical frameworks 
employed throughout the chapter. This is followed by a gendered analysis of the 
war on terror. The body of the chapter – which addresses the involvement of three 
women in the sexualised violence and torture at Abu Ghraib – is divided into three 
main parts. The first section, which draws on Visual Criminology and literature 
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on photography and war, examines a selection of images of the violence(s) that 
took place at Abu Ghraib. The categories addressed include gender and sovereign 
violence; gender, ethics and appropriate responses to images of suffering (spe-
cifically the postmodern meme: ‘doing a Lynndie’); and finally, the limitations 
of the Abu Ghraib images. The second section, which draws inspiration from 
Feminist Criminology, unpacks mainstream media accounts of women’s involve-
ment in sexualised violence and torture, paying particular attention to the case of 
Lynndie England. The main themes explored here are female agency, gender and 
performance, female sexuality, as well as class and the maternal militarised body. 
In a reversal of Spivak’s infamous quote, referred to in Chapter 3, the images 
of the tortured and abused male Iraqi bodies suggest that ‘brown men needed 
to be protected from…white [women]’ (Holland, 2009, p. 249). If  we follow this 
line of thinking, we are able to revise our understanding of globalisation mascu-
linities (Chapter 2) to consider how femininities feature within this enactment of 
American foreign policy. The final section unpacks the subversive possibilities of 
war-on-terror femininity with reference to the conviction that crime is a resource 
for doing gender. Previous themes, such as western civilising missions, hypermas-
culinity and the US empire (Chapters 2 and 3), are revisited in this chapter.
Terminology and Analytical Frameworks
In this chapter, I will use the terms sexualised violence and torture to refer to the 
violence(s) committed at Abu Ghraib.
I outlined Halbmayr’s (2010) notion of sexualised violence in Chapter 1. Here, 
it is employed to understand men’s experiences of ‘humiliation, intimidation and 
destruction’ (Halbmayr, 2010, p. 30). The US government refused to refer to these 
acts as torture, choosing instead to refer to them as abuse. Furthermore, attempts 
were made to distance the US government from the actions of individual sol-
diers. Nevertheless, I posit that these acts of violence were carried out by men and 
women who represented the US military; therefore, these acts of interpersonal 
violence were enacted against the backdrop of the military institution. In other 
words, this violence emerges from an interpersonal-institutional nexus.
In this chapter, I use the term war-on-terror femininity to enrich our under-
standing of women’s involvement in sexualised violence. It is adapted from 
Sjoberg and Gentry’s (2007, p. 86) notion of militarised femininity. According to 
their typology, the female soldier is:
[…] brave, but needs the men around her to survive … She is sexy, 
but not sexual. She can fight, but the kind of fighting she can do 
is sanitized: she cannot engage in cruelty or torture. She is never 
far from her maternal instincts. The ideal-type of militarized femi-
ninity expects a woman to be as capable as a male soldier, but as 
vulnerable as a civilian woman.
While this offers a more generic depiction of the female solider, my war-
on-terror femininity is context specific: it exists within the milieu of American 
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exceptionalism and the fight against terrorism. Within this articulation, the 
female solider is not expected to be sexy. She is violent, aggressive and can engage 
in cruelty and torture as part of this wider US geopolitical agenda. This brand of 
feminism includes the use of sexual violence. While she may be maternal (this will 
be discussed later), this does not belie her duty to serve her country. She remains 
subservient to the white male soldier but is not required to be as vulnerable as a 
female civilian. Above all, she is superior to the Iraqi terrorist ‘other’.
As noted above, I will be analysing the (interpersonal-institutional) violence(s) 
at Abu Ghraib against the backdrop of American exceptionalism. This concept, 
as defined by Kramer and Michalowski (2011, p. 105),
[…] generally portrays the United States as a nation of exceptional 
virtue, a moral leader in the world with a unique historic mission 
to spread universal values such as freedom, democracy, equality…
And with regards to states of exception more broadly, as Aradau and van Munster 
(2009, p. 688) point out, ‘Guantánamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, extraordinary rendition, 
migration camps [and] surveillance practices’ are all examples of extraordinary 
measures that are presented as necessary and justified in the fight against terror-
ism. This chapter provides a gendered analysis of American exceptionalism.
Three of the seven soldiers involved in the sexualised violence and torture 
at Abu Ghraib were women: Megan Ambuhl, Lynndie England and Sabrina 
Harman.1 In order to analyse their involvement in the war on terror, this chap-
ter draws on the sub-disciplines of Feminist and Visual Criminology to critically 
examine gender and the sexualised violence committed at Abu Ghraib. What 
follows is a brief  and partial overview of both subjects, starting with Feminist 
Criminology (for a more detailed account, see Renzetti, 2013).
Feminist Criminology
Feminist Criminology has demonstrated that gender, alongside other intersect-
ing factors such as age, race, class, ethnicity and sexual orientation, is central to 
understanding criminal offending, victimisation and experiences of/treatment by 
the Criminal Justice System. While Feminist Criminology can be divided into 
different strands – liberal, Marxist, radical, postmodern and black feminist 
thought – for my purposes here, reference to the broad aims of Feminist Crimi-
nology will suffice.
Over the years, feminists have sought to highlight the inadequacies and fal-
lacies of much criminological work pertaining to the criminal and/or deviant 
behaviour of women. The general tenet of their argument is that women have 
either been overlooked within the literature or, when included, have been misrep-
resented or presented in distorted and negative ways, and/or depicted in terms of 
sexist stereotypes based upon their supposed biological (Lombroso & Ferrero, 
1The male soldiers were Javal Davis, Ivan Frederick, Charles Graner and Jeremy Sivits.
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1893/2004) and psychological (Kanopka, 1966) nature. In sum, their criticisms of 
mainstream criminology centre around three main issues: excluding, marginalis-
ing and distorting (mis-representing) women (Banwell, 2007). Since the 1980s, 
inquiries (both theoretical and empirical) into the relationship between feminism, 
gender and crime have flourished. Chesney-Lind (2006) and Cook (2016) provide 
a more thorough review of this work than is possible here.
In the twenty-first century, Feminist Criminology interrogates the relationship 
between patriarchy and female offending (Parker & Reckenwald, 2008). It con-
tinues to unpack intersecting inequalities in the lives of criminal women and girls 
(see Burgess-Proctor, 2006; Button & Worthen, 2014; Erez, Adelman, & Gregory, 
2009; Potter, 2006). It also examines the blurred boundaries between females’ vic-
timisation, their offending behaviour (Banwell, 2010; Peters, 2006; Wesely, 2006) 
and their treatment within the Criminal Justice System (Franklin, 2008; Pollack, 
2007). Feminist criminology has also broadened its analysis to address ‘transna-
tional dimensions of crime’ (Henne & Shah, 2016, p. 4; see also Henne & Torshynski, 
2013; Kim & Merlo, 2014).
Questions of how agency, choice and victimisation feature in the lives of 
women and girls caught up in the Criminal Justice System, alongside the broader 
structural, institutional, political and economic constraints that inform these 
lived-experiences – in sum, their pathways into crime – remain key concerns for 
the discipline. Finally, from a methodological point of view, feminist criminol-
ogy embraces the reflexive tradition and draws upon a range of methodological 
tools in pursuit of this agenda (Burman, Batchelor, & Brown, 2001; Henne & 
Shah, 2016; Mason & Stubbs, 2010). Having outlined the basic tenets of Feminist 
Criminology, let us move on to consider Visual Criminology.
Visual Criminology
In recent years, Criminology has become concerned with the visual (for a review 
of this work, see Brown, 2014; Carrabine, 2011, 2012; Henne & Shah, 2016; 
Young, 2014; see also The Handbook of Visual Criminology edited by Brown & 
Carrabine, 2017 and the special edition of Theoretical Criminology, 2014). The 
goal of this work is to understand ‘how crime and punishment are represented 
visually’ (Henne & Shah, 2016, p. 6). Criminologists have argued that the study of 
visuality as a formation of social power is capable of producing specific visions 
of hierarchical systems such as race, gender and sexuality (Brown, 2014; Brown & 
Carrabine, 2017). That said, Visual Criminology is not limited to the visual. It is 
also interested in the material reality of people’s lives, paying attention to ‘affec-
tive and sensory’ elements (Brown, 2017).
Using a variety of methods to document and analyse visual representations of 
crime and punishment – including photodocumentary, photo-ethnography, data 
visualisations, graffiti and dark tourism (see Brown, 2017) – visual criminologists, 
as Brown (2017) notes, push the boundaries of conventional crime and media 
studies to interrogate the role of the image more thoroughly. Images may be pro-
duced by the researcher or, as is more common, researchers analyse existing visual 
materials (Pauwels, 2017).
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From the beginnings of the discipline, criminologists have used images in their 
analyses of crime and criminality. Ranging from Lombroso’s biological determin-
ism (and the use of photographic evidence to identify criminals, see Finn, 2017), 
to the ethnographic work of the Chicago School (and Cultural Criminology more 
broadly), as well as Foucauldian analyses of sovereign punishment (and critical 
work on Criminal Justice responses to crime), scholars have engaged with visual 
representations of crime across spatial, social, cultural and political planes (see 
Brown, 2017; Carney, 2017; Ferrell, 2017; Finn, 2017).
The outline provided above speaks to the more generic elements of Visual 
Criminology. For the remainder of this section, I will focus on specific elements 
that align with the focus of this chapter: gender, American exceptionalism and the 
war on terror. Certain scholars have acknowledged the importance of the rela-
tionship between visuality, empire and the State, particularly in relation to colo-
nial and imperial practices (see Mirzoeff, 2011; Schept, 2016; see also Marchant, 
2019). Simply put, visuality (in this context) – as highlighted in the Introduction 
– is not intrinsically visual but takes on a narrative form. It involves, to paraphrase 
Schept (2016), the creation, representation and normalisation of State power (I 
will return to this shortly). For Schept (2016), however, the use of the image in the 
production of State power has not taken centre stage within Visual Criminology. 
That said, Visual Criminology has explored the relationship ‘…between aesthetics 
and ideologies…optics and politics’ and whether or not visuality ‘achieve[s] recog-
nizability and legibility’ (Brown & Carrabine, 2017). Allied to this, Visual Crimi-
nology is interested in unpacking the ethical, normative and moral consequences 
of looking and seeing (Brown & Carrabine, 2017; Gies, 2017).
Now that I have outlined the general principles of Feminist and Visual Crimi-
nology, let us move on to unpack women’s role(s) within the war on terror.
Gender and the War on Terror
For some criminologists, the US-led war on terror is an example of American 
exceptionalism (Aradau & van Munster, 2009; Rothe & Muzatti, 2004).2 What 
is missing is a gendered analysis of this ‘extraordinary’ fight against terrorism. 
Militarised masculinities play a key role in US empire building. With reference 
to the (interpersonal-institutional) violence(s) at Abu Ghraib, I want to examine 
how war-on-terror femininity might also form part of this neo-imperialistic story. 
What follows then, is an exploration of the war on terror through a gendered lens.
Three narratives emerge when we consider women and the war on terror:
1. The woman in need of rescue and protection (reads as the generic ‘third-world’ 
Muslim woman; see Mohanty, 1988).
2. The woman in danger: militarised femininity and the ideal female soldier.
3. The fallen woman: female perpetrators of sexualised violence.
2For a discussion of these issues in relation to the British State, see Mythen and Walk-
late 2006 & 2008.
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The first two ‘stories’ will be addressed briefly here while the remainder of the 
chapter interrogates the third narrative.
1. The ‘Third-world’ Muslim Woman in Need of  Rescue and Protection
In both Iraq and Afghanistan, US intervention was justified on the grounds that 
both missions were part of a broader campaign to rescue and liberate Muslim 
women from ‘barbaric’ Islamic regimes (Holland, 2009; Khan, 2014; Nayak, 
2006; Riley, 2013; Shepherd, 2006; Sjoberg, 2006a; Stabile & Kumar, 2005; Ste-
ans, 2008; Tétreault, 2006).
In the Introduction, I talked about western efforts to instil gender equality in 
Afghanistan. Part of this mission involves the liberation of Afghan women. The 
mutilated face of Bibi Aisha on the front cover of Time Magazine in July 2010 is 
a perfect illustration of western civilising missions. The image is graphic. We see 
a hole where the nose has been cut off. The headline reads: ‘what happens if  we 
leave Afghanistan’. In the article that follows, written by Aryan Baker (a news 
reporter for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Heck & Schlag, 2012), we learn that Bibi 
Aisha was an 18-year-old Afghan woman who ran away from her husband and 
his family who, under orders from the Taliban, cut off  her nose and sliced her 
ears. Bibi was rescued by US forces in Afghanistan and was taken to the US to 
receive reconstructive surgery (Heck & Schlag, 2013; Khan, 2014). This narrative, 
as Khan (2014, p.102) notes:
[…] leads to a logical conclusion: NATO and the United States 
should stay in Afghanistan to continue to rescue women from the 
Taliban who want to brutalise them. Logically, [w]estern forces are 
set up as saviors of the Afghan woman. (see also Rasul & McDow-
ell, 2010)
The violence involved in US interventions in the middle-east is obscured. Here, 
drawing on Schept (2016, p. 5), we return to the relationship between visuality, 
empire and the State:
Visuality, then, is the mechanism by which the quotidian vio-
lence underwriting authority is made illegible and un-seeable… [it 
masks] the inherent violence of [S]tates in a vocabulary that leaves 
intact the very logics, infrastructures and institutions necessary for 
the violence to occur in the first place.
In the previous chapter, I talked about sighting and citing women. Unlike 
the image of President Trump signing the anti-abortion Executive Order, where 
woman is absent, in this picture the woman is present. Bibi is both sighted and 
cited. However, she is still marginalised. Her story is not simply about fighting 
gender injustice; about the violence enacted upon her, its (geo)political scope is 
greater than this: victory in the battle against the evil forces of Islamic terrorism. 
This agenda is based on ethnocentric and orientalist ideas about women, Islam and 
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the middle-east. Orientalism, as coined by Said (1979), is based upon ontological 
and epistemological distinctions between the ‘orient’ and the ‘occident’, where 
the west dominates, restructures and has authority over this threatening, dan-
gerous, mysterious ‘Other’. For Said (1979, p. 300), orientalism is the systematic 
attempt to distinguish ‘between the West, which is rational, developed, humane, 
superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior’. Furthermore, 
the Orient is considered as a ‘hotbed of terrorism, ignorance, poverty, oppression, 
racism and misogyny’ (Nayak, 2006, p. 46).
To explore this case in more detail, I turn to Walklate’s (2017) work on 
the power of the visual to communicate ideas about victimhood and suffering (see 
also Gies 2017 who discusses mediating suffering in relation to staged imagery of 
killing and torture).
In the chapter Mediated Suffering, Walklate (2017) draws on three images to 
discuss the concepts of ‘pain, horror and resilience’. The first is an image of a 
woman running towards a funeral procession. The funeral is for her cousin who 
died in Afghanistan. This is reviewed under the subheading Pain? This is fol-
lowed by the image of a woman in Norway covered in blood following the attacks 
by Anders Breivik in 2011. This section is entitled Horror? The final image, dis-
sected under the title Resilience?, is of a march in Paris in response to the Char-
lie Hebdo attacks. The image features a banner with ‘Not Afraid’ written on it. 
Walklate (2017) argues that all three, produced in the aftermath of 9/11, ‘carry 
the marks of that moment in time in how they have been mediated and responded 
to’. Through her analysis, we see how suffering is ‘…reshaped, commodified, and 
packaged for its public and didactic salience’ (McEvoy & Jamieson, 2007, p. 425 
as cited in Walklate, 2017).
To this canon of post 9/11 images, we can add the photo of Bibi Aisha. 
I argue that the image of Bibi Aisha offers a ‘mediated’ illustration of pain and 
horror vis-à-vis the generic ‘third-world-woman’. In this example, the orchestra-
tion of female suffering was used by the US administration to sell the war on ter-
ror to the American people. As Stabile and Kumar (2005, p. 778) note:
As long as women are not permitted to speak for themselves, they 
provide the perfect grounds for an elaborate ventriloquist act, in 
which they serve as the passive vehicle for the representation of 
U.S interests.
As an illustration of how gender can serve American exceptionalism, Bibi Aisha 
is only one example of the various ways in which women were used to justify this 
global campaign (see Stabile & Kumar, 2005; Steans, 2008 for a more detailed 
analysis).
2. The Woman in Danger
The next narrative I want to draw upon is a variation of the first. However, in 
this instance, the woman in danger was a US soldier deployed in Iraq . Her name 
was Jessica Lynch. News stories reported that 19-year-old Lynch had ‘gone down 
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fighting’, that she had been injured in battle and then sexually violated in captivity 
(Sjoberg, 2007, p. 86). However, this was a fabricated story (by the Pentagon) of 
capture, detention and sexual violation. The reality was far more banal: Lynch’s 
gun had malfunctioned. She did not ‘go down fighting’. Her injuries were not 
battle-related. She was not captured per se; rather she willingly surrendered. She 
was held but received medical care (Bragg, 2003 as cited in Sjoberg, 2007; see also 
Lobasz, 2008; Mason, 2005).
After nine days, US soldiers rescued Lynch from the Iraqi hospital where she was 
being held (Lobasz, 2008). Lynch was portrayed as helpless, as needing male soldiers 
to rescue her (Sjoberg, 2007). As Lobasz (2008, p. 319 emphasis in the original) notes:
[…] Lynch was represented not only as a woman in need of res-
cuing, but as a virtuous and good woman in need of rescuing. 
Depicted as an innocent small-town girl who wanted nothing more 
than to teach kindergarten…Lynch both needed and deserved to 
be rescued.
While the story of Bibi Aisha was used to legitimise the continued presence of 
US forces in Afghanistan, it can be argued that the fabricated rescue mission of 
Jessica Lynch formed part of US efforts to revitalise support for the war on ter-
ror in Iraq. Like with Bibi Aisha, Lynch’s story was central to the war on terror 
narrative. Conversely, our final ‘story’, concerning women’s involvement in sexu-
alised violence and torture, did very little to justify the invasion and occupation 
of Iraq. In fact, this comparison – between victim and perpetrator in the form 
of Lynch and England – has formed the basis of numerous academic articles 
on the subject of women’s role in the US military (see Howard III & Prividera, 
2008; Lobasz, 2008; Mason, 2005; Sjoberg, 2007). Here, as captured in the title of 
Lobasz’s (2008) article, The woman in peril (Lynch) is compared with ‘the ruined 
woman’ (England). Lynch embodies women’s normative role within the US mili-
tary, while England represents the subversion of it.
3. Abu Ghraib and Female Perpetrators of  Sexualised Violence
In April 2004, 60 Minutes II, a CBS American news programme, broadcast a 
breaking report detailing the sexual abuse and torture of Iraqi prisoners by US 
soldiers at Abu Ghraib (Howard III & Prividera 2008; Murphy, 2007). The show 
released images of hooded naked detainees being piled on top of one another to 
form a pyramid, while other images depicted forced simulated sexual acts (Hol-
land, 2009). Later, in May 2004, Seymore Hersh also reported on the story in The 
New Yorker. This was followed by published photographs of the violence(s) in the 
The New York Times, Newsweek and The Washington Post (Tucker & Triantafyl-
los, 2008). US soldiers, over the course of three months, took an estimated 1,800 
photographs of the sexual abuse and torture of Iraqi detainees (Murphy, 2007; 
Richter-Montpetit, 2007).
Hersh’s article in The New Yorker, Torture at Abu Ghraib, was based on the clas-
sified report by Major General Antonio Taguba (Holland, 2009). And although, 
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as Sjoberg (2007) notes, there were eight official investigations into the sexualised 
violence and torture, only those written by General Taguba in 2004 and by Major 
General George Fay in 2005 are in the public domain. Among the acts of physical, 
mental and sexual abuse listed in the Taguba (2004, pp. 16–17) report are: the use 
of military dogs to intimidate detainees; various acts of physical violence, including 
jumping on prisoners’ feet; forcing prisoners to pose in sexually explicit positions 
for the camera; forced nakedness, forced masturbation and ‘forcing naked male 
detainees to wear women’s underwear’; the sodomising of a detainee; and ‘threat-
ening male detainees with rape’. This is corroborated by Fay and Jones (2005) who 
also found that military personnel engaged in the improper use of isolation.
Seven US military soldiers – the seven ‘rotten apples’ (named earlier) – 
were found guilty of various violations of the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice (UCMJ), including numerous counts of dereliction of duty, as well as the 
maltreatment of prisoners between May 2004 and September 2005 (Caldwell & 
Mestrovic, 2008, p. 276). No senior officers within the US military were charged 
or tried for their crimes (Howard III & Prividera, 2008, p. 288). Janis Karpin-
ski, the female general in charge of Abu Ghraib, was ‘formally admonished and 
quietly suspended’ (Hersh, 2004). For my purposes here, I will provide details 
of the three women who were involved as well as Charles Graner, the supposed 
ringleader of the violence(s) and England’s boyfriend at the time of the scandal.
In 2004, Megan Ambuhl, following a plea deal, pleaded guilty to a single 
charge of dereliction of duty. She was dismissed from the army and did not serve 
any prison time (CNN, 2013). In 2005, Sabrina Harman was demoted and sent 
to prison for her role in the sexualised violence and torture at Abu Ghraib. Fol-
lowing her sentence, she received a bad conduct discharge from the army (CNN, 
2013). In the same year, as part of a pretrial agreement, Lynndie England pleaded 
guilty for her involvement, while claiming that she did not understand that her 
actions were wrong. This resulted in a mistrial. During her second trial, England 
was found guilty of ‘four counts of maltreating detainees, one count of conspir-
acy and one count of committing an indecent act’ (CNN, 2013). She received a 
three-year prison sentence but was released after serving half  of this time. Charles 
Graner was sentenced to 10 years in prison. He also received a dishonourable 
discharge from the army (CNN, 2013).
In Chapter 1, I talked about the tendency to argue that perpetrators of excessive 
and brutal violence dehumanise their victims prior to carrying out their acts of vio-
lence. Accounts of the sexualised violence at Abu Ghraib are no exception. A num-
ber of writers have argued that the sexualised violence and torture at Abu Ghraib 
was enacted upon dehumanised victims (Apel, 2005; Spens, 2014). My position on 
this remains the same: dehumanisation was not a precursor to this violence. What 
happed to the detainees at Abu Ghraib may have dehumanised them, after the fact, 
but this violence was not enacted upon dehumanised bodies. It was inflicted upon 
bodies that were identified and marked as enemies of the State. Bodies that ‘required’ 
punishment as part of a western civilising mission. In the context of Abu Ghraib, 
moving beyond dehumanisation allows us to appreciate the racial (and by exten-
sion, ethnocentric and orientalist), political and gendered meanings and motivations 
behind this sexualised violence (see also Richter-Montpetit, 2007; Tétreault, 2006).
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Images of Sexualised Violence and Torture at Abu Ghraib
I opened this chapter with a discussion about teenagers smiling and taking 
‘selfies’ at Ground Zero. Following on from this, the images that I have chosen to 
analyse include England and Harman smiling for the camera as they pose in front 
of abused and exposed Iraqi men (see Figs. 1, 2, 4 & 5). I have also included the 
somewhat paradoxical image of Harman treating an injured solider. On the one 
hand, Harman is performing the normative feminine role of caring. On the other 
hand, she is grinning and posing, with a thumbs-up, in front of a naked man who 
has been bitten by a military dog (see Fig. 5). There are no published images of 
Megan Ambuhl, and apart from the details regarding her dismissal from the army, 
there is no real focus on her involvement, other than the fact that she was one of 
the three women who engaged in acts of sexualised violence.
Before we unpack the individual images in detail, I want to consider Foucault’s 
work on sovereign violence and how this applies when women are at the forefront 
of the analysis.
In his chapter, How Does the Photograph Punish?, Phil Carney draws on Fou-
cault’s work on sovereign punitive violence where ceremonial/spectacular punish-
ment is enacted upon the body of the criminal by the State (see Foucault, 1977). 
He focuses in particular, on Foucault’s reference to the punitive act of mark-
ing in the form of branding, scarring and flogging. Here, Foucault distinguished 
between a ‘real’ and a ‘virtual’ marking of the body. The former leaves a visible 
mark on the physical, anatomical body, while the latter is a mark upon a person’s 
status. Here, the individual’s social, symbolic body is humiliated and shamed. 
In both cases, the person is ‘…marked by an element of memory and recognition’ 
(Foucault, 1972-3/2015, p. 7). Here, we might think of the serial number tattooed 
onto the bodies of Jews in the concentration camps during the Holocaust as both 
an actual and a virtual mark.
The bite mark, seen in the final image in this collection, speaks to Foucault’s 
notion of actual marking. In this photograph, there is a visible, material imprint 
of the violence that was inflicted. In terms of virtual marking, as noted above, 
male detainees – as part of the catalogue of violence(s) at Abu Ghraib – were 
forced to wear pink underwear on their heads. In this instance, their bodies were 
virtually and symbolically marked. Their humiliation and shame were captured 
in a photograph and then shared for others to consume their degradation. In this 
second example, these men have been emasculated and feminised by this act of 
sexualised violence. As Halbmayr (2010, p. 30) notes, this affects a person’s ‘physi-
cal, emotional and spiritual’ status.
In the examples Foucault (1977) refers to, while we might question the nature 
of  the violence inflicted upon the subject, we are less inclined to question the 
legitimacy of  the State’s right to inflict such violence. In other words, we do not 
question the sovereign authority of the State to punish these particular individu-
als. This does not translate to the situation in Abu Ghraib. Based on the well-
rehearsed arguments that this was an illegal invasion; constituting a State crime 
(Kramer & Michalowski, 2005, 2011; Whyte, 2007), we might question the sov-
ereign authority of the US and the sexualised violence and torture committed 
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against these detainees. Here, it will be useful to return to American exceptional-
ism and the war on terror. It has been argued that in this context the normal rules 
of war did not apply. Given that detainees at Abu Ghraib were presented as per-
sons under control and not prisoners of war (POW), it was argued that the third 
Geneva Convention (that offers protection to POW) did not apply (Caldwell & 
Mestrovic, 2008). Nevertheless, I still want to interrogate these spectacles of State 
violence; especially given the involvement of women and the departure from tra-
ditional representations of this type of violence. As Caldwell (2012, p. 70) notes:
In a modernist patriarchal society… ‘sovereign’ is associated 
with masculinity such that power is aligned with the masculine 
symbolic or phallic power, as this is the ultimate measure for 
self-determination.
Against this backdrop, how do we theorise women’s involvement in this State 
violence?
In terms of locating the individual agency and responsibility of the three 
women involved in this sexualised violence and torture, Richter-Montpetit (2007, 
p. 39) believes that these actions followed a pre-constructed ‘heterosexed, racial-
ised and gendered script’ that can be placed within the broader ‘war on terror’ 
campaign. In other words, these women (and indeed the men) were simply props. 
They did not make ‘individual’ decisions to engage in this violence. They were 
part of the larger US war machinery. For Richter-Montpetit, Operation Iraqi 
Freedom was a colonial endeavour. The racialised violence enacted by US sol-
diers on Iraqi detainees were ‘acts of colonial violence rooted in the desire to 
enact “Whiteness”’ (Richter-Montpetit, 2007, p. 45). Caldwell (2012) comes to 
a similar conclusion in her book Fallgirls: Gender and the Framing of Torture at 
Abu Ghraib. The book, as the title suggests, presents the women as scapegoats. As 
Caldwell (2012, pp. 102–103 emphasis in the original) argues: the ‘…female sol-
diers were used for the humiliation of Iraqi male prisoners … and were framed as 
objects complying with male organized torture scenarios’. Others (see Gronnvoll, 
2017; Sjoberg, 2007), however, have argued that the women played a specific role: 
to feminise and emasculate the enemy. As Sjoberg states (2007, p. 95):
Sexual abuse of Iraqi men by American women communicates 
(whether it was intended to or not) a disdain for Iraqi mascu-
linities so strong that subordinated American femininities are the 
appropriate tool for their humiliation.
Using these insights as my point of departure, I will now provide my own 
interpretation of women’s involvement in sovereign violence.
What Is the Appropriate Response to These Images?
In Fig. 1, England has a cigarette in her mouth and is smiling for the camera. 
In keeping with my discussion of taking ‘selfies’ at memorial sites, this is a more 
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playful image of Lynndie compared with the infamous picture of her with the 
detainee on a leash. My decision to use the term ‘playful’ to describe England 
in this image will become apparent when we discuss the phenomenon of ‘doing 
a Lynndie’ in due course. This first image will be unpacked in relation to gender, 
ethics and appropriate responses to suffering and violence.
Writers have expressed concern about the inability of  images to move 
people, both in general, but specifically in relation to the photos that were 
taken at Abu Ghraib (Butler, 2007; Carrabine, 2011; Kennedy & Patrick, 
2014; Sontag, 1979, 2003). In her book On Photography, Sontag declared that 
images of  suffering and violence had lost their ability to alarm (Sontag, 1979). 
In her next book, Regarding the Pain of Others, published in 2003, Sontag 
concedes that habitual viewing of  horrifying images does not always result 
in compassion fatigue. Others have raised similar concerns to those raised 
by Sontag in her earlier work. Bulter (2007), for example, in her article, The 
Digitalization of Evil, grapples with ideas about what is grievable, which lives 
matter and whose lives are represented in the aftermath of  war. With refer-
ence to Abu Ghraib, Butler tries to understand the process by which these 
images and their distribution were normalised. Her argument is that the so-
called enemy, depicted in these images, was ‘…not idiosyncratic, but shared, 
so widely shared, it seems, that there was hardly a thought that something 
might be amiss here’ (Butler, 2007, p. 958). Furthermore, the images, Butler 
argues, came to be perceived as banal because they were catalogued alongside 
the soldiers’ ‘holiday’ photos:
In these instances, it would seem that the photos are part of a 
record of everyday life, and that everyday life has to be understood 
Fig. 1. Lynndie England Either Doing the ‘Thumbs-up’ Gesture or Signalling 
That She Is Holding a Pistol Aimed at the Penis of the Hooded Naked Iraqi 
Detainee at Abu Ghraib (en.wikipedia.org, 2003).
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in this context as consisting in a certain sequential interchange-
ability of such images. (Butler, 2007, p. 960)
In this context then, the actions of  these soldiers are normalised and not 
regarded as ‘morally alarming’ (Butler, 2007). Here, the exceptional becomes 
the quotidian.
It is a common argument that repeated viewings of images of war, violence 
and atrocity, eventually lead to compassion fatigue (Kennedy & Patrick, 2014). 
When the images of the sexualised violence and torture at Abu Ghraib surfaced 
in 2004, various newspapers expressed their shock and horror at what had taken 
place, particularly given the involvement of women (see Åhäll, 2017). But do these 
images still have the same impact? I always provide students with a trigger warning 
when teaching on this subject. I also do the same when presenting at conferences. 
In fact, in December 2018, I presented a paper at The Evil Women conference 
in Vienna. The title of my paper was The feminine-as-monstrous: Using the 
whore narrative to unpack representations of militarized femininity gone awry. As 
per my usual practice, I forewarned the audience that I would be showing vio-
lent images. In this particular presentation, I was showing images of Lynndie 
England and Sabrina Harman. No one in the audience seemed concerned. In fact, 
the person who presented after me (with no visual cues) received more outrage 
for his teaching practices than I did for showing images of sexualised violence 
and torture. Is this compassion fatigue or do images of female violence no longer 
shock us? Carrabine’s (2011, p. 19) work on this is instructive. He reminds us 
that images of suffering and violence are deeply embedded in human storytelling 
therefore, ‘“human outrage” is not the “natural response” to images of torture’. 
Furthermore, such images have to be placed within the broader cultural context. 
While for some, this means addressing the consumption of violent pornogra-
phy and video games within American culture (see Sontag, 2004), the cultural 
context I am interested in is the war on terror, which created simplistic binaries 
between good and bad; rescuers/liberators versus dictators/extremists. Perhaps for 
some, the violence that we see in these images can be regarded as a just and nec-
essary response to the threat posed by ‘dangerous terrorists’. This is compatible 
with the rhetoric of American exceptionalism. Recall the image of Bibi Aisha. 
Although her story relates to Afghanistan, a similar rhetoric (the protection of 
women) was applied to the case of Iraq. Maybe for some, the men in these images 
are a synecdoche for men in the middle-east. The kind of men who cut off  wom-
en’s noses.
Perhaps due to some, or all of these reasons, the images of Abu Ghraib 
did not shock as much or, as universally, as one would assume.3 This may also 
3In his book, The Abu Ghraib Effect (2007), Stephen Eisenman provides evidence to 
support the notion that the images did not cause as much outrage as one might have 
expected. First, despite the four investigations into what happened at Abu Ghraib, 
as noted earlier, only a few charges and convictions followed. Second, US con-
gress received as little as 12 hours of sworn testimony concerning the violence(s) at 
War-on-terror Femininity and the Sexualised Violence(s) at Abu Ghraib   121
explain why they have been appropriated and recontextualised in numerous ways 
(Carrabine, 2011, p. 25). Some of these reimagining’s have offered critical analy-
ses of this violence (see Carrabine for a discussion of Phil Toledano’s 2008 virtual 
exhibition), while others fall short. The most obvious example being the ‘doing 
a Lynndie’ phenomenon. This involves posing like England, as captured in the 
image above, and taking a photograph. According to Hristova (2013), 827 photos 
of the ‘Lynndie pose’ were uploaded to the British blog, Bad Gas, following the 
release of the Abu Ghraib images in May 2004. Most of the submitted photos 
are, Hristova (2013) argues, mundane; taken in the context of people’s everyday 
lives. These are the instructions for visitors to the site:
1. Find a victim who deserves to be ‘Lynndied’.
2. Make sure you have a friend nearby with a camera ready to capture the 
‘Lynndie’.
3. Stick a cigarette (or pen) in your mouth and allow it to hang slightly below the 
horizontal.
4. Face the camera, tilt your upper body slightly forward but lean back on your 
right leg.
5. Make a hitchhiking gesture with your right hand and extend your right arm so 
that it’s in roughly the same position as if  you were holding a rifle.
6. Keeping your left arm slightly bent, point in the direction of the victim and 
smile (Know Your Meme, Lynndie England Pose, n.d.).
The gesture is also included in the Urban Dictionary as: ‘the act of pointing 
and laughing at an unaware victim while holding a cigarette half-cocked in your 
mouth and being photographed. Much like Lynndie England’ (as cited in Hris-
tova, 2013, p. 431).
Let us unpack this phenomenon in more detail with reference to semiotics, 
postmodernism and the uses of memes. For our purposes here, a brief  overview 
of these subjects is provided.
The Lynndie England Pose as Postmodern Meme
The term meme, from the Greek mīmēma, meaning that which is imitated 
(Grundlingh, 2018), was coined by Richard Dawkins in his 1976 book The Self-
ish Gene (Boudana, Frosh, & Cohen, 2017; Cannizarro, 2016; Grundlingh, 2018; 
Krsteva, Donev, & Iliev, 2018; Marchant, 2019; Milner, 2012). Internet memes, to 
paraphrase Huntington (2013), are considered a subversive form of communica-
tion within participatory media culture (see also Gradinaru, 2018). As everyday 
artefacts, memes recycle, mimic and parody popular culture (Kuipers, 2005 as 
cited in Huntington, 2013; Marchant, 2019). They also appropriate and trans-
form cultural texts (Milner, 2012). Milner (2012, p. iii) defines internet memes 
Abu Ghraib. Third, candidates did not discuss the images during the 2004 Presidential 
election campaign. And finally, George W. Bush was re-elected.
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as ‘amateur media artefacts, extensively remixed and recirculated by different 
participants on social media networks’. Also, in the words of Krsteva et al. (2018, 
p. 136):
[M]emes can be viewed as postmodern hybrid creations combining 
the visual and the written modes of expression. They make use of 
different artistic forms, genres, modes and techniques. The visual 
and the written parts form one unit often using radical parody, 
irony, kitsch, quotations and other stylistic devices. The result is a 
new media item of rich semiotic content, a metaphor ready to be 
seen by more media consumer than ever before.
A number of  scholars have used ideas from semiotics to examine the use 
and meaning of  memes (Cannizarro, 2016; Grundlingh, 2018; see also 
Gradinaru, 2018). Semiotics is interested in unpacking the meaning attached 
to cultural objects and how that meaning is conveyed through signs. Signs con-
tain the signifier, the physical form, as well as the signified, the concept (Hall, 
1997 as cited in Huntington, 2013; see also Gradinaru, 2018). Within postmod-
ern thinking, the relationship between signifier and signified is viewed as arbi-
trary (Gradinaru, 2018). For writers such as Lacan, Barthes and Derrida, the 
meanings of  signs are fluid, ‘…signs do not need to be fixed in any partic-
ular signified, the “free play” of  signifiers being the only authentic semiotic 
movement’ (Gradinaru, 2018, p. 295). While Gradinaru (2018, p. 304) bases 
her discussion on GIFs, we can apply her thinking to memes to posit that 
memes change the meaning of  the initial sign, modifying the signification and 
transforming ‘the originals into floating signifiers’ (Gradinaru, 2018, p. 304). 
Or, as articulated by Boudana et al. (2017, p. 1226), ‘the signifiers are discon-
nected from their historical signifieds and reassigned according to the users’ 
will and wit’.
Boudana et al. (2017, p. 1212) unpack the use of postmodern memes in rela-
tion to iconic photographs. For them, iconic images consist of three traits:
(a) the recognition of these photos by a large public, (b) their rep-
etition and recycling across media platforms, and (c) their broad 
social and moral significance, beyond the referential meaning of 
the originally reported event.
In their research, they review 34 different memes of the iconic photograph The 
Napalm Girl, taken by Nick Ut in 1972. This image depicts children fleeing the 
Napalm attack during the Vietnam War. In terms of the various appropriations 
of this photograph, in the form of memes, the authors note:
[T]hese appropriations reveal a fundamental paradox: the more a 
photograph is recycled, the more it may influence the public – yet 
the more the original referential context may be lost in the process. 
(Boudana et al., 2017, p. 1214)
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In terms of appropriations, there are two types: ‘politically oriented’ or 
‘pop-culture-oriented’ (Shifman, 2013, p. 372 as cited in Boudana et al., 2017, 
p. 1225). The former, on the whole, are sardonic, while the latter, are more humor-
ous (Boudana et al., 2017). While some memes aim to revolt and subvert, others 
can be viewed as ‘a solipsistic, self-referential, closed…and ultimately dysfunc-
tional approach to community that accepts offending others as a normal part of 
everyday experience’ (Kien, 2013, p. 560 as cited in Boudana et al., 2017, p. 1227).
Based on the criteria outlined by Boudana et al. (2017), the photograph of 
Lynndie England, shown in Fig. 1, can be categorised as iconic. The ‘doing a 
Lynndie’ meme falls under pop-culture-oriented appropriation. To explore this 
postmodern phenomenon, I visited the Know Your Meme website and looked up 
‘the Lynndie England Pose’. The site includes background information on the 
‘doing a Lynndie’ pose, as well as the instructions that were posted on Bad Gas. It 
also includes details of how the phenomenon spread, the original photograph of 
Lynndie (as shown in Fig. 1), as well as some brief information about her involve-
ment in the sexualised violence and torture at Abu Ghraib. Details of her sentencing 
are also provided. What I find most problematic is the ‘notable examples’ that are 
included of people ‘doing a Lynndie’. In total, there are hundreds of thousands of 
posted images, however, I have limited my analysis to the ones included in the ‘nota-
ble examples’ section. Of the six that are included one stands out in particular. It is 
of a young boy doing the pose, pointing at an overweight woman sat opposite him 
in a chair. He appears to have a pencil in place of the cigarette. It is not clear why 
he is smiling sardonically at the woman. Perhaps he is mocking her for being over-
weight. Whatever the reason, the woman looks back at him with disdain. In keeping 
with the original image, the boy is smiling. Unlike in the original, where the men’s 
faces are obscured by the hoods they have been made to wear, we see the woman’s 
response to the boy’s mocking pose. It is not clear why this woman/victim ‘deserves to 
be Lynndied’. Regardless of the appropriation, if the boy is indeed mocking this 
woman due to her size, this is problematic in and of itself. The fact that this is a 
parody of sexualised violence and torture adds to the discomfort this image elicits.
The sign in this case is the object of the photograph. In the original photo-
graph, the image of Lynndie England pointing at the naked Iraqi prisoners is the 
signifier. The signified is American exceptionalism and the war on terror. I believe 
that ‘the original referential context’ of this image – the use of sexualised violence 
and torture as part of the war on terror – is lost in these mimetic performances. 
While the uncoupling of signifier and signified within postmodern signs can, in 
some cases, challenge and disrupt in ways that are positive, this is not the case 
with the ‘doing a Lynndie’ meme.
I would like to make one final comment on this image and the ‘doing a Lynndie’ 
phenomenon. To do so, I will return to where I started the chapter: dark tourism 
and taking selfies at memorial sites.
Dark Tourism and Taking Selfies at Memorial Sites
Based on the Urban Dictionary definition, what is missing from these re-enactments 
(i.e. the Lynndie pose) is the intersubjective meaning behind the violence in the 
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original image. To reiterate, the violence(s) witnessed in the images at Abu Ghraib, 
were enacted upon discursively constructed (as opposed to dehumanised) bodies; 
where racial, gendered and political meanings were inscribed prior to, and post, 
these acts of sexualised violence. Reminiscent of my argument about sexualised 
violence against Jewish women presented in Chapter 1, there is an intersubjective 
dynamic to this violence. Both the victim (the racially inferior terrorist ‘other’) 
and the perpetrator (the white knight of the US empire) are consumers of this 
political economy of violence. It is hard to imagine how these broader narra-
tives surrounding the original Lynndie pose are captured in these re-enactments/ 
performances. The question for me is: in what way, if  any, is ‘doing a Lynndie’ 
similar to what I witnessed at Ground Zero? The answer, I believe, is that both 
involve superimposing individuals onto key moments in American geopolitical 
history. In both cases, the specific context and meaning of the original events are 
lost in these frivolous retellings. And yet herein lies the paradox. Both examples – 
‘doing a Lynndie’, talking selfies at Ground Zero – involve actions that are at once 
ahistorical (apolitical even), while simultaneously existing within, and responding 
to, a specific moment in history: the 2001 terrorist attacks. Now we will move on 
to consider the second image in this collection.
Masculinities, Femininities and the War on Terror
In previous chapters (Chapters 2 and 3), I have talked about globalisation mas-
culinities. These include: masculinities of conquest and settlement, masculini-
ties of empire and masculinities of postcolonialism and neoliberalism (Connell, 
1998, 2005). Masculinities of empire, postcolonialism and neoliberalism were 
Fig. 2. James Graner and Sabrina Harman Pose Behind a Pyramid of Naked 
Iraqi Detainees at Abu Ghraib (en.wikipedia.org., 2003–2004).
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applied to the invasion of Iraq. Furthermore, I argued that this intervention was 
informed by a hyper-masculine agenda to re-masculinise the US after 9/11 (see 
Chapter 3). Paradoxically, in the context of the invasion of Iraq, this hyper-mas-
culine campaign relied upon war-on-terror femininity in the form of Ambuhl, 
Harman and England. It is this paradox I wish to unpack. I will do so with refer-
ence to Connell’s (2005) hierarchy of masculinities framework. Readers will recall 
from Chapter 2 Connell’s (2005) four types of masculinity: hegemonic, com-
plicit, marginalised and subordinate. As the most dominant form of masculinity, 
hegemonic masculinity is positioned above the others. Complicit, marginal (those 
unable to meet the requirements of hegemonic masculinity) and subordinated 
masculinities (those prevented from achieving hegemonic masculinity) are always 
positioned below hegemonic masculinity. Within this hierarchy, femininities are 
also placed below masculinities. As Connell and Messerchmidt (2005, p. 848) 
articulate: ‘[g]ender is always relational, and patterns of masculinity are socially 
defined in contradistinction from some model (whether real or imaginary) of 
femininity’. Indeed, hegemonic masculinity was formulated alongside hegem-
onic femininity. The latter was then renamed ‘emphasised femininity’ to denote 
the asymmetrical relationship between masculinities and femininities (Connell & 
Messerchmidt, 2005).
Below (see Fig. 3.) I offer a visualisation of this gender hierarchy.
Drawing on this visual representation of the gender hierarchy, my notion of 
war-on-terror femininity, and Sjoberg’s (2007) ideas about subordinated feminini-
ties and inferior masculinities, we can map the image of Graner and Harman (see 
Fig. 2.) onto this pyramid and reformulate this illustration of the gender hierar-
chy in the following way:
At the top of the pyramid, we have Graner, arms folded, relaxed, playful, rep-
resenting the patriarch and hegemonic masculinity. Then we have Sabrina. She 
is both literally and figuratively placed below him. She represents emphasised 
femininity which, in this context, is reimagined as war-on-terror femininity. This 
femininity is above subordinated and inferior masculinities, which are positioned 






Fig. 3. Visual Representation of Connell’s (2005) Gender Hierarchy.
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viewed in this way, at once reproduces Connell’s gender hierarchy while, at the 
same time, challenges it. Unlike in the illustration of the gender hierarchy – where 
women are always and already inferior to all types of masculinity – in Figure 2, 
Sabrina is positioned above inferior Iraqi men. However, she remains subordi-
nate to the white, western man. What we see here is a temporary, context specific 
enactment of hypermasculinity that – within the contours of American excep-
tionalism – relies upon war-on-terror femininity.
Who Was the Real Sabrina Harman?
In her book, The Cruel Radiance: Photography and Political Violence, Linfield 
(2012) asks: ‘[w]hy are photographs so good at making us see cruelty?’ Her answer 
is ‘…because photographs bring home the reality of physical suffering with a 
literalness and an irrefutability that neither literature nor painting can claim’ 
(Linfield, 2012, p. 39 emphasis in the original). This is particularly true when, as 
argued earlier, the bodies being looked at are subjected to real and virtual mark-
ing. Or, indeed, when images of violence and torture have been ‘carefully cho-
reographed with the visual experience of viewers in mind’ (Gies, 2017). As Gies 
(2017) explains, ‘[t]he audience encoded within the images occupies the position 
of helpless onlookers, but it is also assigned an instrumental role in the degrada-
tion of victims’.
And yet for some, the photos of sexualised violence and torture at Abu Ghraib 
do not tell the whole story. Philip Gourevitch (writer), in collaboration with 
Fig. 4. Sabrina Harman Giving the ‘Thumbs-up’ While Smiling Over the Dead 
Body of Manadel al-Jamadi Who Died During Interrogation at Abu Ghraib. 
His Body Bag Has Been Opened So Graner and Harman Can Take Photos of 
Themselves (wikimedia.commons.org, 2003a). 
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filmmaker Errol Morris, created the documentary Standard Operating Procedure 
(2008). Gourevitch believed that in order to get a fuller picture of what happened 
at Abu Ghraib we need to speak to the perpetrators. In this section, I will draw 
on an interview transcript with Sabrina Harman, as well as other pictures of Har-
man in relation to the war on terror, to see if  these offer a more comprehensive 
portrait of her and her involvement in what occurred at Abu Ghraib.
In 2013, I wrote a review for the aforementioned book by Caldwell. In my 
review, I suggested that the book fell short of  delivering a more nuanced account 
of  gender and the sexualised violence and torture at Abu Ghraib. I argued: ‘[m]
uch like analyses which simply demonize the women involved, the case presented 
here – that these women were exploited and coerced participants – is every bit 
as reductionist’ (Banwell, 2013, p. 216). I found the denial of  female agency in 
these acts of  violence problematic and concluded my review with the opinion 
that Fallgirls was a misguided attempt to ‘…excuse these women because cur-
rent gender stereotypes are incompatible with their existence’ (Sjoberg, 2007, p. 
96). Here, I want to revisit Caldwell’s book to unpack the final two images in 
the collection (Figs. 4 & 5).
Under the image of Harman tending to the detainee who has been bitten (see 
Fig. 5), Caldwell (2012, p. 108) includes the following caption: ‘Harman giving 
stiches and giving instrumental care’. She also includes, in a sub-section titled 
Maternal Sabrina and Friendships, a number of photos of Harman smiling with Iraqi 
families in their homes. We also learn that Harman, who cared for some of the pris-
oners at Abu Ghraib, was described by many as a maternal caregiver. In addition to 
this supplementary information, Caldwell includes the transcript of her conversa-
tion with Harman in 2007 (Caldwell, 2012, pp. 173–174):
Fig. 5. Sabrina Harman Gesturing a ‘Thumps-up’ While Stitching a Wounded 
Detainee Who ‘Has Been Bitten by a Military Dog’ at Abu Ghraib (wikimedia.
commons.org, 2003b).
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Caldwell: In Al Hilla, did you purchase a family mattress and a 
refrigerator? Why? What did this family mean to you?
Harman: Yes, because she made me…lunch and I wanted to 
return the favor. They were important to me and I was around 
them for almost everyday for three months. I don’t know, it’s hard 
to explain without coming off  as anti-American. They had noth-
ing and were still happy because they had each other. Their situa-
tion seemed horrible but they made it work and never complained 
about it to me. If  I got their kids clothes and small toys like a 
soccer ball they were so happy while kids in the U.S. would be 
so pissed if  they didn’t get an Xbox. I don’t know, they were just 
amazing people that I learned a lot from.
Does this knowledge change our reaction to these images of Harman (Fig. 4 &5); 
to her involvement generally? To return to Gouervitch, was he correct to suggest 
that images alone do not tell the whole story? As I said at the outset, with regards to 
this final image (Fig.5), the smile and the ‘thumbs up’ gesture appear incongruous 
with the care that Harman is providing this detainee. Given her relationship with the 
Iraqi families, is Caldwell right in her assessment that these women did not ‘choose’ 
this violence? Even now, five years after I wrote my review, I find this denial of female 
agency problematic. I believe it is possible for Harman to occupy both positions: as 
a caring person (a civilian) who looked out for people in need and as an individual 
(a solider) who engaged in sexualised violence and torture. One does not, and should 
not, negate the other. I believe that my concept of war-on-terror femininity (where 
violence and torture are prescribed) resolves the paradox of Sabrina Harman, par-
ticularly if we accept that Harman chose to enact this type of femininity. Finally, 
despite portrayals of Harman as maternal, this does not (and did not) interfere with 
her duty to serve her country and play her role in the geopolitics of the war on terror.
The final part of the chapter will draw on Feminist Criminology to explore 
Lynndie England’s involvement in the sexualised violence and torture at Abu Ghraib.
Feminist Criminology and Discursive Representations  
of Female Violence
As noted earlier, Feminist Criminology is interested in unpacking how agency, 
choice and victimisation feature within the lives of criminal women. Spanning 
the national and the transnational, Feminist Criminology addresses interlocking 
inequalities relating to age, race, class, gender, sexuality and patriarchy, to name 
but a few. In the spirit of this work, I will now unpack the various accounts of 
Lynndie England’s involvement in the (interpersonal-institutional) violence(s) at 
Abu Ghraib. I will begin with existing media accounts, before considering the 
subversive possibilities of war-on-terror femininity.4
4For a more detailed exploration of women’s political violence and their involvement 
in terrorism, as well as the narratives used to explain their violence(s), see Mothers, 
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Crazy in Love
Demonised, sexualised and, indeed, infantilised, England was believed to have 
acted under the influence of  her then boyfriend, Charles Graner (Lobasz, 2008). 
For some, this narrative denied her agency and reduced her moral and criminal 
culpability (Sjoberg, 2007). Interestingly, both the media and England relied 
upon this narrative. In her own words, Lynndie claimed: ‘…he wanted me in the 
picture, and I was like, “no way”’. And ‘…Graner kept being persistent, “Oh, 
come on, just take the picture, take the picture”’ (Dateline NBC, 2 October 
2005 cited in Howard III & Prividera, 2008, p. 298). And: ‘I was so in love with 
him that I trusted his decisions and I did whatever he wanted’ (Howard III & 
Prividera, 2008, p. 299). The idea that England was coerced and manipulated 
by her boyfriend is an all-too familiar trope within ‘stories of  violent women’. 
However, if  we turn to Feminist Criminology, a number of  scholars within the 
discipline have demonstrated how women’s violence can be explained by gen-
der oppression and/or patriarchy, particularly in cases of  battered women who 
kill (see e.g. Banwell, 2010; Dunn & Powell-Williams, 2007; see also Batchelor, 
2005). In England’s case, rather than dismiss her claims about Graner simply 
as a ploy to reduce her culpability, we might argue that she acted under the het-
eropatriarchal influence of  this man, but still exercised her own agency, albeit 
in a way that was mediated by a number of  interlocking oppressions (these are 
discussed below).
Not-woman
Other media stories focused on Lynndie’s gender or, more accurately, on her 
distortion of it (see Holland, 2009). Numerous references were made to her 
tomboyish features and her masculine appearance (Holland, 2009; Tucker & 
Triantafyllos, 2008). This is how a Washington newspaper described England: 
‘[s]he has short-cropped hair, a tight, muscular body and that don’t-mess-with-
me-expression’ (as cited in Gronnvoll, 2012, p. 376). As articulated by Holland 
(2009): ‘[s]he was represented as being inappropriately masculine as well as inap-
propriately female, a gender abnormality with one foot in each of these seemingly 
dichotomous categories’. These portrayals are reminiscent of the views of Lom-
broso and Ferrero who, in their 1893 book, The Criminal Woman, argued that the 
true biological nature of a woman is antithetical to crime. Therefore, the female 
criminal is not only abnormal, she is biologically like a man. As succinctly put by 
Hart (1994) in a more recent comment on gender and crime (Hart, 1994, p. 13, as 
cited in Gilbert, 2002, p. 1293):
Monsters, Whores (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007) and its follow-up, Beyond Mothers, 
Monsters, Whores (Gentry & Sjoberg, 2015). See also Women as Wartime Rapists: 
Beyond Sensation and Stereotypes (Sjoberg, 2016). Drawing on a range of case studies 
(the Armenian genocide, the Nazi genocide, the genocides in Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia, as well the DRC) Sjoberg dissects women’s role in sexual violence.
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Masculinity theory pursues its circular reasoning by arguing that 
women are less likely to engage in criminal activity because they 
are not men. Boys will be boys, say masculinity theorists; and girls 
will be girls, unless they do become criminals, in which case they 
are likely to be masculinized women.
Put simply, a woman who is capable of aggression and violence becomes con-
stituted as the masculine woman, the ‘other’ (Gilbert, 2002). Also, as Campbell 
argues:
Her actions are forced into a masculine model of aggression, 
judged to be male, and the woman is seen as having violated not 
just the criminal law but the “natural law” of proper female behav-
ior. (Campbell, 1993, p. 144)
In a similar way to the superficial reading of  the woman-as-dupe narrative 
discussed above, this not-woman characterisation refuses to take women’s vio-
lent behaviour seriously. By placing women’s actions outside of  their gender, 
the association of  femininity/the feminine with non-violence is reaffirmed. 
Conversely, my war-on-terror femininity – which accepts that women can be 
violent and aggressive, while at the same time maternal – disrupts these gender 
binaries.
Class
In other accounts, the focus was on England’s white working-class background: 
‘[a]s the fallen woman, England was not simply to be removed from the military 
caste but to be (re)placed into the white working-class Appalachian culture from 
which she originated’ (Howard III & Prividera, 2008, p. 302). Through numerous 
news sources, we learn that England was poor and grew up in a trailer behind a 
sheep farm (see Howard III & Prividera, 2008). She is described as an ‘uncivilized 
hillbilly’, as someone who is backward, ‘other’ and poor (Mason, 2005). Unlike 
in the case of Jessica Lynch, whose whiteness and Appalachian background were 
used to describe poor yet determined Americans (Tucker & Triantafyllos, 2008, 
p. 92), in England’s case these two facts were reformulated and used as evidence 
of her uncivilised and savage nature (Mason, 2005; see also Lobasz, 2008). In the 
words of Mason (2005, p. 43):
As representatives of Mountain country life, hillbillies can thus 
reflect either heroism – bravery and loyalty to traditional ways – or 
a deviance, sadism and primitivism that is said to fly in the face of 
modern progress.
In a piece on The War on Poverty in Appalachia, professor Ronald Eller 
(2014) reviews the history of politics, poverty and inequality in Appalachia. 
Often regarded as the symbol of the failure of the War on Poverty, introduced 
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by President Lyndon Johnson in the 1960s, Appalachia was (and is) associated 
with the white poor. Eller also explores the racial tensions that emerged from 
the War on Poverty in Appalachia. Disparaging comments relating to England’s 
Appalachian background are common, and apart from the work reviewed above, 
few have given serious academic thought to how her poor, working-class, rural 
upbringing might have informed her decision to join the Army in the first place, 
as well as her willingness to take part in the violence inflicted upon the bodies of 
‘brown’ terrorist ‘others.’ From a feminist perspective, Lynndie’s age, race, class 
and gender (or her supposed inappropriate performance of the latter) should not 
be interpreted in reductive ways that seek to explain her behaviour away, rather, 
they should be understood as interlocking constraints that informed her deci-
sions. Indeed, an analysis which focuses solely on individualised explanations of 
women’s violence is one which ultimately depoliticises women’s experiences and 
does not attend to, or take into account, the structural constraints which inform 
their violent behaviour.
Sexuality
Details of  England’s sexual history and her various sexual partners were 
revealed as evidence of  her deviance and her culpability for her crimes. Main-
stream news stories focused on her ‘dysfunctional, adulterous sexual relation-
ship with Charles Graner’ (Holland, 2009, p. 252). According to Jennifer Wells 
in the Toronto Star: ‘[g]etting naked, it now appears, was not a shy pursuit for 
the 21-year-old England. Included in the not-yet-released Abu Ghraib archive … 
were videos and still photos of  England. Said one senator: “[s]he was having sex 
with numerous partners. It appeared to be consensual”’ (as cited in Gronnvoll, 
2017, p. 378). In another news article, we are told that England appeared ‘in 
sexually explicit pictures with other soldiers’ and engaged in ‘raunchy behavior 
before and after [her] company journeyed to Iraq’ (Gronnvoll, 2017, p. 379). 
Here, we can apply Sjoberg and Gentry’s (2007, 2008) whore narrative, specifi-
cally the first category, erotomania. Erotomania is based on the idea that violent 
women have an insatiable appetite for sex. It is this pathological relationship 
with sex that causes them to be violent. In my reading of  England’s sexual his-
tory, stories about her sexual behaviour are incidental to, rather than explicable 
of  her violent behaviour.
The Maternal Militarised Body
The final narrative I want to explore is that of  the militarised maternal body (see 
Managhan, 2012). In her book, Sexing War/Policing Gender: Motherhood, Myth 
and Women’s Political Violence, Åhäll (2017) argues that stories about violent 
women’s agency are informed by normative constructions of  motherhood and 
maternal reproduction. Women, and their maternal bodies, she argues, are not 
only judged and valued for their appearance, but also for the actions in which 
they engage. With specific reference to England, Åhäll argues that revelations 
that England was pregnant when news of  the sexualised violence and torture 
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surfaced not only underscored the tension between her role as a future mother 
and her current role as a soldier, but also drew more attention to the fact that 
women had taken part in the violence(s). For some news outlets, England’s preg-
nancy softened her image during her trial:
England arrived at military court this morning, seven months 
pregnant and dressed in combat fatigues. Nothing like the young 
woman in these pictures, where she is seen humiliating Iraqi Prison-
ers. (World News Tonight, 3 August 2004, as cited in Howard III & 
Prividera, 2008, p. 304)
In her review of news media representations, Åhäll (2007) cites numerous exam-
ples where Lynndie is transformed from monster to mother, a woman who is no 
longer capable of torture and sexual abuse. Implicit in some of these stories is 
the belief  that motherhood is the reason England finally accepts responsibility 
for her actions. For others, however, her pregnancy and her subsequent status 
as a mother, rather than providing a recuperative narrative, serve as reminders 
of her confusing and dangerous sexual/gender identity (Holland, 2009). I will 
return to this shortly, first let us consider how war-on-terror femininity serves as 
a recuperative narrative.
Violence as a Resource for Achieving War-on-terror Femininity
Conventional femininity has not been associated with crime or violence therefore, 
for women and girls, their criminal and/or violent behaviour cannot be regarded 
as a resource for achieving this type of femininity. However, I would argue that 
within my construction of war-on-terror femininity, violence can, in this instance, 
be considered a resource for achieving this type of femininity. For Sjoberg and 
Gentry (2007, p. 87), women who behave like England and Harman ‘…have com-
mitted a triple transgression: the crime they are accused of, the transgression 
against traditional notions of femininity, and the transgression against…mili-
tarized femininity…’. Conversely, my notion of war-on-terror femininity offers 
a resolution to the paradox that is violent femininity. War-on-terror femininity 
does not negate their individual agency, it simple locates their violence within the 
wider US geopolitical agenda.
Within the discursive representations of England and Sabrina provided and 
discussed above, both women conform to and defy conventional femininity. With 
regards to the former, in keeping with traditional ideas about women as passive 
and weak, England’s claim that she took part because Graner told her to and she 
wanted to impress/please him confirms this stereotype of women (it also under-
scores gender oppression in a patriarchal society). Likewise, in the photo where 
Harman tends to an injured detainee, and in her stories about her time with Iraqi 
families, traditional femininity is upheld. Yet, by virtue of taking part in sexual-
ised violence and torture, both resist these normative expectations. Instead, they 
perform a subversive femininity: war-on-terror femininity.
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Conclusion
Within discussions of militarised femininity, and the war on terror in Iraq, as 
noted earlier, comparisons between Jessica Lynch and Lynndie England abound 
(Lobasz, 2008; Sjoberg, 2007; Tucker & Triantafyllos, 2008). I want to close with 
my own comparative analysis. In 2018, I presented a paper at the European Soci-
ety of Criminology conference in Sarajevo. During my stay, I attended the Crimes 
against Humanity Museum. Among many of the images and artefacts was a pic-
ture of a pregnant refugee being helped into a migrant boat by a man. This image 
encapsulates the narrative of ‘the woman in need of rescue and protection’ out-
lined at the start of this chapter. Here, I want to contrast this image with the 
image of a pregnant Lynndie England standing trial for the crimes she committed 
at Abu Ghraib. As noted above, maternal representations of England received 
mixed responses. In juxtaposing these two images of the maternal body, vis-à-vis 
war/armed conflict, I want to highlight that women’s relationship to war is not 
always as its victims; as those in need of protection. Women can be perpetrators 
too. As perpetrators (in the context of the war on terror) they are not required to 
forsake their gender identities, rather they might interrupt and challenge gender 
boundaries, thus at once being maternal, caring and violent, and perhaps, most 
importantly, superior to subordinated masculinities. The irreconcilable image of 
a maternal body standing trial for sexualised violence forces us to confront the 
reality that women are in fact violent: the maternal, life-giving body is also a 
body that inflicts harm and violence. Indeed, in certain contexts, this behaviour 
is required of women.
Alas, these ideas are not as forthcoming within mainstream accounts of 
violent women. Whether as victims or perpetrators – be it the generic third-
world-woman (Bibi Aisha), the all-American girl next door (Jessica Lynch) or 
the monstrous feminine (Lynndie England) – women are objectified, fetishised 
and reduced to two main archetypes: the fallen woman and the woman in need 
of  rescue. Both tropes deny agency. The former suggest that the violent woman 
is devoid of  womanhood (which is, of  course, constructed as non-violent), the 
latter presents women as weak and vulnerable because of  her womanhood. 
In order to move beyond these reductive narratives, albeit within the specific 
context of  American exceptionalism, my notion of  war-on-terror femininity – 
which, at once resists, complies with and mediates conventional femininity (and 
indeed militarised femininity) – offers a way out of  this conundrum.
In this chapter, I have challenged hegemonic understandings of gender roles 
and of the gender hierarchy. Utilising the sub-disciplines of Feminist and Vis-
ual Criminology, I have unpacked gender and the war on terror, specifically the 
sexualised violence and torture at Abu Ghraib. What took place at this prison 
forms part of the broader narrative of American exceptionalism. In this chapter, 
I used my concept of war-on-terror femininity to resolve the paradox of women’s 
involvement in this hyper-masculine response to 9/11. In a detailed analysis of four 
images of women involved in sexualised violence and torture, I have examined 
the legitimacy of sovereign violence; deliberated over ethics and just responses 
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to sexualised violence and torture; reimagined conventional understandings of 
the gender hierarchy, and interrogated the truth-telling capabilities of images. 
Mainstream media accounts of Lynndie England were reviewed against the basic 
tenets of Feminist Criminology and war-on-terror femininity was offered as a 
resolution to reductive explanations of women’s violence. Continuing with our 
challenge to gender essentialism – specifically the assumption that women are 
always and already the victims within the theatre of war/armed conflict – the final 
chapter addresses the victimisation of men and boys.
Chapter 6
Glocalisation Masculinities and  
Violence(s) Against Men and  
Boys in Darfur
Introduction
On the subject of sexual violence, O’Brien (2016, p. 386) makes the following 
observation:
There is a long history of the use of sexual violence as a weapon 
of war and during mass atrocities such as crimes against human-
ity and genocide. While men are also subject to sexual violence, 
the majority of victims of sexual violence committed during mass 
atrocities are women, particularly in relation to sexual violence 
crimes beyond basic rape.
This statement is indicative of  the way in which many scholars, policymakers, 
global advocacy groups, and the news media approach the topic of  conflict-
related sexual violence (CRSV). Male victims are mentioned, but they are on the 
periphery, presented as though they are footnotes to the main subject of  female 
victimisation. From an empirical standpoint, based on the recorded data that 
we have, O’Brien (2016) is correct in her assessment: females do make up the 
majority of  victims of  rape and sexual violence (Henry, 2016; Leatherman, 2011; 
Sjoberg & Peet, 2011; Touquet & Gorris, 2016; True, 2012; see also Boesten, 
2017; Davies & True, 2015 for a critical review of  the data/research on this). 
However, as argued in Chapter 4, rape and sexual violence do not represent the 
full range of  CRSV and sexual gender-based violence (SGBV) committed dur-
ing, and in the aftermath of, war/armed conflict. Furthermore, returning to the 
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point I made in the Introduction, rather than base our evaluation on differences 
in numbers and prevalence, the experiences of  both males and females can be 
understood through unpacking the gendered meanings of  the violence(s) that 
are enacted and suffered.
Another trend within the scholarly literature on gender and wartime rape and 
sexual violence, as identified by Grey and Shepherd (2013, p. 120), is the absent 
presence logic. They explain:
In these cases, although the writer does not expressly say that sex-
ual violence is targeted predominantly at women, where a gender 
is ascribed to the victim, it is almost invariably female.
In the previous chapter, I referred to Butler’s (2007) work on The Digitalization 
of Evil and her investment in uncovering whose lives matter and whose lives are 
griveable. In a similar vein, Grey and Shepherd (2013, p. 122), in their analysis 
of the visibility of male victims of CRSV (both within policy and academic dis-
courses), ask two key questions: ‘whose bodies are visible?’ and ‘whose bodies 
matter?’ In response to these questions they suggest that the silencing of men’s 
experiences, alongside ‘the absent presence of masculinity’, results in the ‘denial 
of the materiality of the violated male body’.
Writers argue that these exclusionary politics within international relations and 
international security are based, in part, on essentialist assumptions about men 
and women. Here, hegemonic (also normative) understandings of gender associ-
ate men/masculinity with aggression, violence and agency and women/femininity 
with victimisation, vulnerability and passivity (see Carpenter, 2005, 2006; Grey 
& Shepherd, 2013). Thus, male victimisation is both materially and ontologically 
disruptive. This explains why the vulnerability of the penis – when it is disempow-
ered through sexualised violence – is so destabilising (Clark, 2017). In her analysis 
of the human security framework, Carpenter (2005) comes to the conclusion that 
women and children, through their association with innocence and vulnerability, 
serve as a proxy for ‘civilian’. It is they who must be protected during war/armed 
conflict. This blueprint has meant that CRSV and SGBV against men and boys, 
especially those identified as ‘combatants’, is obscured from this security para-
digm (Carpenter, 2005).
Let us expand upon this discussion of the human security framework and con-
sider the role of biopolitical violence within this securitisation narrative. To do so, 
we will draw on the work of Foucault (1978) and Wilcox (2015).
In order to unpack Foucault’s ‘biopolitics of the population’ (1978), it is use-
ful to place these ideas within his broader work on power and governmentality 
(Adams, 2017). For Foucault (1977, 1978), power is not treated as a possession; 
rather it is an economy that is dispersed throughout society, in practices, insti-
tutions and technologies (Foucault, 1977, 1978). Societies, he argued, assigned 
themselves the task of administering life. This political power over life, to para-
phrase Foucault (1978), evolved in two basic forms. The first centred on the body 
as a machine and the second, on the body as a biological entity. Bodies are super-
vised, Foucault (1978, p. 139 emphasis in the original) continues:
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[…] through an entire series of interventions and regulatory con-
trols: a biopolitics of the population. The disciplines of the body 
and the regulations of the population constituted the two poles 
around which the organisation of power over life was deployed.
For Foucault (1978), biopolitics is about regulating and preserving the life of 
populations. It is ‘…a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeav-
ours to administer, optimise, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and 
comprehensive regulations’ (Foucault, 1978, p. 137). Within this line of thinking, 
the security of the nation-state is dependent upon the survival of the population. 
Expert discourses, created by the nation-state, decide which bodies/populations 
are vulnerable and require intervention (see Wilcox, 2015). Here, the body gains 
meaning through discourse.
Drawing inspiration from Foucault’s work (1978) on biopower and biopoli-
tics, Wilcox (2015, p. 17) argues that contemporary practices of violence are con-
stituted with reference to biopower. Biopolitical violence sees bodies as either 
populations that must be eliminated or populations that must be protected. Put 
simply, biopolitical practices of security are concerned with preserving certain 
human bodies whilst dealing death and destruction to others. Bodies, Wilcox 
(2015) argues, are not pre-political; they come into being through practices of 
international war and security. Humans, then, ‘…are not only vulnerable to vio-
lence as natural bodies…they also are vulnerable because they exist only in and 
through their constitution in a social and political world’ (Wilcox, 2015, p. 167). 
In other words, discourses of human security, in the context of biopolitics, decide 
which bodies need to be rescued and kept alive (Wilcox, 2015). As demonstrated 
in Chapter 4, women and girls have been identified as populations that need to be 
protected, particularly from wartime rape and sexual violence. This is reflected in 
the Stop Rape Now campaign (first discussed in the Introduction), whose mission 
statement is to end ‘…sexual violence during and in the wake of conflict’ and ‘…
respond effectively to the needs of survivors’. Here, CRSV is described as ‘…a 
present-day emergency affecting millions of people, primarily women and girls’ 
(see the Stop Rape Now website. Emphasis added).
This gendered ‘rape-security nexus’ (Hirschauer, 2014, p. 3) is also present 
within a number of  UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). UNSCR 
1325, passed in 2000, was the first to ‘take special measures to protect women 
and girls from…rape and other forms of sexual abuse…in situations of  armed 
conflict…’ (UNSCR 1325, 2000, p. 3). This pledge was reiterated in 2008 with 
UNSCR 1820, which emphasised ‘that women and girls are particularly targeted 
by the use of  sexual violence’ (UNSCR 1820, 2008, p. 1; see also UNSCR 1888, 
2009a and 2106, 2013a). It is only when UNSCR 2106 was passed in 2013, that 
men and boys are recognised, for the first time, as victims of  CRSV. Not only is 
this essentialised protection narrative present within policy documents, as dem-
onstrated in previous chapters, it is also represented in visual form. In Chapter 
4, I reviewed the Amnesty International poster – ‘rape is cheaper than bullets’. 
This poster formed part of  their campaign to raise awareness about the use of 
rape as a weapon of war against women and girls. And in the previous chapter, 
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I discussed the mutilated face of  Bibi Aisha which formed part of  the justifica-
tory narrative for the war on terror. In both examples, women and girls, by virtue 
of  being female, are regarded as requiring protection. Men and boys – whether 
implicitly or explicitly – are identified as perpetrators. Within the biopolitics of 
violence, the equation between maleness, masculinity and aggression disqualifies 
them from requiring protection.
As noted in the Introduction, the title of this book is taken from a statement 
made by Major General Patrick Cammaert. This former United Nations force 
commander reproduces the essentialist gender binaries outlined above. Granted, 
his analysis compares civilian women with male combatants. Here, the irony of 
his point – that war/armed conflict is more dangerous for civilian women than 
it is for male soldiers – holds more currency. In this chapter, I unpack the risks 
and dangers faced by men and boys during, and in the aftermath, of war/armed 
conflict.
Outline of the Chapter
The main focus of  the second half  of  this chapter is the genocide in Darfur 
(2003–2005). I have chosen this case study for the following reasons. First and 
foremost, the SGBV that takes place within this conflict is interconnected at 
the macro-, meso- and micro-levels. Each of  the chapters in this book has 
sought to address gender and the violence(s) of  war/armed conflict at these 
three levels of  analysis. Darfur offers the final example in the collection of 
case studies reviewed throughout the book. It also connects the violence(s) 
of  armed conflict to environmental as well as institutional and interpersonal 
causal factors. This is important for, as argued in Chapter 4, by broadening the 
diagnostic framework – to consider climate variability and extreme weather 
events within analyses of  armed conflict – we can extend our understanding 
of  the causes and consequences of  conflict violence. This will assist in our 
endeavors to combat such violence. I will expand upon all three levels in due 
course. Second, as discussed below, existing definitions of  the violence(s) of 
war/armed conflict often omit the specific harms men and boys suffer. Using 
the example of  Darfur, I examine categories of  genocidal and reproductive 
violence that are not explicitly addressed within policy discourse. Finally, this 
case study allows me to revisit Connell’s (2005) gender hierarchy and reimag-
ine her notion of  globalisation masculinities.
I begin my analysis of  Darfur with a detailed review of  the origins of  the 
conflict, outlining the various explanations that have been offered. This is fol-
lowed by an examination of  gender roles in Darfur. I argue that gender roles 
and gendered hierarchies within Sudanese culture more broadly form the back-
drop to this conflict; informing both the motivations of  perpetrators, and the 
experiences of  victims. I then explore the violence(s) that took place during 
this genocide: sex-selective killing, rape and genital harm. In a similar vein to 
Chapter 4, as far as possible, this chapter will draw upon the narratives of  vic-
tims/survivors (both male and female) from the empirical data gathered during 
this period. In my analysis of  the genocide that took place during the conflict 
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I return to the gender hierarchy discussed in the previous chapter, specifically 
the process of  feminising and emasculating male victims. Unlike in the previ-
ous chapter – where the focus was on the motivations and representations of 
female perpetrators – here I explore male victimisation to unpack the messages 
this violence communicates to, and about, men and masculinity. Two iterations 
of  Connell’s (1998, 2005) globalisation masculinities (discussed in Chapters 2, 
3 and 5) are explored in my analysis of  Darfur. In the first instance, I draw 
upon Connell’s thesis to explore the gender hierarchy (see Chapters 2 and 5) 
that led up to, and informed the violence(s) that took place during the conflict 
in Darfur. In the final part of  the chapter, I draw upon feminist understand-
ings of  the local-global nexus to rethink globalisation masculinities. Drawing on 
Howe’s (2008) notion of  glocalisation, and Connell’s globalisation masculinities, 
I use my notion of  glocalisation masculinities to unpack the violence(s) that 
took place during this conflict (more on this below). The chapter begins however 
with a review of  the literature on CRSV against men and boys. In this section, 
I identify key themes within the literature. Before that let us consider the termi-
nology used in this chapter.
Terminology
As noted in Chapter 2, CRSV encompasses the following:
[R]ape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
forced abortion, enforced sterilisation, forced marriage and any 
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated 
against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly 
linked to a conflict. (United Nations (UN), 2018b, p. 3)
Interestingly, the types of CRSV that men and boys may suffer (forced masturba-
tion, genital violence, forced rape) are not explicitly listed in the definition above. 
They would fall under ‘any other form of sexual violence’. Apart from rape and 
enforced sterilisation, all other types of violence refer to violence against women 
and girls.
GBV is violence that is directed against an individual based on socially ascribed 
gender differences. SGBV reflects the sexual(ised) nature of this violence. Based 
on this definition, men and women can be both perpetrators and victims. How-
ever, as Carpenter (2006, p. 86) notes:
Given the intention behind and inclusiveness of these definitions, 
it is very interesting that the concept of [GBV] has been linked 
almost exclusively to the issue of violence against women in the 
human security sector…
Indeed, numerous international instruments conflate GBV with violence against 
women and girls (Carpenter, 2006; Christian, Safar, Ramazani, Burnham, & 
Glass, 2011; Gorris, 2015; see Linos, 2009 for a more detailed review).
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In this chapter, the types of CRSV committed against men and boys (discussed 
in the various sections) includes: rape (both oral and anal); sexual torture and 
genital mutilation; enforced sterilisation (through castration); and sexual exploi-
tation and abuse (SEA). SGBV will refer to sex-selective killings. Grey (2017) uses 
the term reproductive violence to describe violence(s) that violate an individual’s 
reproductive autonomy. In my discussion of Darfur, I use this term to refer to 
acts of genital harm carried out on Darfuri men. Rape and the sex-selective kill-
ing by soldiers and the militia group, the Janjaweed,1 are understood as acts of 
genocidal violence.
I will be replacing Connell’s notion of  globalisation masculinities with my 
notion of  glocalisation masculinities. To recap, globalisation masculinities 
include the following: masculinities of  conquest and settlement, masculinities of 
empire and masculinities of  postcolonialism and neoliberalism (Connell, 1998, 
2005). Howe (2008) uses the term glocalisation to convey the negative impact 
certain macro-level systems and structures (such as globalisation, capitalism 
and neoliberalism) has on meso- and micro-level everyday experiences. This is 
referred to as the global-local nexus. With reference to Darfur, I employ this term 
to examine the intersections between the macro-, meso- and micro-levels. In this 
example, the macro-level refers to climate variability and the extreme weather 
conditions it produces which, in this example, resulted in extreme droughts in 
Darfur. As will be demonstrated, drought and desertification, which also pre-
cluded men from performing hegemonic masculinity, resulted in violent clashes 
over natural resources in Darfur. Here, we can trace the relationship between 
a macro-level phenomenon, such as climate variability, and the genocidal vio-
lence that took place at the local level in Darfur. At the meso-level, I unpack 
how State-led Arabisation policies impacted the gender hierarchy in Darfur. The 
institutionalisation of  local Arab Sudanese masculinities subordinated African 
Darfuri men. Rape and sexual violence were used to achieve this. Finally, at the 
micro-level, I review the use of  genocidal and reproductive violence by the Jan-
jaweed and the government of  Sudan. Here, we see how individual men carried 
out localised acts of  conquest and expulsion.
This chapter acknowledges that the violence(s) that took place during the 
armed conflict in Darfur (against males and females) were genocidal. There 
have been disagreements about this. Most notably The UN International Com-
mission of Inquiry on Darfur. Written in 2005, it ‘…concluded that the Govern-
ment of  the Sudan [had] not pursued a policy of  genocide’ (as cited in Hagan, 
Rymond-Richmond & Parker, 2005, p. 534). Scott Anderson, who wrote an 
article in The New York Times also refused to acknowledge that genocide was 
committed in Darfur (as cited in Hagan et al., 2005; see their article for a more 
detailed review of  these denials). Despite this, a number of  scholars provide 
detailed and compelling evidence to support the argument that genocide was 
committed in Darfur (see Ferrales, Brehm, & McElrath, 2016; Hagan et al., 
1The Janjaweed are an Arab militia. The term itself  means ‘…men with guns on hors-
es or camels…colloquially used by Africans to mean devil on horseback…’ (Hagan 
et al., 2005, p. 530).
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2005; Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2008; Kaiser & Hagan, 2015). When refer-
ring to the conflict in Darfur, I understand and position the violence(s) that 
took place as genocidal.
A Brief Review of the Literature
Throughout history and across conflicts globally (e.g. Colombia, Peru, Rwanda, 
Darfur, Sri Lanka), men are systematically targeted for execution (Carpenter, 
2005). Battle-aged men and boys (those likely to become combatants) become 
targets of political violence (Carpenter, 2005, 2006; Jones, 2000, 2002). In the 
words of Carpenter (2006, p. 88):
The empirical record suggests that, of all civilians, adult men are 
most likely to be targeted in armed conflict. The singling out of 
men for execution has now been documented in dozens of ongoing 
conflicts worldwide…More often than women, young children, or 
the elderly, military-age men and adolescent boys are assumed to be 
‘potential’ combatants and are therefore treated by armed forces...as 
though they are legitimate targets of political violence....
Despite this evidence – which points to the deliberate and systematic target-
ing of civilian men and boys – historically their experiences have been obscured 
from the human security framework (Carpenter, 2005). Gender essentialism, 
biopolitical and ontological constructions of women as vulnerable and in need of 
protection – and the concomitant equation of women with civilian- explain this 
marginalisation of men within the security paradigm.
Apart from Carpenter’s work in the early 2000s, historically, research on 
male victims of  CRSV has received far less attention, particularly when com-
pared with the copious amount of  information on female victims. Generally 
speaking, policy makers, academics, advocacy groups, as well as the news 
media, are guilty of  this oversight (Apperley, 2015; Christian et al., 2011; Gor-
ris 2015; Grey & Shepherd, 2013; Lewis, 2009; Linos, 2009; United Nations 
Office for the Special Representative of  the Secretary-General on Sexual Vio-
lence in Conflict [UN SRSG-SVC], 2013; Sivakumaran, 2007, 2010; Solangon 
& Patel, 2012; Vojdik, 2014). Despite receiving limited attention, both within 
and outside academia, CRSV against men and boys has been documented in 
over 25 conflicts over the last three decades (Gorris, 2015; Linos, 2009; Sol-
angon & Patel, 2012; Touquet & Gorris, 2016; UN SRSG-SVC, 2013; Vojdik, 
2014). As Sivakumaran (2007, p. 257) notes, sometimes the violence is sporadic 
and haphazard, at other times it is systematic. She lists the following conflicts 
where sexual violence against men and boys has taken place: Uganda, Sierra 
Leone, Kenya, Liberia, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Zimbabwe, the 
DRC and South Africa; El Salvador, Chile, Guatemala and Argentina; Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Syria, and Sri Lanka; Greece, Northern Ireland, Chechnya, 
Turkey and the former Yugoslavia (see also Christian et al., 2011; Trenholm, 
Olsson, Blomqvst, & Ahlberg, 2013). This list is by no means exhaustive but 
should give readers a sense of  the scope.
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More recently, scholars from a range of disciplines have begun to write about 
CRSV against men and boys (Carpenter, 2005, 2006; Gorris, 2015; Grey & Shep-
herd, 2013; Lewis, 2009; Linos, 2009; Touquet & Gorris, 2016; Sivakumaran, 
2007, 2010; Solangon & Patel, 2012; Vojdik, 2014). Extending beyond academic 
scholarship, in 2013, the office of the United Nations Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict held a workshop to examine 
the consequences of sexual violence against men and boys in conflict situations. 
And, at the time of writing, empirical research has uncovered the sexual exploita-
tion and abuse (SEA) of unaccompanied and separated refugee boys in Greece 
(Digidiki & Bhabha, 2018; Freccero, Biswas, Whiting, Alrabe, & Seelinger, 2017).
As we know, conflict results in mass displacement. The current refugee crisis in 
Europe is characterised by an unprecedented number of children seeking asylum. 
This includes unaccompanied and separated children2 (Digidiki & Bhabha, 2018; 
Freccero et al. 2017; Mason-Jones & Nicholson, 2018). According to Freccero et 
al. (2017), of the 63,000 unaccompanied and separated children applying for asy-
lum in the European Union in 2016, 89% were males (see also Digidiki & Bhabha, 
2018). These 14–17-year-old boys, many of whom are in Greece, do not have 
access to accommodation or employment opportunities while they await deci-
sions on their cases (Digidiki & Bhabha, 2018). Many of these children, Freccero 
et al. (2017) report, are kept in police cells alongside adults. This exposes them to 
a number of risks, including SEA. In Athens, for example, SEA of young males 
takes place in public spaces such as parks and squares, as well as bars, where boys 
receive payment in exchange for sexual services (Freccero et al., 2017; See also 
Digidiki & Bhabha, 2018; Mason-Jones & Nicholson, 2018).
As noted by Freccero et al. (2017, p. 2), the SEA of unaccompanied and sepa-
rated children ‘is both a human rights violation and an urgent public health con-
cern.’ Outlining the various physical and psychological harms associated with this 
type of abuse, and the barriers refugees and migrants face in seeking the neces-
sary medical treatment within these crisis/emergency settings, Freccero et al. (2017) 
argue that prevention is vital. Resonant with the arguments around gender essen-
tialism and the gendered nature of the human security framework presented above, 
these researchers found that, despite the predominance of adolescent boys within 
the population of unaccompanied and separated children, their experiences did 
not inform policy discussions or humanitarian responses (SEA and coerced sexual 
activities were discussed in relation to women and girls in Chapters 3 and 4).
Invisible Victims
Males who have experienced CRSV are often referred to as unrecognised and/or 
invisible victims (Gorris, 2015). This is due to underreporting and inadequacies 
in international law. Under-reporting, due to shame, fear, stigma and the crimi-
nalisation of homosexuality, hinders our ability to access accurate data on the 
2The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines an unaccompanied child 
as a person under the age of 18 ‘who is separated from both parents and [is] not being 
cared for by an adult who, by law or custom, is responsible to do so’ (UNHCR, 1997, p. 1).
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number of male victims (see Christian et al., 2011; Lewis, 2009; Solangon & Patel, 
2012; Vojdik, 2014). Homosexuality is a crime in over 70 countries (Vojdik, 2014). 
This criminalisation discourages male victims from coming forward (Apperley, 
2015; Clark, 2017; Gorris, 2015; Storr, 2011; Touquet & Gorris, 2016; UN SRSG-
SVC, 2013; Vojdik, 2014). Added to this, international law often re-labels rape 
and sexual violence against males as ‘torture’ or ‘mutilation’ (Carlson, 2006; Siva-
kumaran, 2010; Vojdik, 2014; see also Oosterhoff et al., 2004). And yet, despite 
these criticisms concerning the terminology of international law, Grey and Shep-
herd (2013) commend the Ad Hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and Rwanda (ICTR), as well as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, for pros-
ecuting male-to-male sexual violence and for recognising and taking seriously 
the experiences of male victims (see also Lewis, 2009; Sivakumaran, 2007, 2010; 
Vojdik, 2014). All three prosecuted individuals for committing acts of sexual 
violence against men (Grey & Shepherd, 2013).
The Impact of  These Violence(s)
The impact of CRSV and SGBV on men and boys during war/armed conflict can 
be physical, emotional, psychological, psycho-sexual and psycho-social (Chris-
tian et al., 2011; Lewis, 2009; UN SRSG-SVC, 2013). The consequences can be 
both short- and long-term (Christian et al., 2011; Lewis, 2009; Solangon & Patel, 
2012). As well as the visible and immediate physical impact of these violence(s) – 
such as tearing, bruising and lacerations – males are also at a greater risk of 
contracting sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV and AIDS (UN SRSG-
SVC, 2013; see also Lewis, 2009). Emotional responses may include shame, guilt, 
fear, frustration, humiliation, anger and powerlessness; as well as ambiguity about 
gender identity and sexuality (Solangon & Patel, 2012). They may suffer from 
various mental health problems such as depression, anxiety, Post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), substance misuse, phobias and suicidal thoughts (Solangon & 
Patel, 2012; UN SRSG-SVC, 2013). Psycho-sexual impacts relate to the inability 
of male victims to begin or maintain sexual relationships. Likewise, psycho-social 
consequences relate to problems continuing with pre-existing or new relationships 
(UN SRSG-SVC, 2013). Both also relate to difficulties men may face in carrying 
out physical labour resulting from their physical injuries. This hinders their abil-
ity to provide for their families financially, further emasculating and undermining 
their role as breadwinners/providers (UN SRSG-SVC, 2013, pp. 13–14).
As noted in Chapter 2, rape, pillage and looting were key features of  the 
conflict in the DRC. Accounts from male survivors in the DRC revealed both 
the emotional and financial impact this had on men and their families (Chris-
tian et al., 2011). In the words of  a survivor and a local NGO in the DRC, 
respectively:
It’s a risk to go out and sell things as I might have to face the 
Interhamwe [sic] [rebels] again and that I might be killed. But then 
staying at home without food and dying is the other option. So 
we have to risk our lives. (as cited by Christian et al., 2011, p. 240)
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Men in our culture, is the chief  of the family, when he is raped, he 
cannot accept it since he was not made to be that way. Women are 
raped and it’s acceptable as they are meant to have sex with men, 
but men are not meant to have sex with men. And that’s why men 
are shameful. This can happen to women but not to men and this 
happens most of the time in villages. This they cannot share with 
others … They leave their house and go into the bushes…They 
will have to stay there with another group as they will not have any 
friends in the community. They will be poor, isolated and humili-
ated. (as cited in Christian et al., 2011, p. 238)
Male survivors in the DRC lost everything they owned: their homes, their 
animals and their household supplies. This impacted their ability to fund their 
travel to hospital to receive medical treatment and/or to pay for the medical 
care they required (Christian et al., 2011). These survivors also talked about 
their inability to work and provide for their families following their assaults. 
Men revealed the shame and fear they felt and their concerns regarding risk 
of  revictimisation. This prevented them from earning a living (Christian et al., 
2011). As a result, maintaining the household became the responsibility of  their 
wives. This inevitably put a strain on their marriages. As Christian et al. (2011, 
p. 239) note:
The roles the male survivors report post-sexual assault demon-
strates a change in the gender roles in their household that not only 
impacts the survivors but also the family and wider community.
The Meanings Communicated Through These Violence(s)
In an interview with Will Storr (2011), relating to male sexual violence during the 
Ugandan conflict, Salome Atim (an officer for the Refugee Law Project) made the 
following statement:
In Africa no man is allowed to be vulnerable… You have to be mas-
culine, strong…. You should never break down or cry. A man must 
be a leader and provide for the whole family. When he fails to reach 
that set standard, society perceives that there is something wrong.
Similarly, Sivakumaran (2007, p. 270) states: ‘[t]he concept of hegemonic mas-
culinity is that of a heterosexual male; to deviate from this heteronormative male 
standard is to be “less” masculine’.
Writers have demonstrated that male-to-male sexual violence communicates a 
message of subordination to the victim. Whether through rape, castration, sexual 
mutilation and/or torture, the male and/or female perpetrator, deprives the victim 
of their manhood and their masculinity (Baaz & Stern, 2009; Christian et al., 
2011; Clark, 2017; Ferrales et al., 2016; Lewis, 2009; Solangon & Patel, 2012; 
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Vojdik, 2014). With reference to the vulnerability of the penis, Clark (2017, p. 3) 
observes:
This ‘side’ of the penis is rarely seen. Within contemporary dis-
courses on sexual violence…the penis is typically framed as a 
weapon” [as illustrated in Chapter 4]. It is a hard, aggressive object 
that penetrates and tears, causing pain and suffering…the expo-
sure of [the vulnerability of the penis] challenges phallocentric 
masculinity by stripping the phallus of its power and strength…
hence its dominance.
In the remainder of her article, Clark (2017) urges to think of the penis in a 
two-dimensional way: as a weapon that harms and as an object that is harmed. 
Here the penis is both a symbol of phallocentric masculinity, as well as the target 
of its material and symbolic destruction.
As well as the feminisation and emasculation of individual males, Sivaku-
maran (2007, p. 274) argues that rape and sexual violence can also emasculate the 
group to which the man/boy belongs. She says:
In much the same way as sexual violence against women may symbol-
ize to offender and victim alike the destruction of the national, racial, 
religious or ethnic culture…sexual violence against men symbolizes 
the disempowerment of the national, racial, religious or ethnic group. 
Specifically, [t]he castration of a man is considered to emasculate him, 
to deprive him of his power. The castration of a man may also repre-
sent the symbolic emasculation of the entire community.
In Chapter 1, I discussed the notion of  woman-as-nation. I argued that, dur-
ing war/armed conflict, women and their bodies become the receptacles through 
which national, racial, ethnic and religious identities are reproduced. Compa-
rable to this attack upon ‘woman-as-nation’, an attack upon men disempow-
ers the national, racial, religious or ethnic group to which he belongs. Here, 
we might think of  man-as-protector. The violated male has failed to protect 
the nation/community to which he belongs. In cases of  enforced sterilisation 
(through castration) and other types of  genital mutilation, this violence is more 
than symbolic. It can also be genocidal as it ‘prevents births within the group’ 
(The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of  the Crime of  Genocide, 
2014; see Chapter 1 for the full definition). Violence that is intentionally aimed 
at the male reproductive organs, with the aim of  affecting their ability to pro-
create, can be considered genocidal. This was the case during the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia. As explained by one perpetrator, while he was beating the 
testicles of  his victim, ‘you’ll never make Muslim children again’ (as cited in 
Sivakumaran, 2007, p. 273). These themes of  feminisation, emasculation, repro-
ductive and genocidal violence will be discussed (with reference to the genocide 
in Darfur) in more detail below.
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Darfur
Background to the Conflict
While Sudan and South Sudan have been plagued by civil war, my focus is on 
the conflict in Darfur. Despite the signing of  a peace agreement in 2006, vio-
lence and unrest continue in the Darfur region of  Sudan (United Nations, 2007, 
2017). This section, however, will focus on the period between June 2003 and 
January 2005. This was when the armed conflict, between the Sudanese Gov-
ernment, the allied Janjaweed militia and armed rebel groups, was at its height 
(de Waal, Hazlett, Davenport & Kennedy, 2014). For some, the conflict in Dar-
fur can be attributed to cultural and economic clashes between the African and 
Arab populations in the region (Olsson & Siba, 2013). In the words of  Olsson 
and Siba (2013, p. 301):
[T]he …conflict in Darfur…has deep roots within the social fab-
ric of Darfur itself. It represents a rapid escalation of a conflict 
that has long divided different groups in Darfur over land use and 
competition for scarce natural resources, particularly water.
For others, however, the systematic neglect and marginalisation of Darfur by 
the government of Sudan was the catalyst to the onset of the conflict (Ferrales 
et al., 2016). Below I consider the social, cultural, political, environmental and 
economic factors that contributed to the outbreak of violence (see also Salih, 
2008). I also examine the gendered nature of this genocide.
It is estimated that at least 35,000 civilians were killed during this time 
(de Waal et al., 2014). And by 2007, the UN reported that over 200,000 people 
had been killed and more than 2 million displaced from Darfur since the conflict 
began in 2003 (United Nations, 2007). Ferrales et al. (2016) and others (see Kai-
ser & Hagan, 2015) have examined the gendered nature of genocidal violence in 
Darfur. Drawing on this work, Connell’s notion of the gender hierarchy and glo-
balisation masculinities, as well as Grey’s (2017) notion of reproductive violence, 
I explore the gendered nature of the genocide in Darfur. I do so by focusing on 
the experiences of men and boys. Women and girls were also targeted during this 
genocide. For a review of their experiences, see Hagan and Kaiser (2015).
Situated in the far western province of Sudan, bordering Chad, Libya and 
the Central African Republic, Darfur – translated from Arabic meaning ‘home 
or land of the fur’ (de Waal, 2005, Salih, 2008) – is separated into three federal 
states (Salih, 2008). These are: Shamal Darfur (in North Darfur), Janub Darfur 
(in South Darfur) and Gharb Darfur (situated in West Darfur) (Salih, 2008, p. 1). 
They cover roughly 500,000 sq. km (Olsson & Siba, 2013, Salih, 2008). To put this 
into context, this about the size of Spain (Olsson & Siba, 2013). It is estimated 
that 6.5 million people live in Darfur (Olsson & Siba, 2013). While Darfur com-
prises a number of ethnic groups, the population is either categorised as ‘African’ 
or ‘Arab’ (Olsson & Siba, 2013).
Historically, these self-identified tribes (African and Arab) lived in relative 
harmony in the Darfur region of Sudan (Ferrales et al., 2016; Hagan et al., 2005; 
Glocalisation Masculinities and Violence(s) in Darfur   147
Olsson & Siba, 2013). All Darfuri residents are Sunni Muslims (Salih, 2008). 
The two main resources in Darfur are surface supplies, such as animals and agri-
cultural crops and underground materials, such as oil and minerals (Salih, 2008, 
p. 2). Traditionally, the African population in this region relied upon subsistence 
farming. This is land they historically shared with Arab cattle herders (Hagan 
et al., 2005; Kaiser & Hagan, 2015). As the largest indigenous ethnic groups, the 
Fur and Masalit (African tribes) controlled most of  the land in the area (as dic-
tated by the customary land tenure system in Darfur). These land areas, referred 
to as dars, are controlled by the communal leaders of  the African tribes (Olsson & 
Siba, 2013, p. 301). Under this system, Arab nomads, lacking their own dars, 
rely upon the land of African tribes. They make seasonal movements to access 
water and land for their herds (Olsson & Siba, 2013, pp. 301–302; see also De 
Juan, 2015).
Historically, when there was no shortage of land, this system ensured that 
there were no major clashes between the two groups (Olsson & Siba, 2013; Kaiser 
& Hagan, 2015). However, waves of drought and desertification put pressure on 
this system. Increases in migratory movements by Arab nomads (as a result of the 
environmental changes in the region) resulted in violent clashes between the Arab 
groups and the African tribes, the Fur and Masalit (De Juan 2015). The Arab 
groups who had been excluded from the dars during the period leading up to the 
conflict, joined government forces and other Arab militias to attack and destroy 
villages, thereby displacing African tribes from their lands (De Juan, 2015; see 
also Kaiser & Hagan, 2015; Salih, 2008). From this standpoint, as Olsson and 
Siba (2013, p. 302) point out, the conflict is regarded as a ‘struggle over natural 
resources’. I will return to this in the latter part of the chapter when we review 
glocalisation masculinities in Darfur.
In terms of the national political landscape, from the 1970s onwards the gov-
ernment began engaging in nation-building policies. This led to a coup in 1989, 
leaving President Omar al-Bashir in charge of the country. Under his rule, Sudan 
implemented policies of Arabisation and Islamisation during the 1990s (Ayers, 
2012; Castro, 2018; Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2008; Kaiser & Hagan, 2015; 
Sharkey, 2007). This ‘Arab-Islamic supremacist [imperialist] ideology’ (Hagan & 
Rymond-Richmond, 2008, p. 880) privileged those regarded as Arab and 
demeaned those viewed as African. Also, to paraphrase, Hagan & Rymond-Rich-
mond (2008, p. 880), although Darfur is Muslim, this State-led agenda distin-
guished between Arabs and black Africans, privileging and offering preferential 
treatment to Arabs over Africans. These policies of forced assimilation resulted in 
the denial of women’s independent status, the banning of tribal dancing, alcohol, 
bartering practices and traditional dress codes (Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 
2008). These customs were replaced with Arab traditions. This included speak-
ing Arabic (Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2008; see also de Waal, 2005). Added 
to these cultural and political measures, Darfur (Darfuri Arabs, to be precise) 
became militarised during this time through the spread of small arms provided 
by the Libyan government (de Waal, 2005; Sharkey, 2007). As Salih (2008, p. 3) 
notes, this accumulation of arms occurred during the first wave of drought and 
desertification which plagued the region during the late 1970s and early 1980s.
148   Gender and the Violence(s) of War and Armed Conflict
Within this economic and political milieu, tensions and instability increased 
culminating in attacks by Darfuri rebel groups against the Sudanese army in 2003 
(Castro, 2018; de Waal et al., 2014; Olsson & Siba, 2013; Salih, 2008). The two 
main rebel groups were The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and 
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (Abusharaf, 2006; Salih, 2008). The 
main grievance of the SLM/A was the ‘marginalisation’ of the Darfur region. 
They argued that it had been neglected politically and economically by the Suda-
nese government. They also argued that Darfuris had been denied basic rights 
such as access to healthcare and education (Salih, 2008, p. 7). In response to these 
attacks by the rebel groups, the Sudanese government engaged in a campaign of 
terror against civilians in Darfur (Salih, 2008). The Janjaweed, as well as Sudanese 
soldiers, began destroying ‘African’ villages in Darfur (Ferrales et al., 2016). This 
involved land attacks (with the use of bombs); sex-selective killing of men; the rap-
ing of women; the possession and destruction of property; as well as the theft of 
food, land and resources (Hagan et al., 2005; Kaiser & Hagan, 2015; Salih, 2008).
The targets of this genocidal violence were ‘African’ tribes: the Masaleit, 
Zaghawa and Fur (Ferrales et al., 2016, p. 568). The goal of the Arab-dominated 
Sudanese government was to displace non-Arab African groups by destroying 
their farms and their villages (Hagan et al., 2005). Two million Africans were dis-
placed and 200,000 fled as refugees to Chad during this two-year period (Hagan 
et al., 2005). Racial epithets accompanied these attacks. The perpetrators were 
reported to have said: ‘this is the last day for blacks’ or ‘we will kill all the black-
skinned people’ (as cited in Hagan et al., 2005, p. 543). Based on the literature 
examined here, it is possible to argue that the conflict in Darfur is the result of 
a combination of factors: government neglect and marginalisation, clashes over 
resources and State-led racialised and racist policies. Gender also played a part. 
It is to the latter that we now turn our attention.
The Role of  Gender in Sudanese Culture
Gender roles and gendered hierarchies informed the motivations of perpetrators 
and the experiences of victims during the genocide (see Kaiser & Hagan, 2015). 
Sudanese gendered identities (within the context of tribal farming communities) 
are based upon idealised notions of masculinity and femininity (Kaiser & Hagan, 
2015). Women’s roles are confined to the domestic sphere and their reproductive 
capabilities (Kaiser & Hagan, 2015). Following the forced assimilation policies 
of the 1980s, women’s access to labour opportunities (indeed, their rights gener-
ally) were restricted, resulting in women’s economic dependence on their husband 
(Abusharaf, 2006; de Waal, 2005). Such policies also buttressed heteropatriarchal 
ideas about the role of Sudanese men as providers and protectors of their families 
(Kaiser & Hagan, 2015; Willemse, 2007).
In the previous chapter, I reviewed Connell’s (2005) gender hierarchy and 
her four types of masculine identity: hegemonic, complicit, marginalised and 
subordinate. Hegemonic masculinity, as the most dominant form of masculin-
ity, is positioned above the others and femininities are always and already posi-
tioned below masculinities. Within this framework, hegemonic masculinity is 
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fundamentally based on heterosexuality. Sudan is no exception. The construction 
of hegemonic masculinity within Sudanese culture reproduces heteronormative 
ideas about gender and sexuality, where homosexuality is marked as subordinate, 
inferior and deviant. Indeed, a third offence of homosexuality is punishable by 
death in Sudan (Ferrales et al., 2016).
As a result of  the economic hardship and diminishing resources, men who 
belonged to the Fur began to migrate both domestically and internationally 
(Ferrales et al., 2016; see also De Juan, 2015; Salih, 2008). This impacted 
their ability to safeguard their families. It also prevented them from marrying 
within their community/tribe (Ferrales et al., 2016). According to Willemse 
(2007, 2009), this led to a widespread crisis in masculinity which precipitated 
the violence that followed. Here, we see how poor socioeconomic conditions, 
caused by drought and desertification, impeded Darfuri men’s ability to per-
form hegemonic masculinity (this struggle to perform gender role expectations 
was highlighted in Chapter 2 with reference to men’s experiences in the DRC). 
This inability to achieve hegemonic masculinity repositions men’s status within 
the gender hierarchy, associating them with marginalised masculinity. In this 
instance, we see how external factors, in the form of  extreme weather events, 
inform how and whether men are able to perform/achieve idealised notions of 
masculinity. In other instances, we see how the State draws on national, politi-
cal and ethnic/racialised ideologies to manipulate the gender hierarchy. Below 
I explain this State-led agenda in more detail.
Departing from conventional interpretations of globalisation masculinities, 
(Connell, 1998, 2005), particularly in relation to conquest and settlement – where 
colonial and imperial endeavours are enacted by an outside State/colonial power – 
here I want to narrow the geopolitical lens to think about conquest and settlement 
within a State, where one group has decided that the other is an ‘outsider’ that 
needs to be expelled. While socioeconomic conditions relocate certain men within 
the gender hierarchy (as highlighted above), ethnopolitical Arabisation policies 
in Sudan base hegemonic masculinity on the Arab, Sudanese (heterosexual) 
male. Here, localised enactments of conquest, through Islamisation, marginalise 
African Sudanese men in Darfur. As will be demonstrated in more detail below, 
during the conflict in Darfur, rape and sexual violence were used by Arab soldiers 
and the Janjaweed to subordinate (and indeed emasculate) African Darfuri men. 
I posit that CRSV and SGBV were used to both maintain the Arab version of 
the gender hierarchy and to enact a localised version of masculinity of conquest 
and settlement. Let us consider CRSV and SGBV against Darfuri men in more 
detail.
CRSV and SGBV Against Darfuri men and boys
Based on the narratives of 1,136 Darfuri refugees, Ferrales et al. (2016) ana-
lyse CRSV and SGBV against Darfuri men and boys. They draw on data col-
lected by the US State Department through the Atrocities Documentation Survey. 
Their analysis demonstrates the ways in which the violence(s) of this genocide 
emasculated (through homosexualisation and feminisation) the targeted group. 
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Their qualitative thematic coding of this data identified the following acts of 
violence: sex-selective killing, rape, sexual assault and sexualised violence against 
the body (these are discussed in more detail below). Their coding distinguished 
between primary victimisation – violence targeted directly against the victim, such 
as rape and sex-selective killings – and proximate victimisation, which involves 
witnessing the victimisation of others.
‘They Focused on the Men and Shot Men’3: Sex-selective Killing
Darfuri men were targeted for extermination by the Janjaweed and the govern-
ment of Sudan (Ferrales et al., 2016; Kaiser & Hagan, 2015). In the words of a 
Fur woman: ‘[m]en were targeted. Some women were hit at random. But men were 
targeted and shot’ (as cited in Kaiser & Hagan, 2015, p. 87). Another respondent 
commented:
I also saw the bodies of about 25 young boys – it seemed they were 
targeting the men and boys because I heard them say ‘a puppy can 
become a dog’. (as cited in Ferrales et al., 2016, p. 578)
As noted above, in Sudanese culture, men are regarded as the protectors and 
bearers of their ethnic group (Ferrales et al., 2016). Therefore, as representatives 
of their African group, the deliberate targeting of males by members of the Arab 
tribes – ‘killing members of the group’ – amounts to genocide (see The Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 2014). As 
one example of the violence(s) that took place during this genocide, some argue 
that the routine killing of Darfuri African farmers was an act of ethnic cleansing 
informed by two factors: racialised/racist ideologies and shortages in food and 
water (Kaiser & Hagan, 2015). As well as this genocidal sex-selective killing, men 
were targeted for various acts of sexualised violence.
Rape as Both Primary and Proximate Victimisation
Groups of soldiers and the Janjaweed would rape Darfuri men either through 
penile penetration or penetration using objects like sticks (Ferrales et al., 2016). 
Victims were raped anally and orally. As one 21-year-old Masaleit woman wit-
nessed: ‘[f]our men were raped in the village… These men were then shot and 
killed… After they killed the men, they raped them anally with sticks’ (as cited 
in Ferrales et al., 2016, p. 573). They would also insert penises into the mouths 
of dead victims. In the words of a Fur woman: ‘I saw a young boy and his father 
dismembered while still alive. They cut off  their penises and put them in their 
mouths’ (Ferrales et al., 2016, p. 574). Darfuri men were also forced to watch the 
raping of ‘their’ women. As one survivor articulated:
3Masaleit woman cited in Kaiser and Hagan (2015, p. 87).
Glocalisation Masculinities and Violence(s) in Darfur   151
I saw ladies in the village [as I lay wounded] being raped right in 
front of everyone, even their fathers and their children…We could 
do nothing, nothing. We had no way to fight’.(Ferrales et al., 2016, 
pp. 575–576)
Rape not only disempowers individual men who have been emasculated and 
feminised, it also signifies their inability to fulfill their role as ‘protector’. This 
communicates a message of symbolic elimination/destruction to the wider group 
(Ferrales et al., 2016). Proximate victimisation, that results in the displacement 
of men, transforms symbolic destruction/elimination into a material reality. 
This results in the ‘physical destruction in whole or in part’ of a group and thus 
amounts to genocide (see the full definition of genocide in Chapter 1). As articu-
lated by a 36-year-old Zaghawa man:
I ran away because I couldn’t stand to see the women hurt in [the] 
family…The men gathered in [the] yard to try to defend [them]. 
The soldiers shot them. The men had nothing to protect the  
village. (Ferrales et al., 2016, p. 576)
Here, we can rethink Connell’s notion of globalisation masculinities. In this 
context, conquest and settlement are intrastate endeavours, rather than the colo-
nial or imperial actions of an outside State/nation. Put simply, those who identify 
as Arab use rape to displace those identified as African in order to take over their 
land. Rape is also used to influence the gender hierarchy. Informed by State-led 
Arabisation policies, rape (inducing both primary and proximate victimisation) 
subordinates men within the gender hierarchy.
Reproductive and Genocidal Violence
The definition of genocide (1948) includes the following element: ‘[i]mposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group’ (The Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 2014). Enforced steri-
lisation, through castration, is an example of this. Genital harm, through vari-
ous acts of sexual torture, can also thwart men’s reproductive capabilities. When 
enacted deliberately and systematically, this also counts as a form of genocide. It 
is both a physical and symbolic attack upon men, masculinity and the ‘national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group’ to which they belong (The Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 2014).
In her article on the International Criminal Court and forced pregnancy, 
Grey (2017) applauds the progress that has been made in terms of the acknowl-
edgement and prosecution of rape and sexual violence as war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. Echoing my own concerns about the selective focus on these 
crimes, Grey (2017) laments the invisibility that continues to shroud other types 
of SGBV. She states: ‘[v]iolence which involves a violation of reproductive auton-
omy or which is directed at people because of their reproductive capacity, hence-
forth “reproductive violence”, is one example’ (Grey, 2017, p. 906). Grey’s (2017) 
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notion of ‘reproductive violence’ was discussed in previous chapters (Chapters 1 
and 4). Grey (2017) makes it clear that her focus is on females’ experiences of 
reproductive violence, stating that these harms are often more acute for women 
and girls.
Reproductive violence, like other types of  CRSV, according to Grey (2017), 
impacts primarily on women and girls. She goes on to argue that her choice to 
focus on women and girls reflects her ‘interest in women’s distinct experiences 
of  violence and survival’ (Grey, 2017, p. 909). She explains, in depth, that her 
article:
[…] concentrates on reproductive violence against women and 
girls in situations of armed conflict. This is not because wartime 
reproductive violence is necessarily more serious, or more appro-
priate for international condemnation, than similar conduct in 
everyday life. However, as international criminal law has histori-
cally been applied in conflict settings, it is fitting to focus on those 
settings as a starting point, while noting that this body of law can 
also be applied in times of peace. (Grey, 2017, pp. 909–910)
I will begin by unpacking Grey’s first argument, that reproductive violence is 
more acute for women. As I proposed from the outset, perhaps a more fruitful 
line of  inquiry (as acknowledged by Grey herself) is to explore the unique experi-
ences of  males and females, rather than engage in this comparative analysis based 
on degrees of  harm. To her second point, concerning her focus on situations of 
armed conflict rather than peacetime societies, nowhere in this rationale does 
Grey account for her decision to overlook males’ experiences of  reproductive 
violence (this oversight is curious given her earlier work in 2013 with Shepherd, 
discussed above, where Grey acknowledges the invisibility of  the male violated 
body).
Reproductive violence, specifically the sexual mutilation of the male genitals, 
has occurred throughout history (Sivakumaran, 2007; Solangon & Patel, 2012; 
Vojdik, 2014). This further problematises contemporary work that excludes their 
experiences. Sexual mutilation, through castration, can be carried out as part of 
a genocidal campaign of enforced sterilisation. This occurred during the conflict 
in the former Yugoslavia. Sexual mutilation and sexual torture also took place 
at Abu Ghraib. However, in the case of the latter, this sexualised violence was 
not genocidal. In the context of Darfur, genital harm (which included injury to 
the testicles as well as the targeting of the penis) was widespread and systematic 
(Ferrales et al., 2016). As one Fur survivor recalls:
For seven days, I was detained and tortured by government sol-
diers. I was made to lie on my back with my hands tied behind my 
back, ankles tied and they would stomp on my thighs and kick me 
in the genitals [and I have had] sexual problems ever since. (as cited 
in Ferrales et al., 2016, p. 576)
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A female survivor witnessed five men bleed to death following castration, while 
other survivors spoke of men having organs dismembered and their ‘genitals cut 
off’ (Ferrales et al., 2016, p. 261).
It is the argument of Ferrales et al. (2016) that these acts of genital harm (as 
well as the other acts of CRSV and SGBV discussed above) achieve emasculation 
through homosexualisation and feminisation. Extending their argument, I argue 
that they count as forms of reproductive and genocidal violence. Genital harm, 
whether as an act of symbolic or genocidal violence (see discussion above) vio-
lates men’s reproductive autonomy. As an act of reproductive violence (connotat-
ing homosexuality), it subordinates men within the gender hierarchy. In addition, 
and in a similar way to rape, reproductive violence against African men in Dar-
fur speaks to my revised interpretation of Connell’s globalisation masculinities. In 
terms of conquest and settlement, genital harm, and the emasculation, feminisation 
and homosexualisation that accompanies this act of reproductive violence, destroys 
the individual male and the community to which he belongs/represents. Arab males, 
as part of a larger State-wide policy, are able to conquer and expel African farmers 
(and their families) through these acts of sexualised genocidal violence.
I will conclude this chapter with a discussion of glocalisation masculinities – 
my second iteration of Connell’s notion of globalisation masculinities.
Glocalisation masculinities, Genocidal and Reproductive 
Violence(s) in Darfur
According to Schilling, Saulich & Engwicht (2018, p. 434), ‘[t]he interlinkages 
between global, national and local dynamics are a recurrent theme in the lit-
erature on natural resource governance and conflict’. To capture this relation-
ship, I draw upon (and revise) Howe’s (2008) notion of  glocalisation. In its 
original formation, this concept addresses the relationship between macro-level 
practices and processes (e.g. globalisation, capitalism) and their impact at the 
local level. Incorporating gender into the analysis leads me to the concept of 
glocalisation masculinities. This is understood here as the link between climate 
variability at the macro-level (resulting in droughts at the local level), institu-
tionalised Arab-Sudanese policies at the meso-level and the use of  genocidal 
violence (rape and sex-selective killing) and reproductive violence at the macro- 
and micro-levels. We will begin by unpacking the relationship between climate 
variability and conflict.
There is a growing body of scholarly work, within the Environmental Security 
literature, that reviews the security implications of climate change, particularly in 
relation to violent conflict (De Juan, 2015; Detges, 2017; Schilling et al., 2018; Von 
Uexkull, 2014; Work, 2018).4 Vivekananda, Schilling, Mitra, & Pandey (2014) 
4See Homer-Dixon (n.d.) who has written extensively on environmental scarcity and 
violent conflict. See also Klem 2003 who has written a report Dealing with Scarcity 
and violent conflict based on the 2003 conference of the same name).
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define environmental security as ‘the absence of risk or threat to the environment 
a person or community depends on and lives in’ (Vivekananda et al., 2014, p. 1143 
as cited in Schilling et al., 2018, p. 437). Risks are either caused by nature (e.g. 
flooding or landslides) or by humans. The example Schilling et al. (2018) provide 
for the latter is the pollution of soil and groundwater caused by mining.
Research on the links between conflict and climate change is both quantitative 
and qualitative (Schilling et al., 2018). The former involves analysing and com-
paring climate data with conflict data. This is often at regional or national levels. 
As Schilling et al. (2018) note, quantitative studies cover large geographic areas 
over long periods of time. The aim is to create a comprehensive database that can 
be used for correlation purposes (see also De Juan, 2015). Conversely, qualitative 
research is based on observations, interviews and focus group discussions. A com-
mon theme within this work is that ‘drought or other extreme climatic events may 
serve as catalysts for conflicts over food and water and trigger regional and ethnic 
tensions to escalate into violent clashes’ (Von Uexkull, 2014, p. 16; see also Schil-
ling et al., 2018). The agricultural sector, which is reliant upon surface and sub-
surface water supplies, is hit hardest by droughts (see Von Uexkull, 2014). This is 
of particular concern in Sub-Saharan Africa where (1) droughts have increased 
in frequency and intensity during the past 50 years (Detges, 2017; Von Uexkull, 
2014) and (2) a third of the sub-Saharan African population live in drought-
prone regions (Detges, 2017; Von Uexkull, 2014).
Whilst it is not possible to delineate a direct cause-and-effect relationship 
between climate variability and conflict, writers agree that, combined with pre-
existing grievances and tensions (that may be ethnic, political, and/or religious), 
environmental changes, resulting in drought, are more likely to lead to civil con-
flict (Von Uexkull, 2014; See also Detges, 2017; Schilling et al., 2018). In the 
words of Von Uexkull (2014, p. 18):
Where individual economic hardships coincide with other ethnic, 
class or religious cleavages in society, they may translate into per-
ceptions of relative deprivation felt by a societal group…If eco-
nomic deprivation is blamed on the government, this may translate 
into an increased propensity to engage in violence against the  
[S]tate... Where drought leads to food shortages and falling 
incomes, joining a rebel group is thus relatively more attractive
This is what occurred in Darfur. The drought added to existing grievances, 
allowing rebels to motivate actors to take action against the government (Von 
Uexkull, 2014). Likewise, the Sudanese government offered land to Arab militias 
who took up arms to fight against rebels (Von Uexkull, 2014). For those impacted 
by extreme weather events in Darfur, participation in the fighting was a means of 
securing or gaining resources (Von Uexkull, 2014; see also Castro, 2018; De Juan, 
2015; Olsson & Siba, 2013).
As we have established, clashes over land and water resources caused by 
sustained droughts, was put forward as one of the main reasons for the conflict 
in Darfur. Here, I review the empirical evidence that supports this correlation. 
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Von Uexkull (2014) conducted a detailed empirical test on drought and conflict 
in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1989 and 2008 (thus including the conflict in Dar-
fur). Using ‘geo-referenced data’ on conflicts in this area and ‘high-resolution 
drought data’, his results proved his hypothesis: that there is a positive correlation 
between drought and conflict. De Juan (2015), using a mix-method approach, 
also analysed the causal links between environmental change and violent conflict. 
Narrowing the focus to Darfur, he proposed  that this happens in three stages. 
First there is an increase in migration caused by environmental changes. Second, 
this migration impacts and alters the demographics of ‘high in-migration’ areas 
and third, there are increases in competition over resources (De Juan, 2015, p. 23). 
Combined, these factors, De Juan (2015) argues, ‘…increase the risk of violent 
interethnic resource conflict’.
For the qualitative data, as well as anecdotal evidence, De Juan (2015) drew 
on visual geographical patterns. He utilised the Normalized Difference Veg-
etation Index (NDVI). This correlates with annual rainfall in Sudan and pro-
vides satellite imagery of the density and health of vegetation. The higher the 
NDVI values, the greater the health and density of the vegetation. He used this 
data to record environmental changes in different parts of Darfur. Using the 
‘African Population Database’ he then linked migration patterns within Darfur 
to the environmental changes recorded by the NDVI. According to De Juan’s 
(2015) data, areas most impacted by in-migration were characterised by violent 
clashes. For the quantitative analysis, De Juan (2015) used data collated by the 
US State Department’s ‘Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU)’, which con-
tained information on the villages that were attacked during the conflict. Linking 
all three data sets, his results ‘[lend] consistent support to the assumption that 
long-term environmental change has contributed to shaping the dynamics of vio-
lence in Darfur’ (De Juan, 2015, p. 31). And finally, Detges (2017, p. 95) also ran 
an empirical test, investigating the links between drought and political violence in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. His findings ‘support the argument that political exclusion 
exacerbates climate-related hardships and can thus give rise to social tensions and 
grievances in the wake of drought’.
It is my argument that in order to fully understand the conflict in Darfur, and 
the genocidal, reproductive violence(s) that were carried out, we need to unpack 
the relationship between all of these factors. At the macro-level, we need to con-
sider the impact of climate variability and the extreme weather events it leads to, 
such as droughts. This impacts individuals and communities at the local level. As 
demonstrated above, these weather events can cause clashes that lead to civil war, 
as in the case of Darfur. However, we must proceed with caution. Environmental 
factors alone do not cause conflict. They work in tandem with preexisting griev-
ances. In Darfur, at the meso-level institutionalised ethnopolitical Arabisation 
policies and the manipulation of the gender hierarchy were used to marginalise 
African Darfuri men. Gendered relations and hierarchies, as well as racialised 
enactments of masculinity, coalesced with resource insecurity, resulting in the 
uprising of the two main rebel groups: the SLM/A and the JEM. This marked 
the beginnings of the conflict. During the conflict, rape, sex-selective killing and 
reproductive violence, as tools of genocide, were used at both the macro- and 
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the micro-levels. Sex-selective killing and reproductive violence were widespread 
and systematic. They formed part of a genocidal campaign of conquest and set-
tlement. They can be placed at the macro-level. At the micro-level, these acts of 
genocidal and reproductive violence subordinated individual men within the gen-
der hierarchy. These acts of violence were informed by, and in turn shaped, gen-
der relations and the gender hierarchy in Darfur. Ethnopolitical, cultural, racial 
and environmental forces (as outlined above), in line with the Sudanese gender 
hierarchy (and local masculinities of conquest and settlement), are implicated in 
the CRSV and SGBV that took place during the conflict. Combined, these multi-
level, interrelated factors, account for the origins and the nature of violence(s) 
that took place during the conflict in Darfur.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have examined how, historically, the human security framework 
reproduces gender essentialism confirming the ontological construction of women 
(read civilian) as vulnerable, weak and in need of protection. In contradistinction, 
this biopolitical narrative (as illustrated in the various UNSCRs outlined above) 
necessarily views male victimisation as an ontological and material impossibil-
ity. The implications of this exclusion for male survivors were discussed. Chal-
lenging these reductive and essentialist assumptions, Clark (2017) confronts the 
uncomfortable reality of male vulnerability, specifically the vulnerability of the 
penis. Clark (2017) is not alone – numerous scholars have highlighted the emas-
culating and feminising effect of male-to-male rape and sexual violence and the 
difficulties men face in reporting such violence, not least due to laws criminalising 
homosexuality (Apperley, 2015; Christian et al., 2011; Clark, 2017; Gorris, 2015; 
Lewis, 2009; Solangon & Patel, 2012; Storr, 2011; Touquet & Gorris, 2016; UN 
SRSG-SVC, 2013; Vojdik, 2014). Others have drawn attention to the sex-selective, 
systematic killing of battle-aged men (Carpenter, 2005, 2006; Jones, 2000, 2002); 
the various types of CRSV and SGBV they are subjected to during war/armed 
conflict and finally, researchers have drawn attention to the SEA of unaccom-
panied and separated children (Digidiki & Bhabha, 2018; Freccero et al., 2017; 
Mason-Jones & Nicholson, 2018).
This work offers a rebuttal to the statement made by Major General Patrick 
Cammaert: ‘it is now more dangerous to be a woman than a soldier in armed con-
flict’. While, as noted earlier, the statement is based upon a comparison between 
the experiences of civilian women and male soldiers – affording his cynicism some 
credence – it is still possible to take issue with this comment. Here, I return briefly 
to my argument about disproportionality raised in the Introduction (something 
I will return to in the Conclusion). My suggestion is that we move away from 
focusing on degrees of harm. I propose that we abandon our preoccupation with 
questions of who suffers more/for whom is the impact greater? I advocate that 
we spend more time unpacking the unique ways in which men and women suffer; 
that we dedicate more energy into unpacking the qualitative and material differ-
ences in how males and females experience and survive war/armed conflict. Why 
not examine how constructions of masculinities and femininities inform how the 
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genders experience war/armed conflict? To assume that all women will suffer more 
or less than all men is reductive and homogenises the experiences of both genders.
I raised my concerns about these types of comparative analyses in relation to 
Grey’s (2017) argument that women suffer reproductive violence more acutely 
than men. While I do not take issue with her claim per se, oftentimes these state-
ments appear as throw away comments where no follow up comment is offered 
explaining why or how the author arrived at such a conclusion. Why is it women 
suffer more acutely? Why are men’s experiences of reproductive violence less 
acute? On the contrary, in this chapter, I examined how and why men’s experi-
ences might be different.
This chapter provided an in-depth analysis of the causes and the nature of 
the genocide in Darfur. Acts of genocidal (rape and sex-selective killing) and 
reproductive violence (genital harm) enacted by the State, the military and the 
Janjaweed, were explained by my alternative reading of Connell’s globalisation 
masculinities and my notion of glocalisation masculinities.
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Conclusion
I started this book with the following questions: how is suffering gendered? How 
does gender inform both the experiences of those who victimise and those who are 
victimised during war/armed conflict? I promised that this would be a qualitative 
rather than a quantitative comparative endeavour based on the lived experiences 
of victims, survivors and perpetrators. My goal was to offer a critical understand-
ing of gender essentialism within accounts of gender and the violence(s) of war/
armed conflict. By placing the lived experiences of women and girls before, dur-
ing and in the aftermath of war/armed conflict along a continuum of violence, 
victimisation and coerced sexual activities, I sought to offer a more nuanced 
account of their lives. At the same time, drawing on Feminist and Visual Crimi-
nology, I offered a holistic account of women’s involvement in sexualised violence 
and torture. To complete this story, and redress existing gaps within the literature, 
I examined the experiences of male victims and survivors. In order to reflect in 
more detail on the aims and content of the book, let us revisit and expand upon 
the five key messages outlined in the Introduction.
1. The GBV(s) that take place during and in the aftermath of armed conflict cannot 
be reduced to visible acts of interpersonal violence. They also include, and are 
connected to, structural violence, State crimes and institutional organisations 
(see Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5).
I will unpack each of these categories in more detail below.
Structural Violence
The securitisation agenda ironically, and perhaps paradoxically, undermines its 
own agenda: the elimination of wartime rape and sexual violence. It does so in 
two main ways. First, it selectively focuses on the experiences of women and girls, 
thereby obscuring those of men and boys. Second, it fails to address the range of 
violence(s) committed during war/armed conflict, thereby overlooking the range 
of causal factors. By ignoring structural types of violence, as well as reproductive 
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and genocidal violence committed against men and boys, it limits what falls under 
its remit of investigation/analysis.
In terms of my third example of structural violence – women’s lack of access 
to formal employment, resulting in forced prostitution and survival sex – consider 
the women and girls in Iraq and Syria involved in coerced sexual activities (not to 
be confused with those trafficked for sexual purpose, see Chapters 3 and 4). These 
females occupy the following identities simultaneously: victim, survivor and actor. 
While force is present, in some cases so too is ‘relative autonomy’ (Sjoberg & 
Gentry, 2008; see Chapter 3). These women are three-dimensional agents.
While security actors, activists (such as Lisa Shannon) and celebrities (such as 
Charlize Theron and Nicole Kidman) may have good intentions, raising aware-
ness about the plight of victims in war-torn regions, ultimately, this work – which 
focuses narrowly on one aspect of wartime/conflict violence – will only assist us 
on a cursory level. Our efforts to combat the violence(s) of war/armed conflict are 
impeded by the following: our tendency to speak for and about women and girls; 
our focus on certain types of victims (females rather than males) and our focus 
on certain types of violence (rape and sexual violence) at the expense of structural 
violence. The ways in which western discourses often distort and universalise the 
experiences of oppressed women and girls in the Global South were raised in 
Chapter 2. This was done with reference to Spivak’s insightful essay, ‘Can the 
subaltern speak? (1988) and Mohanty’s arguments about the monolithic third-
world-woman (1988). Gendered civilising missions and the postcolonial feminist 
critique were also discussed in this chapter.
Rape and sexual violence are tools used by both males and females for differ-
ent reasons in different contexts. As we have seen in the various case studies under 
review, these acts of violence can be strategic (the DRC, the 1971 Liberation War 
and the conflict Darfur, as well as opportunistic (the Holocaust and the sexual-
ised violence committed at Abu Ghraib). While these are important distinctions 
to make, particularly for conversations about tackling such violence(s), let us not 
forget that these are only two examples of the violence(s) committed during war/
armed conflict. We must broaden the range of wartime/conflict violence that we 
examine. Throughout the book, by including examples of structural violence, 
I have extended what counts as violence and expanded the diagnostic framework 
which facilitates this broader analysis.
State Crimes
As outlined in Chapter 2, State crimes violate international and domestic laws. 
They are committed by representatives of the State often for economic, geopo-
litical and ideological reasons (Mullins & Rothe, 2008, p. 83). In the context of 
this book, gender, in the form of globalisation masculinities, was also regarded 
as a motivating factor. I unpacked State crimes in relation to the armed conflicts 
in the DRC and Iraq. In both examples, these macro-level illegal actions were 
connected to acts of sexual gender-based violence (SGBV) committed against 
civilian women and girls.
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In both examples, these State crimes were/are committed against the backdrop 
of masculinities of postcolonialism and neoliberalism. In the case of the DRC, 
transnational companies engage in the illegal exportation of minerals, using 
the chaos of the conflict – which involves the strategic use of wartime rape and 
sexual violence – to achieve their economic goals. This implicates them in State- 
corporate crimes. The US invaded Iraq without legal authorisation, fail-
ing to meet the legal standard of self-defence. This act of aggression has been 
described by criminologists as a State crime (Kramer & Michalowski, 2005, 
2011; see also Whyte, 2007). As demonstrated in Chapter 3, following the US 
intervention in Iraq, GBV against women and girls increased. Furthermore, 
following the privatisation agenda of the west, women and girls were forced into 
the illicit economy where they either engaged in forced prostitution or were traf-
ficked for sexual purposes. In both armed conflicts, State crimes maintain and 
exacerbate the use of sexual GBV against civilian women and girls within and 
beyond the conflict zone. Based on this, I posit that the interpersonal violence(s) 
that took/take place emerge from an interpersonal-State nexus.
Institutional Violence
While the US government attempted to distance themselves from the violence(s) 
that took place at Abu Ghraib – referring to those involved as ‘a few bad apples’ – 
the sexualised violence and torture was carried out by individuals working for 
the US military. As I argued in Chapter 5, while agency must be ascribed to those 
individuals who carried out these acts of interpersonal violence, they cannot be 
divorced from the wider context of the war on terror and its driving force: Ameri-
can exceptionalism. As a result, I posit that the interpersonal violence(s) of Abu 
Ghraib can be attributed to an interpersonal-institutional nexus.
2. As both symbolic and corporeal mothers of the nation, women are at risk of 
reproductive and genocidal violence during war/armed conflict (Chapter 1).
On a symbolic level, discourses of war/armed conflict construct the maternal 
body as a canvas upon which national, racial, ethnic and religious identities are 
inscribed (Cohn, 2013). Corporeally, and within ‘nationalist discourses’, women 
are the bearers of the next generation of (preferably male) fighters (Åhäll, 2017, 
p. 22). Perversely, in the context of the Holocaust, women’s biological maternal 
function formed part of the Nazi genocide. In this instance, women’s ability to 
produce future generations of Jews led to crimes of ‘reproductive violence’ (Grey, 
2017) in the form of forced sterilisation and forced abortions. In the case of the 
1971 Liberation War in Bangladesh, as representations of their nation, it is esti-
mated that between 200,000 and 400,000 Bengali women and girls were raped by 
the Pakistani army. As I outlined in Chapter 1, both the physical and the social-
symbolic element of genocide were present in this example. Furthermore, repro-
ductive violence was enacted by the State through its regulation of the post-war 
reproductive body.
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3. Gender essentialism – that is, the equation of maleness with war-fighting and 
femaleness with victimisation – obscures the experiences of male victims and 
female perpetrators (Chapters 5 and 6).
In the Introduction, I asked the following: on what basis do we make the 
claim that women are disproportionately affected by war/armed conflict? Does 
the assumption that women are disproportionately impacted diminish how we 
view male suffering? How do we interpret male civilian victimisation? For my 
part, I believe that gender essentialism underpins the arguments laid out in the 
disproportionality thesis. That is, if  one believes that men and boys are always 
and already combatants – and by extension, the perpetrators of the violence(s) of 
war/armed conflict – on a rudimentary level, it makes sense to view female civil-
ians as disproportionately impacted by war/armed conflict. Therefore, it seems to 
me, that part of the project of redirecting our attention away from this focus on 
disproportionality requires that we contest the gender essentialism that underpins 
its logic (I will return to this shortly in the section below: ‘Rethinking gender and 
the violence(s) of war/armed conflict’).
The fifth chapter of this book focused on female perpetrators in Iraq. How-
ever, this is only one example of women’s more active role in war/armed conflict. 
While the fighters of old and new wars are predominantly male, women have also 
participated in war/armed conflict either, indirectly through numerous auxiliary 
roles or, directly through combat roles. The Soviet Union, for example, recruited 
women into their army units during the First and Second World Wars, as well 
as the Russian Civil War (Pennington, 2010). Women in the UK and oversees 
served as auxiliaries in non-combat roles during the Second World. This included 
the ‘War in the Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS),’ the ‘Women’s Auxiliary Air 
Force (WAAF)’ and the ‘Women’s Royal Naval Service (WRNS)’ (Mason, 2018). 
Examples of females’ active participation include but are not limited to: female 
fighters in the Congo, Uganda, Sierra Leone (Turshen, 2016), Kurdish fighters 
in Syria; women in the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front – a guerrilla 
movement in El Salvador (Ramos, López, & Quinteros, 2015); and female fighters 
of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. This list is by no means 
exhaustive but should provide readers with an idea of the range and scope of 
women and girls’ relationship to war/armed conflict. Allied to my focus on female 
perpetrators of the violence(s) of war/armed conflict, Chapter 6 examined the 
experiences of male victims. Both chapters defy gender essentialism and under-
score the reductive nature of the disproportionality thesis.
4. Climate variability intersects with gender to inform structural and inter-
personal forms of violence within and beyond the conflict zone (Chapters 4 
and 6).
In Chapters 4 and 6 – drawing on the conflicts in Syria and Darfur, respectively – 
I considered climate variability and its relationship to conflict. This broadens our 
analytical framework and adds depth and complexity to our understanding of 
both the causes and consequences of modern conflicts. These chapters outline 
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how macro-level environmental factors coalesce with meso-level policies and 
practices (such as neoliberalism in the case of Syria and Arabisation in Darfur) 
to shape interpersonal and structural forms of violence. I explored these inter-
secting phenomena through a gendered lens. This adds further depth and value to 
the discussion. As demonstrated, in Syria and Darfur, extreme droughts, caused 
by climate variability, led to increases in poverty (in the former) and clashes over 
natural resources (in the latter). For women and girls, this implicated them in 
new war illicit economies. For Darfuri African males, this placed them at risk of 
genocidal and reproductive violence.
5. The violence(s) of war/armed conflict take place at the interrelated macro- 
meso- and micro-levels (all chapters).
In every chapter of the book, and in every case study I have reviewed, the 
particular form of violence under review has been explored at the macro- meso- 
and micro-levels. At the macro-level, I connected global economic geopolitical 
policies and practices, as well as environmental forces, with the interpersonal 
and structural GBV(s) taking place within and beyond conflict zones. In order to 
explore these through a gendered lens, I drew upon globalisation masculinities, 
specifically masculinities of postcolonialism and neoliberalism.
At the meso-level, I examined how gendered cultural practices, the gender 
hierarchy, as well as ethnic identity/identities, are reproduced in institutions and 
State-led agendas which in turn inform the violence(s) that take place during war/
armed conflict. In the case of the DRC, militarised masculinity, pre-existing gen-
der inequalities and Congolese rape laws were reviewed. The violence(s) that took 
place at Abu Ghraib, as part of the invasion and occupation of Iraq, can be 
linked to the US military institution. In the case of Syria, I demonstrated how 
denial of girls’ education is connected to patriarchal beliefs about gender roles 
and gendered divisions of labour. In relation to Darfur, I explored the institu-
tionalisation of local Arab Sudanese masculinities, which led to genocidal and 
reproductive violence against African Darfuri men.
Finally, at the micro level, I narrowed the focus to individual acts of  vio-
lence. While agency can be ascribed to these actors, their actions are informed 
by the aforementioned macro- and meso-level policies, practices and drivers. 
In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, the feminist political economy approach was used to 
facilitate this three-level interrelated analysis. Across all examples, I have high-
lighted how these three interconnected levels interact to both produce and 
reproduce structural, institutional, interpersonal and State GBV(s) during 
war/armed conflict.
Rethinking Gender and the Violence(s) of  
War/armed Conflict
Having reviewed the five key messages of the book, in the next section, I will 
interrogate what it really means when one argues that it is more dangerous to be 
a woman than a soldier in armed conflict.
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As a thought experiment let us, for now, accept Major General Patrick 
Cammaert’s statement (‘it is perhaps more dangerous to be a woman than a 
soldier in armed conflict’) as accurate. In doing so, what are the conceptual and 
empirical grounds to support this claim? As we saw in our discussion of  the 
Holocaust and the 1971 Liberation War in Bangladesh, as reproducers of  the 
nation, women and girls were targeted for rape and sexualised genocidal vio-
lence. Within the political economy of  new wars – where State-corporate crimes 
are committed and the illicit economy flourishes – women and girls become dis-
posable commodities. As we saw in the DRC, the use of  rape and sexual violence 
against women and girls is strategic: it is used to terrorise and displace the local 
population to ensure that combatants on the ground, as well as transnational 
organisations, have access to the minerals that end up on the global market. 
In this instance, females are expendable. In Iraq and Syria, females are used as 
commodities by profit-seeking networks who exploit the illicit economy within 
and beyond the conflict zone. Here, women and girls are trafficked and sold into 
sexual slavery. In addition to these acts of  interpersonal violence, women and 
girls are at risk of  structural violence within the political economy of  new wars. 
As we saw, neoliberal policies, increases in poverty and a lack of  employment 
opportunities (exacerbated by the drought in the case of  Syria) forced women 
to engage in coerced sexual activities during these conflicts. Taken at face value, 
one could argue that this is evidence that it is more dangerous to be a woman 
than a soldier in armed conflict. However, I believe there is a more fruitful way 
of  thinking about all of  this. This requires (on a conceptual level) that we dissect 
the relationship between gender and war/armed conflict.
Here is the conundrum as I see it: the notion that it is more dangerous to be 
a woman than a soldier in war/armed conflict comes from the woman-as-nation 
thesis. To reiterate, within this line of thinking, females and their reproductive bod-
ies are regarded as the vessels through which national, racial, ethnic and religious 
identities are reproduced. They are viewed as both symbolically and corporeally 
mothers of the nation. This equation is discursively constructed. To assist us in 
unpacking this, we need to return to our discussion of semiotics and the cultural 
meaning of signs (see Chapter 5). As noted earlier, signs comprise the signifier, the 
physical form. They also contain the signified, the concept (Huntington, 2013). My 
suggestion is this: the female body (the sign), through its biological reproductive 
function (the signifier) acts as a reproducer of the nation to which she belongs. This 
leads to the woman-as-nation thesis (the signified). For me then, the ‘danger’ lies 
in the semiotics of language; in gender essentialism – and by extension, the hier-
archical gender binary system (more on this below). For example, if  we consider 
gendered justificatory narratives (discussed in Chapters 3 and 5 in relation to the 
invasion and occupation of Iraq), these are based upon ontological constructions 
of women as weak, fragile beings who are in need of protection. The corollary 
of this is that men are strong and are required to fight on behalf of these ‘beauti-
ful souls’ (see Elshtain, 1982; Lobasz, 2008; Sjoberg, 2007; Sjoberg & Peet, 2011). 
However, as we saw in Iraq, intervention and occupation does little to diminish 
GBV against women and girls. In fact, not only does it exacerbate existing types of 
GBV, it can lead to new types of violence, for example structural GBV(s).
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Two further problems arise from this reductive framing of women and men 
vis-à-vis war/armed conflict: (1) the securitisation agenda which focuses on 
women and girls at the expense of men and boys and (2) the persistent view of 
female perpetrators as aberrant. Moving forward my proposal is that we take on 
board the work of Krylova (2016, p. 309) who seeks to understand gender outside 
normative and binary-bound contexts.
In her article, Gender Binary and the Limits of Poststructuralist Method, Kry-
lova (2016, p. 309) proposes that we ‘…broaden our theoretical framework…to 
revisit the concept of dichotomy and differentiate it from binary connotations of 
difference’. Before we get to this distinction, we will begin with her interpretation 
of the concept of ‘gender binary’. For Krylova (2016, p. 307), this is a:
[C]oncept [that] carries a rich repertoire of connotations, which 
informs and influences the gender category: those of radical dis-
tinction, opposition, mutually exclusive and exhaustive differen-
tiation, hierarchy, domination, oppression – in all their myriad 
historical forms.
Based on her research into female combatants during the Soviet era, specifi-
cally the memoir of Zoia Medvedeva, Krylova (2016) encourages us to move 
beyond the concept of gender binary towards the idea of a ‘nonbinary dichot-
omy’. Let us explore this in more detail. Zoia was the commander of a male 
machine-gun platoon in 1941 in Soviet Russia (Krylova, 2016, p. 317). As a Soviet 
female soldier her story is not unique. Soviet women volunteered as combatants 
during the Second World War (Krylova, 2016). They also, following authorisa-
tion by Stalin, established an all-female team of night bombers. Referred to as 
‘The night Witches’,1 this ‘588th Night Bomber Regiment…became one of the 
most remarkable fighting forces of World War II’. Referring specifically to the 
story of Zoia, while gender forms a part of this landscape, Krylova (2016, p. 317) 
argues that ‘it did not operate as an omnipresent binary enterprise’. Furthermore, 
Zoia’s accounts do not describe female soldiers as feeling as though they were 
entering into ‘a male space’ (Krylova, 2016).
Here, it is worth quoting Krylova (2016, pp. 317–318) at length:
[…] ‘women-soldiers’…are not described by Zoia as a self-evi-
dent contradiction assembled out of binary parts…that is, as 
‘masculine women’, enacting or mimicking male behaviour. Far 
from it, the social identity of a ‘women-soldier’ constitutes what 
the Soviet society referred to as a ‘different concept of a woman’ 
1The Night Witches often flew their planes at night. As they approached their targets, 
they would idle their planes before releasing their bombs. This tactic meant that their 
planes made whooshing noises as they glided by. It is reported that, for their German 
victims, this noise was reminiscent of a witch’s broomstick, hence the name ‘Night 
Witches’ (see Garber, 2013; Grundhauser, 2015).
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whose feminine qualities were not seen as necessarily compromised.  
Rather, they were informed with new connotations of the femi-
nine. For example…I read the presence of red poppies at her gun 
site (marking one’s combat space with flowers was a common 
preoccupation among women-soldiers) not as an importation 
of conventional femininity into the male trenches but as women 
combatants’ attempt to change the very meaning of the feminine, 
to detach femininity from its binary associations with weakness 
and debilitating frivolity and to visually change the gender map 
of combat spaces.
Based on this, Krylova believes that the term dichotomy – which does not 
assign negative or positive values to its parts – can assist us in moving beyond 
binary understandings of gender. Within this framework, we explore how dif-
ferences between the genders are produced, but we also acknowledge that ‘…not 
all dichotomies must be necessarily binary’ (Krylova, 2016, p. 320 emphasis in the 
original). In other words, dichotomies, unlike binaries, do not assign a positive 
or negative value to males/masculinity/ies and females/femininity/ies respectively. 
Rather, they acknowledge differences, but not in a hierarchical sense. While Kry-
lova’s proposal is drawn from a specific historical time period, the conceptual 
foundations of her theoretical framework need not be time or context bound. 
This leads me to ask: how might her ‘nonbinary dichotomy’ assist us in moving 
away from gender essentialism and the assumption that it is more dangerous to be 
a woman than a soldier in war/armed conflict?
First, it is important to note that I believe that the dismantling of gender 
essentialism – the assumption that certain behaviours are inherently male/female – 
needs to work in conjunction with nonbinary dichotomies. So, while we can 
acknowledge that there are differences in the experiences of males and females, 
we must regard these as socially constructed normative ideas about gender and 
gender roles. These gendered expectations are internalised and performed by 
males and females who subscribed to these conventional ideals. This is stage one. 
Stage two involves applying the nonbinary dichotomy which removes the positive 
and negative connotations that map onto the categories male/female respectively.
Now that I have clarified this two-stage approach let us continue with our 
application of the nonbinary dichotomy. Here, I will draw out the various ele-
ments included in Krylova’s definition of the ‘gender binary’ cited above.
‘Hierarchy, Domination, Oppression’
In the Introduction, I talked about the bacha posh, the Afghan girls who dress like 
boys because being female is considered a ‘humiliation’ or a ‘failure’ in Afghan 
culture. Conversely, being male is considered a ‘triumph’ (Nordberg, 2014, 
p. 39 as cited in Banwell, 2015a, pp. 587–588). However, the benefits and privi-
leges associated with being male are short-lived: the bacha posh cannot present 
as male beyond puberty as they will be required to marry in order to fulfil their 
childbearing responsibilities. Similarly, within the conflict zone in Syria, young 
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girls who enter into marriage at a young age are forced to abandon their educa-
tion so they can begin their childbearing and childrearing responsibilities. While 
this is used as a coping mechanism by fathers to alleviate poverty and secure their 
daughters’ financial future, it also speaks to patriarchal beliefs about the role of 
females within the domestic/private sphere. This is a role where access to educa-
tion is secondary. Here, we see how traditional gender binaries – which are hierar-
chical – associate males/masculinity/ies with freedom, privilege and power and 
females/femininity/ies with powerlessness, a lack of freedom and a lack of deci-
sion-making power. In cases of early and forced marriage, to paraphrase Krylova 
(2016), we need to detach conventional femininity from its binary associations 
with domesticity to ensure that young girls are not denied access to education, but 
also not placed at an increased risk of sexual violence and exploitation from their 
much older husbands. This will reduce the dangers they face.
‘Connotations Which Informs and Influences the Gender Category’
As reproducers of the nation females are targeted during war/armed conflict. 
Here, the connotations associated with the maternal body – as symbolic and 
corporeal mothers of the nation – means that women, as a gender category, are 
attacked. In this example, we need to revise the meaning of the feminine and 
detach it from its essentialist association with biological motherhood. Again, this 
will reduce the dangers women face during war/armed conflict.
‘Radical Distinction, Opposition’
As noted at the outset, differentiated gender roles are performed and reproduced 
within the military institution. As we saw in the DRC, militarised masculinity expects 
men and boys to be tough and aggressive. Furthermore, they are required to perform 
a violent heterosexual hegemonic masculinity. In opposition, idealised militarised 
femininity requires females to engage in sanitised fighting (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007).
Within my framing of ‘war-on-terror femininity’, as outlined in detail in Chap-
ter 5, the female soldier is violent and aggressive. She can engage in cruelty and 
torture. And while I based this alternative militarised femininity on the war on 
terror, its subversion of binary associations of femininity with weakness, frailty 
and vulnerability can be applied more universally. This means acknowledging that 
females, like males, can and are violent and aggressive, thus challenging the equa-
tion of femaleness (and conventional femininity) with passivity and non-violence.
Mutually Exclusive and Exhaustive Differentiation
Within the gender hierarchy, femininities are always positioned below masculini-
ties. To paraphrase Connell and Messerchmidt (2005), masculinity is defined in 
contradistinction to femininity. Put another way, the feminine is always inferior to 
the masculine. However, my ‘war-on-terror femininity’ and the images I reviewed 
in Chapter 5, challenge this. Now I want us to consider the implications of the 
gender hierarchy for male victimisation.
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As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the three women involved in the sexualised 
violence and torture at Abu Ghraib were used to feminise and emasculate the 
enemy. Rape and reproductive (genocidal) violence against males, disempow-
ers men on an individual level, but it can also emasculate the group to which 
he belongs, thereby sending a message of symbolic elimination/destruction to 
the group as a whole (Ferrales, Brehm, & McElrath, 2016; Sivakumaran, 2007, 
p.274). Going back to Krylova’s reading of Zoia’s memoir, if  we detach feminin-
ity from this binary association with weakness and inferiority, the power of rape 
and reproductive violence to emasculate and feminise the enemy is diminished.
In all of these examples, ‘[changing] the very meaning of the feminine’ 
(Krylova, 2016, p. 318) – that is, applying the nonbinary dichotomy – assists us 
in challenging reductive understandings of the roles and experiences of males 
and females during war/armed conflict. Critics might argue that this is a purely 
academic exercise, that tackling this from a conceptual standpoint will do little 
to address the lived experiences of those affected by the violence(s) of war/armed 
conflict. And yet, as we have seen throughout this book, gender essentialism and 
binary constructions are pervasive and have informed (national and interna-
tional) discourses (i.e. the securitisation agenda), cultural practices, foreign policy 
agendas (justifications for invading Iraq) and the tactics of war/armed conflict 
(woman-as-nation, man-as-protector). Ultimately, these discursive constructions 
have served to reinforce the notion that it is more dangerous to be a woman than 
a soldier in war/armed conflict. That said, I will now consider some of the practi-
cal steps we need to take to address the GBV(s) of war/armed conflict. These are 
demarcated along empirical, policy, legal, institutional and cultural lines.
Research (Empirical)
As I noted earlier, despite an increase in research on the links between climate 
change, and violent conflict, no direct causal relationship can be found (De Juan, 
2015; Detges, 2017; Schilling, Saulich, & Engwicht, 2018; Von Uexkull, 2014; 
Work, 2018). Rather, environmental changes, leading to extreme weather events 
intersect with pre-existing grievances that can lead to conflict (Von Uexkull, 2014; 
see also Detges, 2017; Schilling et al., 2018). Drawing on the conflicts in Syria 
and Darfur, I examined gender, climate variability and conflict. Additional robust 
qualitative and quantitative data are needed to measure the relationship between 
conflict, extreme weather events (caused by climate variability) and interpersonal 
and structural GBV(s) that occur as a result.
Writing in 2016, Ferrales et al. (2016, pp. 567–568) argued that ‘research on 
gender-based violence against men is in its infancy and has faced several limita-
tions, including a disproportionate focus on the former Yugoslavia’. Indeed, to my 
knowledge, since then there have only been a handful of articles published that 
address this subject (these are reviewed in Chapter 6). In fact, while researching my 
chapter on men and boys, I was struck by the paucity of scholarly articles on the 
topic of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) against men and boys, particu-
larly when compared with the copious amounts of material about female victims/
survivors. SGBV against men and boys, has been listed in over 25 conflicts over 
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the past 30 years, yet this is not reflected in the amount of literature we have on 
this subject. To redress this, research with male survivors/victims is needed. This 
empirical work must address the causes, the nature and the range of violence(s) 
to which men and boys are subjected to. As with females, this work must extend 
beyond rape and sexual violence. For example, Aijazi and Baines (2017, p. 464) 
conducted research with demobilised men from the Lord’s Resistance Army in 
Uganda relating to their experiences of forced marriage. As they note: ‘[t]he major-
ity of scholarship on forced marriage focuses on women’s experiences of harm’.
Securitisation (Policy)
As noted previously, the securitisation agenda identifies women and girls as those 
most at risk of rape and sexual violence. This message is reproduced in numerous 
policy documents, most notably in a number of UN Security Council Resolu-
tions (UNSCRs). Up until 2013, before UNSCR 2106 was passed, men and boys 
had not been included within these policy documents. Going forward, we need 
to ensure that the language of these documents (and others that address CRSV) 
includes the experiences of men and boys (see, for example, the 2019 annual 
report by the UN Secretary General on CRSV).
National and International Laws
The ICC and Forced Pregnancy
To reiterate, the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) defines forced 
pregnancy as: ‘the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, 
with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying 
out other grave violations of international law’ (Rome Statue of the Criminal 
Court, 2011, p. 4). Taking a different position, The Holy See suggests that the 
Statute need only ‘criminalize the act of forcibly making a woman pregnant, but 
not the subsequent conduct of forcibly keeping her pregnant’ (Grey, 2017, p. 920, 
emphasis in the original). They proposed the term forcible impregnation rather 
than forced pregnancy. However, forcible impregnation was not considered as 
an acceptable replacement for forced pregnancy. This is because the former only 
refers to forcibly making a woman pregnant, whilst the latter involves keeping 
the woman pregnant. Thus, this definition ‘excludes situations where the victim 
becomes pregnant by force, but is not subsequently confined’ (Grey, 2017, p. 921).
In line with Grey’s (2017) notion of reproductive violence, I believe that forci-
ble impregnation should be listed as a crime by the ICC; one that is distinct from 
forced pregnancy as an act of genocide. This would recognise the experiences 
of women who have been forcibly impregnated, denied access to a safe abortion 
and then forced to continue with an unwanted pregnancy (as discussed in rela-
tion to Syria). Removing the requirement that women be confined would also 
mean that the experiences of women and girls, such as those who were raped and 
impregnated during the 1971 Liberation War, would be recognised and perpetra-
tors criminalised under international law.
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Rape, Honour Killings and Trafficking Laws in the DRC,  
Iraq and Beyond
States that are party to international laws prohibiting rape and CRSV should 
incorporate these into their national laws (as argued with reference to the DRC). 
Corruption within the local Criminal Justice System as well as the high fees asso-
ciated with prosecution (including travel costs) need to be addressed. If  we can 
improve the system itself, including how evidence is gathered, this may incentivise 
victims to come forward and report their experiences. As noted in previous chap-
ters, one of the main reasons why survivors (both male and female) remain silent 
is due to fear of being stigmatised by their family and/or community. As we saw 
in Iraq, in some cases this led to honour killings in order to remove shame and 
restore family honour.
While removing the internalised shame victims/survivors may feel is arguably 
an impossible task, this should not deter us from tackling the shortcomings of the 
judicial process from a practical and logistical standpoint. Nor should we aban-
don efforts to criminalise and/or enforce existing laws relating to honour killings. 
Relatedly, anti-trafficking laws need to be enforced and perpetrators prosecuted. 
Women and girls who have been trafficked for sexual purposes are victims and 
should not be criminalised, as was the case in Iraq.
In terms of men and boys, laws that criminalise homosexuality need to be 
revoked, thereby making it easier for male victims to come forward. Acts of 
reproductive violence in the form of genital harm need to be fully acknowledged 
and not categorised as lesser crimes when dealt with by the ICC or other courts 
(Grey & Shepherd, 2012).
The Military (Institutional)
As noted with reference to the DRC, the performance of heterosexual hegemonic 
masculinity is reinforced within the military. This is an institution that normalises 
rape and sexual violence. It allows individual men to subvert their marginalised 
position within the hierarchy of the military and society more generally. Research 
by Trenholm, Olsson, Blomqvst, & Ahlberg (2013, p. 212) with 12 child soldiers 
from a range of rebel and official State military groups in the DRC, revealed 
that ‘starvation, the use of mind-altering substances, forced marches and sleep 
deprivation’ were among the measures used to ensure compliance from these 
child soldiers. This included engaging in gang rape. Most of the boys had either 
been abducted or forced into the military, with some joining to alleviate lives of 
abject poverty. The boys recount atmospheres of subjugation within the military, 
designed to maintain their obedience and loyalty to authority. This was often 
achieved through violence, including being beaten with sticks. Their involve-
ment in acts of sexual violence signified their commitment and conformity to the 
aggressive heterosexual code of the military. As I argued earlier, this culture of 
militarised heterosexual masculinity, that condones violence against women and 
girls, needs to be challenged. However, in cases of forced recruitment, where male 
child soldiers are forced to rape, the ICC (and international law more generally) 
needs to recognise and prosecute commanders who order these acts of violence.
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Despite the involvement of female soldiers in sexualised violence and torture 
at Abu Ghraib, female violence is not embedded within the institutional code of 
the military. This was underscored by the need for my recuperative narrative in 
the form of war-on-terror femininity.
Pre-existing Gender Inequalities and Discrimination 
(Cultural)
As I argued in the Introduction, pre-existing gender discrimination and gendered 
inequalities are reproduced and exacerbated during war/armed conflict. These 
need to be tackled prior to, during and in the aftermath of war/armed conflict. 
Laws, programmes and policies that promote equality between males and females 
need to be upheld and/or developed. Restrictions on women’s freedom of move-
ment need to be removed. Denying females access to reproductive healthcare and/
or education should be regarded and punished as acts of structural violence.
So, to finish where we began: is it more dangerous to be a woman than a soldier 
in armed conflict?
In the six chapters of this book my qualitative analysis of the unique lived 
experiences of men, women, boys and girls eschews misguided tendencies to pur-
sue quantitative, comparative analyses to prove the disproportionality thesis. The 
experiences of victims, survivors and perpetrators (boys, men, women and girls) 
were unpacked through a gendered lens. By unpacking  ontological constructions 
of females as weak, passive and in need of protection and, conversely, of males 
as always and already actors and perpetrators, I have offered a counter narra-
tive to the reductive gender essentialism inherent in many accounts of war/armed 
conflict. This alternative story about gender and the violence(s) of war/armed 
acknowledges that males and females experience such violence in unique and gen-
dered ways; but does not seek to quantify the material reality of those affected by 
war/armed conflict. Non-essentialist and nonbinary dichotomous depictions of 
the categories male and female are key to fully understanding those who victimise 
and those who are victimised during war/armed conflict.
If  the female body, and its biological reproductive function, continues to stand 
in for the nation, and if  men and boys continue (and indeed are expected) to act 
as fighters and protectors, gendered notions of who ‘is dangerous’ and who is ‘in 
danger’ during war/armed conflict will remain unchallenged.
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